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It is widely believed that "petrostates," or countries whose economies rely heavily on oil 
exports, are at greater risk from external aggression. This popular view has made frequent 
recourse to the neo-Malthusian intuition that, in a world of material scarcity, resource 
predation will be rampant. Recent empirical research, however, has shown that 
petrostates are neither more common targets of military attack nor particularly peaceful 
members of the international community. In fact, available statistical analyses 
overwhelmingly suggest that, in terms of conflict initiation, these states are mostly on the 
offensive in world politics—a phenomenon often referred to as "petroagression." Despite 
this finding, little is known about what accounts for variation in petrostate belligerence. 
Not all petrostates are international troublemakers, and their propensity to threaten or use 
 
 
military force has varied both across geography and over time. This dissertation attempts 
to explain this within-group variation, using two conceptual experiments. The first heeds 
to the internal organization of petrostates, examining how differences in their regime 
institutions could mediate (strengthen or weaken) the conflict-inducing effects of oil 
income. It is argued that, because of certain compositional and identity characteristics of 
their ruling coalitions, petrostates with personalist institutions would be more potent 
conflict initiators than comparable oil exporters of nonpersonalist institutional makeup. 
The second conceptual experiment abstracts from petrostates' internal attributes, 
exploring potential sources of variation in their external environments. Adopting a 
system–subsystem perspective, this analysis proposes that, all else equal, exogenous 
structural variables—in particular, superpower penetration in regional subsystems 
containing petrostates—could account for differences (spatial and temporal) in those 
states' conflict behavior. Although the dissertation's main thrust is theoretical, empirical 
evidence providing preliminary support for these variational propositions is also offered. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Preliminaries 
A little over a century ago, it became clear that petroleum would play a major role in 
international security affairs for years to come. Shortly before the outbreak of World War 
I, in 1912, Great Britain completed one of the most sweeping transformations of its Royal 
Navy, reequipping all of its vessels, previously reliant on coal, with oil-powered 
engines.1 The decision, greatly influenced by Winston Churchill—then First Lord of the 
Admiralty—was controversial and required a swift action. A state without known 
indigenous oil reserves at the time, Britain had to secure reliable petroleum supplies, and 
it did so by strengthening its foothold in Persia and ensuring a 51-percent British stake in 
the Anglo–Persian Oil Company. Germany, the main reason for the British switch to oil, 
engaged in similar activities, modernizing its budding blue-water navy and seeking 
access to Middle East oil through large-scale rail projects in the heart of the Ottoman 
Empire.2 
Over the next century, great power strategic decisions were tightly intertwined with 
petroleum, whose importance for economic and military power, as well as a state's ability 
to project force, became increasingly apparent. In December 1941, Imperial Japan, 
                                                 
1 Erik Solem and Antony Scanlon, "Oil and natural gas as factors in strategic policy and action: a long-term 
view," in Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and 
Action, ed. Arthur Westing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
2 F. William Engdahl, "Oil and the origins of the 'War to make the world safe for democracy'," June 22, 
2007, 
http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/History/Oil_and_the_Origins_of_World_W/oil_and_the_origins_of_
world_w.HTM#_edn18. 
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starved by a punishing oil embargo imposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 
of that year, invaded and occupied the Dutch East Indies in an effort to improve its 
fortunes and ability to wage war. In January 1980, partly in response to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan during the previous year, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed his 
famous Carter Doctrine, publically pledging the growing U.S. military might—and the 
country's international credibility—to the defense of the oil-rich Persian Gulf,3 a former 
"British lake" now turned American. And most recently, oil has found its way into 
discussions of the motives behind the two U.S. interventions against Iraq (1990 and 
2003), a state believed to have the second-largest oil deposits in the world, prompting 
leading intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky to exclaim, "It's the oil, stupid!"4 
Oil's importance for military affairs, its implications for a state's standing in the 
international hierarchy of power, and the behavior of great powers over the last century 
all allude to some kind of relationship between petroleum and interstate conflict. Not 
least because of anecdotal examples such as those put forth above, many foreign affairs 
commentators—including political scientists—have seen this relationship as tied to the 
notion of resource capture, or the intuition that oil, and its physical control, could be a 
hefty price for aggressive states motivated by either greed or need. This so-called "blood-
oil" thesis has a long pedigree and owes much of its appeal to the well-documented 
scramble for resources that dominated the pre-oil era of 19th-century colonial expansion. 
Importantly, at the core of this thesis lies a testable proposition, namely, that oil-rich 
                                                 
3 William B. Quandt, "America and the Middle East," in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International 
Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, ed. L. Carl Brown (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 
68. 
4 Noam Chomsky, "It's the Oil, stupid!" Khaleej Times, July 8, 2008. 
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states, or "petrostates,"5 are at higher risk of falling victim to the aggressive whims of 
external powers. In the somber words of one of the thesis' chief proponents, "[oil] surplus 
states, lacking strong armies or powerful friends, remain vulnerable to invasion by 
powerful energy-importing states."6 
The simplicity of this prediction is not to come to its detriment; what seems more 
damaging for the blood-oil thesis, however, is the budging, recently presented evidence 
that its key proposition does not hold in any systematic fashion. Statistical analyses of 
large-n, cross-national data have offered either weak or no support for the claim that 
petrostates are more frequent targets of external aggression, either monadically or 
dyadically, than are nonpetrostates.7 To make things even more intriguing, another 
consistent finding of this research—a finding that is the focal point of this dissertation—
has confirmed the presence of what has been termed "petroagression," or the observed 
elevated external belligerence of petroleum-abundant states. In fact, as reported in one 
study using the Correlates of War (COW) Project database, petrostates are 94 percent 
more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) than are nonpetrostates, a 
statistically significant difference.8 
                                                 
5 In this dissertation, the term "petrostate" refers to a state whose dollar value of oil exports represents 10 
percent or more of gross domestic product for at least 80 percent of the years in the study period (1971–
2001). For further information on methodology and measurement, as well as a list of petrostates, see 
chapter 4. Occasionally, the term is used more loosely, mainly to illustrate key theoretical points.  
6 Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2008), 17. 
7 For monadic results, see Georg Strüver and Tim Wegenast, "Ex oleo bellare? The Impact of Oil on the 
Outbreak of Militarized Interstate Disputes," GIGA Working Paper 162 (German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies, 2011); for dyadic, see Indra de Soysa, Erik Gartzke, and Tove Lie, "Blood, Oil, and Strategy: 
On the Relationship Between Petroleum and Interstate Disputes," 2009 (unpublished manuscript). 
8 Jeff Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict," International 
Organization 64, no. 4 (2010): 664. 
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1.2 Purpose, theoretical approach, and contribution 
One need not be versed in statistical analysis to see why the moniker petroagression 
could be well deserved. The external behaviors of some major oil exporters—Iraq and 
Libya being two prime examples—have been notoriously aggressive, producing some of 
the most destructive and lengthy conflicts in the post-World War II period. The Iran–Iraq 
War (1980–88), for instance, was the most protracted conflict of the 20th century—more 
so than the two world wars—and caused well over half a million deaths and more than a 
trillion dollars in financial costs on both sides.9 In the case of Libya, massive arms 
purchases fueled by skyrocketing oil revenues in the 1970s have turned the country into 
the "world's largest military parking lot"10 and offered it an offensive option used 
consistently against neighbors and other regional actors. 
The finding of petroagression notwithstanding, efforts to explain it or, not less important, 
to account for variations within it have been scarce. For the most part, existing studies 
have focused on empirical confirmation of petroagression along the petrostate–
nonpetrostate divide, employing various measures of oil availability and conflict and 
paying less attention to developing refined theoretical arguments. While this approach is 
valuable in that it has strengthened confidence in the purported empirical relationship, it 
has opened itself to charges of what John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have called 
"simplistic hypothesis testing," or the oft-seen scholarly preoccupation with "discovering 
                                                 
9 Fatality counts vary considerably by data source. The Battle Deaths Dataset compiled by the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/) estimates them at over 
600,000; the COW Project database (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/), at more than twice that. For the 
war's financial toll, see Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 2. 
10 Anthony H. Cordesman, A tragedy of arms: military and security developments in the Maghreb 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 230. 
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well-verified empirical regularities" at the expense of theory building.11 Induction also 
seems to have played at least some role in explanation, which is not uncommon in a line 
of research that is still in its infancy. 
In light of these limitations, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to spell out and test 
theoretical propositions about variations in the conflict behavior of petrostates. While oil-
abundant countries, as a group, may have been a bigger spoiler of international peace and 
stability, they have not been uniformly aggressive, either across space or over time. In the 
three decades from 1971 to 2001, for example, Iraq initiated over 6 times more MIDs 
than Venezuela and about 30 times more than oil-rich Algeria, and differences of similar 
magnitudes also transpire over successive decades within a single case.12 If oil, a 
potential enhancer of state offensive capabilities, produces certain patterns of aggressive 
behavior, then, it appears that it does so alongside, and perhaps in interaction with, other 
explanatory factors, whose identification is yet to be made. 
In carrying out this task, the dissertation looks both inside and outside the state. That the 
nature of domestic political institutions could shape a state's external behavior, including 
that associated with conflict, is not a novel idea. Still, as of now, no study has made a 
serious attempt to explore, either theoretically or empirically, how regime type—defined 
here as the "rules that identify the group from which leaders can come and who 
influences leadership choice and policy"13—could affect the conflict propensity of 
                                                 
11 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is 
bad for International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–457, 
427. 
12 Estimates are based on COW MID data. 
13 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A 
New Data Set," Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 313–331, 314. 
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petrostates. The argument advanced in the present work is that oil abundance and regime 
institutions—in particular those associated with personalist regimes—interact in ways 
which may explain, at least in part, petrostate belligerence and behavioral variations. 
Such interactions, it is argued, could determine how petroleum rents are absorbed 
domestically, the discretionary resources available to governments, the prospect for arms 
buildup, and the strength of decisional constraints imposed on leaders' foreign policy 
choices. Shifts in these factors could, in turn, increase or lower the prospect of 
petroagression. 
The regime typology used to investigate the domestic explanatory channel draws 
primarily on the work of Barbara Geddes et al.14 and distinguishes between personalist, 
single-party, military, monarchic, and democratic regimes. This five-pronged typology is 
distinct from commonly used measures of democracy, such as Polity scores, which 
capture institutional characteristics (e.g., competitiveness of elections) that do not 
identify the group which selects leaders or determines policy. In the words of Geddes, 
"different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from 
democracy."15 This insight is essential in the case of petrostates, many of which exhibit 
nondemocratic governance.16 Attention to institutional differences among these states is, 
therefore, of obvious, but so far poorly recognized, importance for any theoretical or 
empirical investigation of petroagression. 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 318. 
15 Geddes, "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" Annual Review of Political 
Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115–144, 121. 
16 Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 1. 
7 
 
An analysis focused solely on domestic factors, however, would be limited: such factors 
could inform an understanding of a petrostate government's incentives and internal 
capacity to choose a certain foreign policy path, but they reveal little about the external 
constraints that determine how easy or difficult it is to embark on that path. Previous 
work on petroagression has primarily looked at internal conditions—domestic oil 
availability, measured in various ways, being the central one—to infer outward behavior. 
What remains to be done, then, is to cross analytical levels and examine how petrostate 
choices are shaped by exogenous conditions and actors. Even leading liberal scholars 
convinced of the explanatory primacy of domestic politics have conceded that such a 
perspective could illuminate foreign policy analysis, with Andrew Moravcsik embracing 
the view that "state behavior should be analyzed as a two-stage process of constrained 
social choice," where domestic preferences derived from liberal theory and exogenous 
factors derived from neorealist theory are considered on equal terms.17 
This theoretical edict brings forth the second analytical dimension pursued here: a 
conceptual experiment in which petrostate regime-type attributes are kept constant and 
external environments are allowed to vary. Oil-rich states are strategic actors as any other 
states, and they consider external conditions—both in terms of opportunities and in terms 
of constraints—in choosing one or another course of action. These conditions can be 
examined within a system–subsystem framework, whereby attention is paid to the 
structural characteristics (the distribution of capabilities, or polarity) of the global 
international system and its impact on the regional subsystems within which petrostates 
exist and interact. This impact, which can vary both across space and over time, can be 
                                                 
17 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553, 544. 
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conceptualized as an intrusion in, or penetration of, those subsystems by the global 
system’s most powerful members, superpowers (the system’s “poles”). Different types of 
penetration (types determined by the number of penetrating superpowers) can alter 
regional power relations, thus affecting the structural bounds imposed on petrostates 
foreign policy choices. During the era of bipolarity, for example, the two superpowers 
penetrated various regions in the periphery, often through surrogates, some of which oil 
rich, in order to expand their influence.18 This penetration varied by region, compelling 
weaker states, including petrostates,19 to accordingly readjust their foreign policy 
choices. 
This kind of analysis naturally calls for attention to superpower strategic and economic 
interests, which, as alluded earlier, are tied to resource considerations and resource 
geography. It is reasonable to expect that, because of their importance as oil exporters, 
petrostates will enjoy greater protection from their most powerful peers, perhaps 
becoming more risk acceptant as a result. However, it is also reasonable to expect that, 
for the same reason, petrostates will be discouraged from foreign policy adventurism, 
which could disrupt oil markets and prices. The proposed system–subsystem framework 
allows for the identification of regional conditions under which such constraints will be 
relaxed. The focus on superpower subsystem penetration does not mean that the initiative 
is out of the hands of petrostates. Depending on the type of penetration, these actors 
could take advantage of their regional environments by shifting their external alignments 
in the advancement of aggressive foreign policy objectives. 
                                                 
18 Alan R. Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 51. 
19 Most petrostates are lesser powers. For a detailed list, see Colgan, “Oil and Revolutionary Governments," 
691–692. 
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While the dissertation's main contribution is to the study of petroagression, its 
implications intersect with broader environmental security debates and extend beyond 
academia. Most research concerned with the conflict-inducing effects of oil, and natural 
resources more generally, has focused on civil war onset and duration. Besides 
developing strong theoretical arguments, this investigative niche has been heavy on 
empirics, testing—both qualitatively and quantitatively—various propositions about the 
oil–intrastate conflict linkage.20 Surprising as it might be, academic work on the nexus 
between oil and interstate conflict has been comparatively scarce. As observed by Vally 
Koubi et al., "Only a few large-N studies examine the role resource scarcity or abundance 
may play in interstate conflicts and existing work of this nature concentrates on water 
resources."21 Hence, the dissertation targets and enhances a largely neglected area of 
research, focusing on that area's newest and most wanting aspect, petroagression, and 
offering both theory and preliminary evidence in support of its claims. By not dispensing 
with system-level analysis, it also reveals that abundance and scarcity theories of 
resource conflict are not incompatible. They can be reconciled in a broader framework, in 
which the security importance of oil is seen both in its cornucopian dimension (as 
domestic abundance) and in its scarcity dimension (as global scarcity). 
                                                 
20 For representative work in this area, see Paivi Lujala, "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and 
Rebel Access to Natural Resources," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 (2010): 15–28; Michael Ross, "A 
Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 265–300; 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 2 
(2004): 563–595; and James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90. 
21 Vally Koubi, Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Bohmelt, and Thomas Bernauer, "Do natural resources matter for 
interstate and intrastate armed conflict?” Journal of Peace Research (2013): 1–13, 13. 
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In addition, the present work pays heed to the methodological advice to tackle "problems 
facing the real world."22 Studying petroagression is not an abstract or ahistorical 
endeavor; it addresses a tangible problem that has been a persistent feature of 
international security. Within this context, the dissertation's theoretical insights and 
empirical findings could inform policy. If, as argued here, certain characteristics of 
domestic politics make some petrostates more belligerent than others, then conflict 
prevention efforts should focus on removing the conditions that give rise to such 
characteristics. Likewise, if particular external conditions or superpower behaviors (e.g., 
arming or otherwise supporting revisionist oil-rich countries) contribute to petrostate 
aggression, identifying those conditions and behaviors can be used in both conflict 
prediction and conflict prevention. 
1.3 Roadmap 
The dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 presents a critical review of the 
literature on oil and international conflict and identifies gaps in the ability of existing 
work on petroagression to capture variations in petrostate conflict behavior. Chapter 3 
builds upon this analysis and the conceptual framework sketched above, laying out the 
theoretical argument and arriving at testable propositions for each analytical dimension 
(i.e., domestic and systemic). Although the discussion contains a fair amount of deductive 
theorizing, it is not ahistorical and uses empirical examples and previous research to 
illustrate key points. Chapter 4 contains the quantitative part of the analysis, testing both 
                                                 
22 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997), 
97. Gary King et al. echo the same methodological sentiment, suggesting that research topics should be 
"consequential for political, social, or economic life"; see Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 15. 
11 
 
dimensions of the theory. The analysis adopts a monadic research design, detailed early 
in the chapter, and uses a dataset on petrostates for the 1971–2001 period. Data on MID 
counts, the dependent variable in all regression models, are obtained from the COW 
Project database, whereas information on other variables, such as oil exports, regime 
type, and superpower regional penetration is pulled from various sources. 
The dissertation then proceeds with the qualitative part of the empirical analysis. Chapter 
5 presents a detailed case study—Libya from 1969 to 2005—examining the effects of 
changing external structural conditions (superpower regional penetration) on variations in 
petrostate conflict behavior over time. The focus is primarily on testing aspects of the 
theory's system-level dimension, which entails superpower–petrostate interactions (e.g., 
foreign policy alignment, diplomatic signaling) that are less susceptible to quantitative 
measurement and are best revealed in a process-tracing, historical method of analysis. 
Special attention is paid to the impact of the global and regional structural transformation 
that took place in the late 1980s. The case selection is made such that key domestic-level 
characteristics, notably petrostate status and regime type, do not change over time. 
Finally, chapter 6 wraps up the discussion by summarizing the study's key arguments and 
results. Given that the dissertation breaks ground into a relatively new field of research, 
areas for future work are also identified.  
12 
 
 
2 The conflict-inducing effects of oil: what we know and do not know 
2.1 Oil and interstate conflict: an assessment of the literature 
Surprisingly little academic effort has been expended on investigating the relationship 
between oil and interstate conflict.23 This neglect extends even to realism, the paradigm 
that should have said most on the subject given oil's apparent importance for state 
economic and military power. Precursors of realism, such as naturalist and geopolitical 
theories, did examine how "variations in the physical environment shape political 
outcomes,"24 but the theme received almost no attention in later writings with similar 
ontological roots. This omission is clearly noticeable in Hans Morgenthau's classical 
realism, a pillar of post-World War II international relations theory, and his treatment of 
power and imperialism. For Morgenthau, political power was a "psychological relation 
between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised,"25 a definition with 
intersubjective and nonmaterialistic overtones that has left limited room for resource 
considerations. Morgenthau also did not hesitate to underplay the economic rationale for 
imperialism. After granting some causal importance to gold and oil as motives for 
aggression in the Boer War of 1899–1902 and the Chaco War of 1932–35, he concluded 
that "during the entire period of mature capitalism, no war…was waged by major powers 
                                                 
23 Colgan, "Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War," International Security 38, no. 2 (2013): 147–180, 
147. 
24 Daniel Deudney, "Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era," in 
Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, eds. Daniel Deudney and 
Richard Mathew (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 29–30. 
25 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, brief edition, revised by 
Kenneth Thompson (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), 30. 
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exclusively or even predominantly for economic objectives"; rather, imperialism was 
driven by "the existence of weak states and empty spaces."26 
Although later realist theorists—in particular those promoting the offensive and defensive 
variants of structural realism27—have rejected Morgenthau's notion of "power as 
control"28 and elevated the importance of material capabilities in the study of 
international politics, they have also been mostly mum on the role of oil or other natural 
resources in security affairs. A passing mention of petroleum as a valuable price for great 
power conquest does appear in the work of Mearsheimer, but the idea receives no further 
theoretical or empirical treatment.29 Petroleum’s potential role in the buildup of offensive 
capabilities—and, hence, in outward aggression—has also remained largely 
unrecognized.30 For the most part, what we know about the security implications of oil 
has come from sociology, ecology, and the "fringes" of political science, in particular 
from the relatively recent environmental security program, which has tied resources and 
environmental factors to an expanded notion of national security.31 But even in that 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 61, 67. 
27 See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001); and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979). 
28 The concept of "power as control" is commonly associated with the work of Robert Dahl ("The Concept 
of Power," Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 202–203) and dismissed by the neorealist school. For a 
critique of that concept, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 57. 
29 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 150. 
30 A.F.K. Organski has offered a brief reflection on the importance of mineral resources for state military 
power: "Resources are essential for the use of force. From the great flint industries of prehistoric times to 
the present, man has relied on minerals for fashioning weapons.... A lack of oil was one of Hitler's greatest 
handicaps." See Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 138. 
31 See, for example, Nils Gleditsch, "Environmental Change, Security and Conflict," in Leashing the Dogs 
of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 
Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007); and Jessica Mathews, “Redefining 
Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989): 162–177. 
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literature, growing as it might be, only a small fraction of studies have examined the 
linkage between oil and interstate conflict.32 This has given much creative leeway to 
contemporary scholars looking into that relationship, with some entertaining as many as 
eight causal mechanisms responsible for it and alluding to the existence of more.33 
Searching for structure at a lower level of complexity, however, one can discern two 
prevailing approaches to the study of the destabilization effects of oil in interstate 
context: one drawing inferences from the perspective of resource scarcity and the other 
from the vantage point of resource abundance.34 Each is discussed and assessed in turn. 
2.1.1 From scarcity to resource wars 
The scarcity approach has been, by far, the dominant one. It underpins much of the 
literature on "resource wars"—a broader category of conflict in which struggle over oil 
has figured prominently—and owes much theoretical debt to the naturalist philosophy of 
Thomas Malthus, who, as early as 1798, argued that the future of humanity would be held 
hostage by demographic and resource pressures. In questioning the "perfectibility of 
man" and predicting social discord in various parts of the world in the face of rising 
                                                 
32 In fact, that literature has increasingly focused on environmental cooperation among nations, 
emphasizing the incentives for peaceful management of natural resources. See, for example, Ken Conca, 
"Environmental Cooperation and International Peace," in Environmental Conflict, eds. Paul Diehl and Nils 
Gleditsch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); and Eric Neumayer, "Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger 
Environmental Commitment? A Cross-Country Analysis," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 (2003): 
139–164. 
33 These causal pathways, proposed by Colgan ("Fueling the Fire," 152–153), are classified in terms of 
ownership and market structure, producer politics, and consumer access concerns. For a different set of 
mechanisms, see Charles L. Glaser, "How Oil Influences U.S. National Security," International Security 
38, no. 2 (2013): 116–117. 
34 For a similar framing of the relevant literature, see Sanjeev Khagram and Saleem Ali, "Environment and 
Security," Annual Review of Environment and Resources 31 (2006): 395–411. 
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resource pressures, Malthus famously wrote that "the power of population is indefinitely 
greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man."35 
This dire verdict, while proven wrong by subsequent technological and commercial 
developments, reemerged in academic and policy debates in the late 1960s, giving fodder 
to neo-Malthusian arguments linking population growth to violent resource competition. 
In a seminal essay written in 1968, during a decade that saw rising demographic 
pressures, ecologist Garret Hardin lamented that the problem of overpopulation had no 
technical solution; if anything, it required a change in human morality.36 Hardin also 
framed the scarcity thesis in a game-theoretical perspective, arguing that collective action 
problems in the management of shared resources would make resource overexploitation 
and competition an inescapable reality. This concern was echoed in the work of Paul 
Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, who, in two pioneering books published in 1968 and 1973, 
saw demographic pressures as harbingers of global conflict, famine, and even 
thermonuclear war.37 Following suit in 1975 was the duo of Nazli Choucri and Robert 
North, whose influential lateral pressure theory posited that states experiencing high 
population stress and growing resource needs would see incentives for outward 
expansion—including one involving military force—toward areas and countries that 
could meet those needs.38 
                                                 
35 Thomas Malthus, "An Essay on the Principle of Population," Library of Economics and Liberty, 1789, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop.html. 
36 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968): 1243–1248. 
37 Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (Ballantine Books, 1968); and Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. 
Ehrlich, Human Ecology: Problems and Solutions (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company, 
1973). 
38 See Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence 
(San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1975). In elaborating lateral pressure theory, Choucri 
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Although these early neo-Malthusian accounts did not focus specifically on petroleum, 
they spelled out the basic intuition behind much of the literature on resource wars, 
including that concerned with blood-oil relationships. In 1982, oil was singled out in the 
work of acclaimed sociologist Johan Galtung, who wrote that "environmental 
deterioration may lead to war…'normal' economic activity will sharpen the struggle for 
scarce resources, oil being one example."39 A few years later, Arthur Westing et al. 
established a more rigorous research agenda, arguing that actual or perceived global 
shortages of various renewable and nonrenewable resources—shortages caused by 
population growth, rising standards of living in the developed world, and economic 
growth in developing countries—could cause, or at least contribute to, conflict among 
nations.40 As part of this large-scale effort came a rare systematic attempt to present brief 
case studies that lend some empirical credence to scarcity arguments drawing a causal 
linkage between oil and interstate conflict. Among the cases offered were France's war 
with Algeria (1956–62), which was seen as a French attempt to retain colonial control 
over Algeria's oil, and China's war with Vietnam (1974), which was presented as one 
fought over the presumed petroleum deposits of the Paracel Islands in the South China 
Sea. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and North wrote, "In a growing population there will be an increasing demand for basic resources...if 
national capabilities cannot be attained at reasonable cost within national boundaries, they may be sought 
beyond...[v]irtually any mode in which lateral pressure is expressed...may contribute to international 
conflict and violence" (15–17). 
39 Johan Galtung, "Why Does the Environment Deteriorate and What Can be Done About It," NGO 
Symposium on Environment and the Future, 1982. See also Galtung, Environment, Development and 
Military Activity (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1982). 
40 Arthur Westing, ed. Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic 
Policy and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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Following in the footsteps of Westing et al., a series of more recent resource war 
investigations have focused almost exclusively on petroleum to trace scarcity–interstate 
conflict linkages.41 Notably, a widely cited body of work by Michael Klare, the chief 
proponent of the blood-oil thesis, has claimed that oil's national security importance, 
declining availability, and unique geography—three factors seen as forming a "strategic 
triangle"—create conditions of resource dependence conducive to interstate war.42 
According to Klare, "each [factor] is sufficient in its own right to raise the specter of 
bloodshed, but it is the combination of all three that produces the highest risk of war."43 
Not surprisingly, among the regions identified as most likely to face this blood-oil 
predicament is the oil-rich Middle East, an "epicenter of…disorder" in which 
"intervention by outside powers—especially the United States—is an ever present 
possibility."44 As global oil stocks dwindle and states in need of petroleum approach the 
"edge of desperation," Klare also expects this conflict dynamic to intensify in other areas, 
including Central and East Asia and parts of Africa and Latin America.45 
                                                 
41 Water is another resource that has motivated many resource war investigations. Since this literature is 
peripheral to the purposes of this dissertation, it is not discussed here. For a representative account of how 
water scarcity can lead to interstate conflict, see Petter Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources 
and International Security," International Security 18 (1993): 79–112. For empirical tests that question the 
scientific merits of such work, see Shira Yoffe, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano, "Conflict and 
Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of Basins at Risk," Journal of the 
American water Resources Association 39, no. 5 (2003): 1109–1125; and Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over 
Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries?” Political Geography 25, no. 4 (2006): 361–382. 
42 Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008); Blood and Oil: 
The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2004); and Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2001). 
43 Klare, Resource Wars, 49. 
44 Ibid., 45, 51. 
45 Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. 
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Arguments similar to those of Klare have come in various shapes. Some have seen a 
heightened risk of resource wars along the North–South axis. Simon Dalby, for example, 
has argued that the North, which consumes a disproportionately larger share of petroleum 
and is most dependent on it, is bound to use military force against oil-surplus states 
because "it has become accustomed to the idea that access to these resources is its 
right."46 Susanne Peters has made similar predictions, arguing that the unequal 
distribution of petroleum between developed and developing nations, along with an 
anticipated "oil supply crisis," would lead to a new era of resource wars between North 
and South.47 Other arguments have focused on specific geographical areas. The Caspian 
Sea basin, for instance, has become one focal point of recent investigation, with authors 
pointing to U.S., Russian, and Chinese competitive behaviors in the area (e.g., stationing 
of troops on the territory of local states and providing them with aid) as heightening 
military tensions.48 Still other accounts have seen oil conflict as a product of rent-
seeking.49 Thus, Mary Kaldor et al. have highlighted the incentives for resource capture 
                                                 
46 Simon Dalby, "Threats from the South: Geopolitics, Equity, and 'Environmental Security,'" in Contested 
Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, eds. Daniel Deudney and Richard 
Mathew (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 165. 
47 Susanne Peters, "Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: 'Resource Wars' as a New Threat to 
Global Security," Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004): 187–212. 
48 See, for example, Mehdi Amineh and Henk Houweling, "Global Energy Security and Its Geopolitical 
Impediments—The Case of the Caspian Region," Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 6, 
no. 1 (2007): 365–388; and Travis Sharp, "Resource Conflict in the Twenty-First Century," Peace Review: 
A Journal of Social Justice 19, no. 3 (2007): 223–230. Glaser ("How Oil Influences U.S. National 
Security") has focused on a different region, suggesting that "the probability of oil-driven conflict has 
increased in Northeast Asia" (142). 
49 Sometimes a distinction is made between greed- and scarcity-based oil conflict (see Colgan, "Fueling the 
Fire," 154–155; and Emily Meierding, "Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth," Security Studies 25, no. 2 (2016): 
258–288). While this distinction may be useful in some cases, it is one of analytical choice. Greed conflicts 
presuppose an extremely high value of the resource that is to be seized—a value typically measured with 
price and considered in relation to other resources. But that value is high precisely because the resource is 
scarce, either in actuality or in perception. 
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presented to international and domestic actors by the size of oil rents, which have grossly 
exceeded those obtained from either labor or capital and which are unlikely to subside 
because of oil’s "depletability."50 
What can be seen in all these accounts is the gradual broadening of the concept of 
scarcity. Whereas the neo-Malthusian arguments of the 1960s and 1970s saw scarcity 
mainly as an indirect result of population growth, later works, starting with those of 
Galtung and Westing et al., have added other, also indirect, indicators: economic activity 
taxing available resource stocks, unique features of petroleum geography, import 
dependence of one state or a group of states on another state or group, oil prices (with 
higher prices indicating greater scarcity), and institutionally determined variations in 
actors’ ability to access resources.51 While the concept of scarcity has become more 
multifaceted—in terms of how scarcity is measured, who experiences it, and at what level 
of analysis it is observed—theory linking it to conflict has not. Causal expectations have 
often been stated without precision, forcing scholars to infer them from general 
narratives.52 Klare's concept of scarcity, for example, implies at least two blood-oil 
predictions: a monadic one in which oil scarcity at the global level makes petrostates 
more frequent targets of external aggression and a dyadic one in which domestic scarcity, 
viewed in terms of resource dependence, makes oil-importing states more likely 
aggressors against oil suppliers. 
                                                 
50 Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said, eds. Oil Wars (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 11–26. 
51 This evolution has mimicked a conception of scarcity found in the more expansive literature on domestic 
resource conflict, which has adopted Thomas Homer-Dixon’s tripartite distinction among demand-induced, 
supply-induced, and structural scarcity. See Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1999), 48. 
52 See Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature," Journal of Peace 
Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 381–400, 395. 
20 
 
These kinds of blood-oil predictions are rarely tested. This is partly due to the habit of 
those making them to seek empirical validation in some future scarcity condition—
typically, an anticipated "peak" in global oil output.53 Not surprisingly, critics have 
questioned the scientific value of such work, mocking its tendency to use "the future as 
evidence."54 Concerns of similar nature have extended to other areas. Inattention to 
political and economic variables has been one issue, with some scholars pointing to 
international trade, human social and technological ingenuity, and democracy as factors 
that could mitigate the competitive pressures implied by domestic or global resource 
scarcity.55 Occasionally, the very notion of scarcity has been assaulted, with cornucopian 
theorists claiming that the prices of oil and other fuel minerals, while showing volatility, 
have not exhibited a consistent upward trend over the decades.56 
The evidence for blood-oil predictions, when offered, has been mixed. A handful of 
historical cases, some already mentioned, have been regurgitated by scholars over the 
years.57 While oil has certainly played some role in them, its causal importance relative to 
                                                 
53 See, for example, Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, 14; and Peters, "Coercive Western Energy 
Security Strategies," 193. 
54 See Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment," 393. 
55 See Deudney, "Environmental Security: A Critique," in Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the 
New Environmental Politics, eds. Daniel Deudney and Richard Mathew (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1999), 205–207; and Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment," 389. Scarcity 
theorists have responded to the critics by pointing to ingenuity gaps and market failures as impediments to 
scarcity mitigation; see, for example, Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap (Vintage Books, 2002). 
56 See Bjorn Lomborg, "Resource Constraints or Abundance?" in Environmental Conflict, eds. Paul Diehl 
and Nils Gleditsch (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001); and Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource 2 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). The cornucopian critique should be taken with caution, however, 
because it adopts a concept of scarcity much narrower than that proposed in many scarcity arguments. 
57 The most frequently cited cases are Japan's attack of the Dutch East Indies (1941), Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait (1990), the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932–35), and the two U.S. interventions 
against Iraq (1991 and 2003). 
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that of other, nonresource factors has been difficult to ascertain.58 In quantitative tests, 
resource war mechanisms have struggled to demonstrate strong empirical patterns. On the 
support side, a study by Francesco Caselli et al. has found that contiguous dyads in which 
one country has oil are more likely to experience conflict, with the arrow of dispute 
initiation pointing from the oil-less state to the oil-rich state.59 However, this finding 
holds only if petroleum deposits are located close to the border, raising questions about 
the potential confounding influence of border disputes unrelated to oil.60 Scholars also 
have suggested that results showing petrostates as more frequent MID defenders may be 
artifacts of "bad neighborhood" effects in the Middle East.61 
Existing empirical work has increasingly converged on the view that, while resource wars 
do occur occasionally, their frequency has been exaggerated. A major statistical test of 
lateral pressure theory, for example, has revealed that countries experiencing high 
population pressures—and, by implication, growing resource needs—are more likely to 
become involved in interstate disputes, although not as conflict initiators (as the theory 
would predict) but as targets of aggression.62 Both dyadic and monadic tests have 
challenged blood-oil accounts that put petrostates on the defensive, with some scholars 
finding no evidence that petrostates are more frequent dispute targets63 and others finding 
                                                 
58 Cases have often been mentioned in passing, as anecdotal examples rather than detailed case studies 
assessing competing causal pathways. 
59 Francesco Caselli, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner, "The Geography of Interstate Resource 
Wars," The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2015): 267–315. 
60 Meierding ("Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth") has questioned Caselli et al.'s work on the grounds that it 
does not include measures of oil value (e.g., price or reservoir size). 
61 See Colgan, "Fueling the Fire," 155–156. 
62 Jaroslav Tir and Paul Diehl, "Demographic Pressure and Interstate Conflict: Linking Population Growth 
and Density to Military Disputes and Wars," Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 319–339. 
63 De Soysa, Gartzke, and Lie, "Blood, Oil, and Strategy." 
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limited evidence for small oil-rich countries but not for large ones.64 The assertion that 
oil-dependent great powers would concentrate their military interventions in oil suppliers 
has run into similar problems. One empirical study examining the conflict behaviors of 
the United States, Great Britain, and France has reported that "oil-supplying countries did 
not experience interventions [from the three powers] more frequently than other 
suppliers,"65 and another investigation has offered mixed evidence for the purported 
relationship.66 
2.1.2 From abundance to petroagression 
The lack of systematic empirical support for blood-oil predictions likely has contributed 
to recent interest in the second main perspective of interstate oil conflict, which has seen 
domestic oil abundance as a fuel for outward aggression. (In fact, it appears that efforts to 
test the former have led scholars to empirical confirmation of the latter.) Although studies 
on petroagression are still small in number, virtually all of them have relied on statistical 
tests and evidence, following the methodological recipes of mainstream social science 
research. What is more, their empirical findings have been remarkably consistent in 
corroborating the view that petrostates are pervasive spoilers of international peace. Thus, 
one major statistical investigation has concluded that "oil exporters appear to flout global 
norms of non-aggression, more often using force against other states"67; another has 
                                                 
64 Strüver and Wegenast, "Ex oleo bellare?" 
65 Mats Hammarström, "Military Conflict and Mineral Supplies: Results Relevant to Wider Resource 
Issues," in Conflict and the Environment, ed. Nils Gleditsch (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 127. 
66 Georg Strüver, "Too Many Resources or Too Few? What Drives International Conflict?" GIGA Working 
Paper 147 (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2010), 24. Strüver cautions that the significance 
of his results may have been affected by a lack of data. 
67 De Soysa, Gartzke, and Lie, "Blood, Oil, and Strategy," 1. 
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reported that "large absolute amounts of petroleum are conducive to MID initiation"68; 
yet a third has made the observation that "the link between oil and conflict is driven 
primarily by petrostates that are aggressive in international conflicts."69 
While being rich on empirics, available work on petroagression has been relatively poor 
on theory. To date, no consensus exists on how domestic oil abundance translates into 
more belligerent external behavior and, with almost no exception, explanatory 
mechanisms have been sketched with a broad brush. Three such mechanisms, or 
propositions, have appeared most consistently in relevant studies. For convenience of 
exposition, these can be named "militarization," "strategic oil," and "revolutionary 
government." 
Rarely discussed in detail, the militarization proposition is the most intuitive. As 
mentioned earlier, oil is a potential power asset that could be used either directly, as a 
material input in military operations, or indirectly, through exports that could finance 
arms purchases and large standing armies. In both cases, oil can bolster a state's military 
capabilities and present petrostate governments with offensive opportunities that are 
otherwise unavailable. Reflecting along similar lines, Georg Strüver and Tim Wegenast 
have written that "[c]entralized resources may make oil-rich countries more capable of 
engaging in militarized disputes."70 That oil wealth is correlated with greater military 
spending has been confirmed empirically: statistical tests conducted by Michael Ross and 
                                                 
68 Strüver and Wegenast, "Ex oleo bellare?" 18. 
69 Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments," 662. 
70 Georg Strüver and Tim Wegenast, "The Hard Power of Natural Resources: Oil and the Outbreak of 
Militarized Interstate Disputes," Foreign Policy Analysis (2016): 1–21, 4. 
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Joseph Wright et al. demonstrate that the relationship is strong and significant.71 
Interestingly, oil's importance for hard power has been acknowledged even by scarcity 
theorists, with Klare observing that "since...the beginning of the twentieth century, 
petroleum has been viewed as essential for success in war"72 and Thomas Homer-Dixon, 
a prolific writer on resource scarcity and domestic conflict, arguing that oil and other 
fossil fuels are easily transformed into state power assets.73 What has set the work of 
these scholars apart, however, is that they have typically seen oil's implications for power 
as a petrostate liability (i.e., as something that puts these states on the defensive) rather 
than a petrostate offensive asset. 
The concept of power has also loomed large in the strategic oil proposition, but this time 
in a mechanism that highlights the potential economic leverage of petrostates. In 1975, in 
laying out the so-called "oil weapon" thesis in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, Hanns 
Maull argued that petroleum-exporting nations could use embargoes and other 
manipulations of oil supply, such as closures of pipelines and transit chokepoints, to 
influence the behavior of oil-importing states.74 In so doing, Maull introduced the 
concept of "oil power," defined as "the power which stems from the dependence of 
consumer nations on oil."75 Maull's idea has reappeared in contemporary work on 
                                                 
71 Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 350; and Joseph Wright, Erica 
Frantz, and Barbara Geddes, "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival," British Journal of Political Science 45, 
no. 2 (2015): 302–303. 
72 Klare, Resource Wars, 29. 
73 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 138. 
74 Hanns Maull, "Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon Examined," Adelphi Paper 117 (1975), in The 
Evolution of Strategic Thought: Classic Adelphi Papers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 
328–382. The oil-weapon thesis is not discussed in detail because it refers to economic, rather than 
military, coercion. 
75 Ibid., 328.  
25 
 
petroagression, with Indra De Soysa et al.—the originators of the strategic oil 
proposition—asserting that the international community's external dependence on 
imported oil gives petrostates a freer hand in threatening or using military force abroad, 
especially against states that have no oil.76 From this perspective, the greater prospect for 
conflict initiation is seen as a consequence of a "moral hazard" problem (assured by 
petrostates' unique status as oil suppliers), which "encourages oil exporting nations to 
pursue revisionist policy objectives."77 
In a notable departure from the militarization and strategic oil propositions, the 
revolutionary government thesis has afforded greater importance to domestic politics. 
The thesis, associated with the work of Jeff Colgan, has offered a more complex (but still 
cursory) explanation of petroagression, building upon the idea that revolutions could give 
rise to leaders with more aggressive foreign policy agenda.78 According to Colgan, while 
revolutionary leadership can increase the frequency of conflict initiation even in the 
absence of oil, it is when such leadership sits on oil wealth that international peace is 
most threatened: "When the state leader has aggressive, risk-acceptant preferences, as is 
likely under a revolutionary government," writes Colgan, "the political autonomy 
provided by oil makes it more likely that the leader will decide to launch an international 
conflict."79 What stands out in this exposition is its reliance on the assumption that 
"revolutionary leaders" (an ambiguous term revisited later) share certain psychological 
                                                 
76 De Soysa, Gartzke, and Lie, "Blood, Oil, and Strategy." 
77 Ibid., 10. 
78 See Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments"; and Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes 
War (Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
79 Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments," 662. See also Colgan, Petro-Aggression, 5. 
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traits—namely, tendencies toward outward aggression and risk-taking—that are less 
common among other elites. 
Colgan's account is not the only attempt to implicate domestic politics in petroagression. 
Occasionally, authors have looked for answers in the "resource curse" literature, much of 
which has found that, besides suffering slower economic growth because of "Dutch 
Disease" effects,80 rentier states tend to exhibit higher rates of authoritarian governance 
and civil war.81 Both findings could have implications for interstate conflict, albeit 
through mechanisms identified in the broader international relations literature. Studies on 
the democratic peace, for example, have suggested that nondemocratic states are more 
likely to use military force in their external dealings, with some scholars claiming that 
this relationship holds not only dyadically but also monadically.82 Recent investigations 
                                                 
80 For a detailed economic account of the resource curse, see Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, "The 
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36; Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the 
Mechanisms," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 508–537; Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, 
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looking into the geographical spread of civil war also have argued that internal turmoil 
could diffuse to interstate conflict through mechanisms of intervention (i.e., use of 
military threats and force by external states supporting rebels in the war-torn country), 
externalization (i.e., retaliatory military response by the state experiencing civil war 
against external meddlers), and spillover (i.e., militarized disputes arising from cross-
border migration).83 To account for these possibilities, statistical tests of petroagression 
have sometimes, but not always, controlled for civil war and democracy. 
Empirical insights taken from studies on the democratic peace and domestic conflict are 
not necessarily universal givens, and should be used with caution in theoretical synthesis. 
The democratic peace literature, despite its long tradition and influence, has been 
challenged repeatedly over the years, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Critics 
have argued that it has neglected the effects of the Cold War,84 economic development,85 
and territorial disputes,86 among other factors. The link between oil and internal conflict 
has been qualified as well, with recent work finding that a petrostate's susceptibility to 
domestic political challenges is contingent on its level of oil dependence, 
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democratization, and ethnic fractionalization.87 In addition, while studies on civil-war 
diffusion have implied greater MID involvement of the state experiencing internal 
conflict, questions remain about the directionality of that involvement. If externalization 
is the dominant mechanism of diffusion, then war-torn countries should be more frequent 
dispute initiators; conversely, if intervention has the upper hand, such countries should be 
more frequent dispute targets. Although a recent statistical study has reported that civil 
war increases both types of involvement at about the same rate,88 that study needs further 
corroboration, especially since it challenges previous arguments emphasizing external 
opportunism89 and diversionary war90 in conflict internationalization and does not 
account for the presence of oil. 
Although it remains unclear which explanation of petroagression is most true to reality, 
the empirical finding about the presence of such phenomenon stands. Irrespective of 
which study one looks at, it does appear that, in the aggregate, petrostates belong to a 
more belligerent group of actors, whose foreign policy choices favor coercion over 
accommodation. But what accounts for spatial and temporal variations in the behavior of 
those states? None of the major explanations of petroagression is well equipped to answer 
this question. This is due to limitations in existing arguments, the identification of which 
could point to possible venues for theoretical refinement. 
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2.2 Gaps in extant petroagression theory: the problem of variation 
The idea that oil income can support a state's military apparatus and external aggression 
is compelling. It is aptly captured in the words of Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, the first 
Iranian president after the Islamic Revolution of 1979: "To make war, arms must be 
purchased, and for that, oil must be sold."91 Yet, in its bare form, the militarization 
proposition is not a complete theoretical account; it does not explain, at least not fully, 
why some oil exporters arm themselves significantly more than others, nor does it say 
why petrostate decisions and ability to acquire arms vary considerably over time. During 
the 1970s, for example, the total dollar value of Libya's arms imports (about $20 billion) 
was about 20 times that of Venezuela and, in the 1990s, it collapsed to a negligible level, 
to roughly $19 million.92 Variations of such magnitudes cannot be accounted for by 
temporal changes or cross-country differences in oil income, and must be due to other 
factors. 
Such factors could be located both inside and outside the state. The process of 
militarization presupposes a permissive context in which one party—a buyer—is willing 
and able to expend resources for the purchase of arms, and another party—a seller—has 
no reservations to enter the transaction. If one of these requirements is not met—and this 
could occur because of internal or external political conditions—there is no bargain. 
Domestic incentives and resources for militarization may not be present and, even if they 
are, the supply of arms and military equipment could be denied. The situation in which 
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Iran found itself in late 1979 is a case in point. After the seizure of the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran in November of that year, the United States and other Western powers stopped 
supplying military spare parts to Iran, handicapping its air force and combat readiness at 
a time of rising tensions with Baghdad.93 In addition, Washington froze about $12 billion 
of Iranian assets and embargoed all imports of Iranian oil, limiting Tehran's funds for 
large-scale military operations.94 Historical examples of this kind—and there are many—
indicate that the militarization mechanism does not operate at all times and at all places. 
Similar limitations transpire in the strategic oil proposition. Although the notion that an 
oil-dependent international community could be disinclined to resist petrostates' external 
revisionism appears plausible, it is not convincing as a blanket statement (which is how it 
is usually presented). First, the relevant actors need be clearly identified: not all oil 
importers have a say or influence on what petrostates do or do not do. Neither are states 
equally dependent on oil imports; some have adequate domestic supplies,95 and others 
have diversified import sources, which makes them less vulnerable to potential supply 
disruptions. Import dependence and diversification could also change over time, and the 
experience of the United States is a telling example of this variation. After the 1973 oil 
crisis, the country took active steps to improve its energy security on two fronts. One 
effort zeroed in on boosting domestic petroleum supply, a goal accomplished with the 
starting of the strategic petroleum reserve in 1975 and the completion of the trans-Alaska 
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pipeline in 1977. Another focused on import diversification, which was achieved through 
a hemispheric energy policy that included, and still includes, the country's northern and 
southern neighbors, as well as other oil exporters in Latin America.96 
The international clout attributed to petrostates because of their status as oil exporters has 
also been exaggerated. Trade is not a one-way street. While oil importers certainly desire 
to maintain their ability to buy petroleum, oil exporters similarly want to maintain their 
ability to sell it. This condition creates reciprocal sensitivities and vulnerabilities,97 and it 
is not surprising that even Maull, the early believer in the economic prowess of 
petrostates, has admitted that, for the most part, attempts by these states to use the "oil 
weapon" have been short lived and of limited effectiveness.98 In fact, because major oil 
importers tend to have bigger and more diversified economies (and, hence, greater 
resilience to external economic shocks), the use of the oil weapon may have hurt the 
users more than the targets.99 Moreover, the Iranian experience just recounted 
demonstrates that a great power whose interests are at stake would not hesitate to punish 
a major oil supplier, even if that supplier is a large regional state with significant 
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population and military capabilities. Therefore, a theoretical account capable of 
explaining change in petrostate behavior should look at petroagression not only in 
economic but also in geopolitical terms. 
Proponents of strategic oil also insist that "oil-importing countries have intense incentives 
to maintain stability across established supply networks,"100 a claim that raises questions 
about the proposition's theoretical completeness and ability to account for diverging 
outcomes. If external petroleum consumers indeed desire stability, an assumption 
challenged by some,101 it is not clear why would they tolerate petrostate military 
adventurism that could result in domestic or, worse, regional turmoil. De Soysa et al.'s 
finding that oil-poor states are more frequent targets of oil exporters does not answer this 
question. The initiation of international conflict, irrespective of target type, could 
engender an unpredictable sequence of events102 and, as strategic oil theorists themselves 
observe, "even a hint of instability [emphasis added] creates volatility in prices on the 
world market."103 Third-party consumers may close their eyes for gain, but they also have 
strong incentives to prevent potentially costly petrostate gambles. If they fail to do that, 
one should be able to explain why this is so. This limitation becomes even more apparent 
in light of the proposition's inability to account for instances of aggression of petrostates 
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against other petrostates. Paradoxically for strategic oil, some of the most unambiguous 
and deadly cases of petroagression—those associated with wars initiated by Iraq—
involve major oil-exporting targets (Iran and Kuwait). 
Like its counterparts, the revolutionary government thesis has its own significant 
shortcomings. Although work published by Colgan has claimed that revolutionary 
petrostates exhibit more belligerent behaviors,104 more fine-grained differences (political 
or over time) remain unexamined, and the concept of "revolutionary government" is 
ambiguous, at best. One major limitation is related to temporal variations in the foreign 
policy choices of petrostate leaders, and the case of Iraq is a fitting illustration of it. In 
Colgan's analysis, that petrostate is classified as having revolutionary leadership from the 
Baath Party overthrow of the Arif government in 1968 all the way to the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003—a period of 35 years. During this lengthy time span, Iraq's penchant for 
external aggression was not uniform, to say the least. The total number of MIDs initiated 
by the country in the 1980s increased almost fourfold from the level seen in the previous 
decade and then shrank by about the same factor in the 1990s.105 None of the variables 
offered in Colgan's work can account for these nontrivial shifts, and they are not unique 
to Iraq.106 
The validity of Colgan's revolutionary measure is also suspect. Defining and 
operationalizing revolution in a meaningful way is notoriously difficult, and whatever 
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attempts have been made to this end have struggled to arrive at the same conclusions. 
Colgan defines revolutionary government as one which assumes power through "irregular 
transition" (constituted by either violence or widespread popular demonstrations) and 
which transforms the "organization of society, including its social, economic, and 
political institutions and practices."107 It is doubtful that many of the cases informed by 
this broad definition and identified by Colgan as revolutionary—cases that include 
petrostates—would qualify as such on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical 
work on the subject. Definitional discrepancies and imprecisions emerge along multiple 
dimensions, including whether or not social change occurs through violence, what type 
and level of popular mobilization is observed, whether and how much institutional 
transformation is involved, and when and how fast these processes unfold. 
Most scholars studying revolutions have set the bar quite high on one or more of these 
dimensions, greatly restricting the universe of relevant cases. Theda Skocpol, for 
example, has emphasized violence, class-based cleavages, and high degree of popular 
participation as defining features of revolutions,108 and all of these criteria have been 
relaxed in Colgan's operationalization. Not surprisingly, Skocpol has identified less than 
10 revolutions in her empirical work.109 Samuel Huntington has suggested that a 
revolution is a "rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change" driven by an 
"explosion" in popular participation, and ruled out coups, insurrections, revolts, wars of 
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independence, and rebellions as revolutionary events.110 Reflecting upon Huntington's 
view, Charles Tilly has commented that "depending on how generously one interpreted 
the words 'rapid' and 'fundamental,' it would be easy to argue that no revolution has ever 
occurred, and hard to argue that the number of true cases exceeds half-dozen."111 In the 
work of other authorities on the subject, the signature of revolutionary change has been 
the incidence of violence, with Zeev Maoz contending that nonviolent transformations 
are evolutionary, whether or not they alter domestic political structures.112 In another 
prominent study, Walt has been reluctant to present more than 10 cases of 
"unambiguous" revolutions, stating that "[s]uccessful revolutions are rare."113 
These points underscore the risks associated with grouping diverse cases under a single 
category that is defined ambiguously or overly broadly. On the important dimension of 
violence, for instance, peaceful political transformations, such as those that took place in 
a number of Eastern European countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, would most 
certainly not qualify as revolutionary (in Colgan's work, they do), and the same is true for 
elite changes, such as coups d'état, many of which have occurred without much violence. 
Colgan claims that he is "catholic about the process (violent or non-violent),"114 but this 
is problematic for his argument, which is built on the assumption that revolutionary 
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leaders become "habituated [emphasis added] to resolving political conflict by force" in 
the process of rising to power.115 Questions also arise with respect to social revolutions in 
the Third World, whose processes and outcomes have been deeply penetrated by great 
power influence,116 and one has to make a compelling argument that such cases are 
comparable to, say, those of the Occident. 
The precision with which a concept is defined also speaks to the validity of the analyses 
using it. Walt and Mearsheimer have warned that "valid hypothesis tests depend on 
having measures that correspond to the underlying concepts being studied,"117 and 
Colgan's revolutionary government measure is not transparent in this regard, not least 
because it makes no distinction between "leaders" and "governments."118 If, on the one 
hand, the measure's purpose is to capture violent dispositions unique to political leaders, 
which appears to be Colgan's aim,119 one cannot be agnostic with respect to process, 
which could vary significantly across cases.120 If, on the other hand, the measure's 
purpose is to capture domestic institutional characteristics that could affect how states 
arrive at different foreign policy decisions, one cannot be inattentive to the types of 
institutional structures that emerge after polity displacement or the question whether 
decisions are made by individuals or collectivities. Although Colgan's specification 
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claims to measure "radical" change in the internal "organization of society," it contains 
no information about the timing or speed of that change or the specific type of polity that 
sets in after it. 
What is pooled under the revolutionary category also may alter expectations about the 
nature and timing of external state behavior. According to Maoz, nonviolent 
(evolutionary) domestic changes are unlikely to result in outward military revisionism 
and may even reduce it,121 a prediction consistent with the experience of Eastern 
European countries (coded as revolutionary by Colgan) in the early 1990s. By contrast, 
violent (revolutionary) transformations, which put pressure on elites to mobilize popular 
support through scapegoating, are likely to lead to "drastically increased conflict 
behavior" in the initial period following the change and, as time goes by, yield to "the 
'normal' conflict involvement pattern."122 Walt—who also views revolutions as violent, 
but highly state-weakening, events—has taken a more qualified position, arguing that the 
immediate postrevolutionary period may put revolutionary states mostly on the defensive, 
because third parties could see those states' "weakness as an opportunity to improve their 
relative positions."123 What these examples illustrate is that, even in scholarly accounts 
with moderately restrictive conceptions of revolutionary change, conflict predictions 
come with a high dose of analytic uncertainty, and the more encompassing the 
conceptions, the greater the difficulty in determining what they measure or what in them 
is causally responsible for observed outcomes.  
                                                 
121 Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change, 86. 
122 Ibid., 86, 93. 
123 Walt, Revolution and War, 32. 
38 
 
 
3 Theory and hypotheses 
Identifying the conditions under which petrostates are more or less likely to initiate 
interstate conflict requires an account that is neither confined to a single level of analysis 
nor inattentive to within-level factors that could significantly affect that likelihood. As 
argued in the previous chapter, all major explanations of petroagression are fully or 
partially deficient with respect to one or both of these dimensions. For that reason, the 
theoretical approach adopted here seeks to uncover changing patterns of petroagression 
by paying closer attention to (1) unique domestic institutional attributes of oil exporters 
and (2) spatial and temporal variations in the external environments of those actors. This 
approach also bridges the scarcity–abundance dichotomy laid out in the literature 
assessment. Although oil scarcity and abundance are often seen as engendering 
competing conflict mechanisms, they both have potential implications for how petrostates 
behave externally. Thus, scarcity at the global level, mediated by system-level political 
variables, could affect the way in which the most powerful members of the international 
system view and interact with oil exporters. Likewise, domestic abundance, mediated by 
internal political variables, could condition petrostates’ perceptions about the range of 
coercive and accommodative options they have in engaging with their external 
environments. 
3.1 The domestic dimension 
A growing number of scholars have voiced the concern that existing resource conflict 
studies focus too much on the resource and neglect domestic institutional sources of 
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variation. According to Koubi et al., causal arguments linking resources to conflict are 
"for the most part underspecified" because they do not examine "the role of [domestic] 
institutions in mediating the effect of resource scarcity or abundance."124 In a separate 
assessment of the literature, Nils Gleditsch has reached a similar conclusion, observing 
that "most work on environmental conflict does not discuss how regime type may 
influence such conflict."125 
Investigations of petroagression have not escaped this lingering problem. The 
militarization proposition is agnostic with respect to domestic institutional characteristics, 
and the strategic-oil proposition derives its causal logic from a system-level viewpoint. 
As a result, neither of these perspectives recognizes domestic institutions as potential 
sources of variation in petrostate behavior. The revolutionary government thesis is only 
marginally better in this regard. As mentioned earlier, its key measure is of dubious 
validity and does not capture the specific types of institutional arrangements that take 
shape after domestic political transitions. Although monadic tests of petroagression have 
used controls based on Polity scores, they have not found compelling evidence that these 
variables significantly affect MID initiation.126 This result has led some authors to 
conclude that "it seems time to abandon the general debates over the democracy–
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autocracy dichotomy...and to instead concentrate on more specific institutional or regime 
characteristics as possible causes of international violence."127 
Heeding to these insights, this section adopts a more refined regime-type breakdown to 
identify salient domestic institutional characteristics that could influence petrostates' 
propensity to initiate conflict. The breakdown relies on the work of Geddes et al.128 and 
differentiates among personalist, single-party, military, monarchic, and democratic 
regimes. This typology is similar to that used in previous studies of autocratic conflict 
behavior, which is desirable for purposes of comparability. Unlike these studies, 
however, the present argument looks at the interaction between oil and domestic 
institutions in foreign-policy formation, a resource dimension not considered in extant 
research. The analysis suggests that petrostates with personalist institutions may be 
significantly more likely to initiate militarized disputes than petrostates of other regime 
types. 
3.1.1 Beyond the democracy–autocracy dichotomy 
Peace and conflict accounts grounded in domestic politics have typically adopted an 
institutional perspective that sees states as either democratic or autocratic. This first-order 
distinction has served well the democratic peace literature, which has found that, 
compared with autocracies, democratic states are more peaceful toward each other 
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(dyadic democratic peace) and/or in general (monadic democratic peace).129 Although 
definitions of democracy are by no means uniform, many of them have identified 
universal suffrage, multiparty competitive elections, legislative checks on the executive, 
independent judiciary, rule of law, free press, and civil liberties as characteristic features 
of this type of polity.130 It is these traits—purportedly absent in autocracies—that liberal 
scholars have seen as making democratic governments comparatively more pacific, either 
through political accountability mechanisms (institutional constraints placed on elected 
executives who can be voted out of office), normative mechanisms (shared culture and 
rules of peaceful dispute resolution), or both.131 
For many investigations, however, the democracy–autocracy dichotomy is not optimal. 
Relegating autocracies to a residual category antithetical to the pure democratic type 
sidelines the fact that the institutional setup of nondemocratic regimes may vary in 
nontrivial ways. It is highly unlikely, for example, that, all else equal, the foreign-policy 
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choices of a despot and a monarch would be identical: these individuals rely on the 
support of domestic groups of different identities, interests, and sizes and operate within 
governing arrangements with different rules for making decisions. Continuous measures 
of democracy, such as Polity scores, are not equipped to capture these types of 
institutional characteristics, and, while they say something about the "degree of 
democracy and repressiveness," they do not constitute regime classifications 
themselves.132 Indeed, different autocratic regimes may receive relatively high Polity 
scores, and these scores could vary significantly both across nondemocratic states and 
over time within those states.133 
Grouping nondemocracies into a single, homogenous category is ill-advised for another 
reason. Despite successive waves of democratization, more than 40 percent of all states in 
the international system remain autocratic.134 This percentage is much higher among oil 
states, which are 50 percent more likely to exhibit some type of nondemocratic 
governance.135 In the petrostate sample used for this dissertation, only about 20 percent 
of state-years are coded as democratic. The higher incidence of autocracy among 
petrostates may be associated with oil—for example, through a mechanism in which oil 
increases government tenure—but this need not be the only, or even the most important, 
channel. A country's failure to democratize could be due to, among other things, 
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geographical neighborhood effects,136 Islamic culture,137 and colonial history,138 all 
factors pertinent to the oil-rich regions of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. 
Whatever the case, these figures suggest that a simple democracy–autocracy 
classification could mask nontrivial institutional features with important implications for 
petrostate behavior. This may be one of the reasons why Polity scores often fail to rise to 
statistical significance in monadic tests of petroagression. 
It is imperative, then, that patterns of petrostate belligerence be examined through a 
typology that has the ability to distinguish among different forms of autocratic 
governance. Geddes et al.'s classification, while developed to shed light on regime 
breakdowns and transitions, is useful for that purpose. It identifies four distinct types of 
autocratic regimes—personalist (despotic), single party, military, and monarchic—on the 
basis of "whether control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus" is 
held by, respectively, a single leader, a dominant ruling party, the military institution, or a 
royal family.139 The choice of classification criterion is naturally suitable for the study of 
autocratic conflict behavior. Threatening or using military force depends on who makes 
foreign policy decisions, who commands the coercive apparatus of the state, and how 
political power is distributed within a ruling coalition. Therefore, knowing the 
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composition and identities of autocratic elites could inform an analysis of their conflict 
propensity. 
Geddes et al.'s typology also permits an investigation that accommodates certain aspects 
of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s selectorate theory.140 Selectorate theory posits that 
government policy is influenced by the size of two domestic groups that keep leaders 
accountable: the winning coalition (the group that maintains leaders in power) and the 
selectorate (the larger group with a say on leadership selection).141 Although this 
classification does not capture substantive characteristics of domestic groups and, hence, 
is not a regime typology itself, its conception of a winning coalition is similar to the 
leadership group identified by Geddes et al.142 Therefore, substantive insights about the 
identity and interests of that group can be supplemented with instrumental insights about 
the size of the group. This approach could be useful in the study of foreign-policy 
formation in conditions of domestic oil abundance, because the identity and the size of a 
ruling coalition both have potential implications for the allocation of resource rents 
among domestic constituencies.143 While coalition size might be the same across 
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different autocratic regimes (in which case attention to group identity would be of 
paramount importance), it can be expected that, more often than not, that size will be the 
smallest in personalist regimes.144 By definition, the size of the winning coalition in a 
democracy is larger than that in any autocratic subtype, because democracies have 
multiparty systems with competitive elections.145 
3.1.2 Domestic institutions, personalism, and oil 
Conflict research based on Geddes et al.'s regime typology, which first appeared in 
1999,146 is relatively recent and still inconclusive. Early efforts examined the possibility 
that a phenomenon similar to the dyadic democratic peace exists among pairs of 
autocratic regimes, with some scholars presenting affirmative evidence for such a 
relationship.147 In addition, a handful of later studies, mostly by the same authors, have 
indicated that personalist regimes tend to initiate disputes at higher rates than do military 
or single-party regimes, with the latter seen as the most peaceful after democracies.148 To 
date, there is no agreement on what accounts for these results. Mark Peceny and 
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Christopher Butler have entertained an explanation based on selectorate theory, arguing 
that regimes with larger winning coalitions—and more constrained leadership—choose to 
fight wars they are certain to win and, therefore, tend to initiate fewer of them.149 This 
approach has been questioned in recent work by Jessica Weeks,150 who has claimed that 
personalist leaders may be more belligerent because of their "grand international 
ambitions" and lower "threat of domestic punishment."151 Weeks also has suggested that 
elite groups composed of military officers would be particularly conflict prone, as they 
are more likely "to form ominous views of the status quo, and to view military force as 
effective and routine."152 
Some scholars have discounted the role of personalism. According to Brian Lai and Dan 
Slater, what matters in conflict initiation is not how "regimes make decisions 
(personalized vs. collective procedures), but how they enforce them (party vs. military 
institutions)."153 In this view, governments with greater domestic insecurity and lower 
legitimacy—traits seen as most common among military regimes and indicative of those 
regimes' reduced "infrastructural power"154—are more likely to use diversionary force as 
a means to creating "rally around the flag" effects. In contrast to Weeks' argument, Lai 
and Slater's account is institutional and does not imply that military elites share a "cult of 
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the offensive."155 Other scholars have turned the "infrastructural power" perspective on 
its head, putting the claimed peacefulness of single-party regimes under greater scrutiny. 
Using reciprocal models to link diversionary motives to conflict initiation, Jeffrey 
Pickering and Emizet Kisangani have argued that, because single-party regimes have 
fewer means to buy the loyalty of their key constituents, they should have greater 
incentives to use diversionary force as a way to solidify and enhance domestic support.156 
Despite failing to agree on causal mechanisms, these and similar investigations indicate 
that regime type could have important implications for state conflict behavior. But is that 
the case for petrostates? No previous study has examined this question through a 
typology such as that of Geddes et al., and it is reasonable to expect that the conflict-
inducing effects of oil would be mediated differently by different regime institutions, 
becoming manifestly stronger in some regimes and less so in others. As argued below, 
the inclusion of a resource component in regime-based analysis of dispute initiation 
presents grounds for making a stronger case for the purported elevated belligerence of 
personalist regimes. The analysis suggests that petrostates exhibiting personalism would 
initiate disputes at higher rates than petrostates with other governing arrangements 
because of two related mechanisms: one working through the heterogeneous effects of 
regime institutions on the domestic diffusion and allocation of oil rents, and one 
operating through the heterogeneous effects of oil income on the ex ante decisional 
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constraints and ex post accountability experienced by leaders. Whereas the former 
mechanism can affect the discretionary resources available to ruling elites, the latter 
speaks to the ease with which leaders can overcome decisional impediments to foreign 
policy revisionism. 
Discretionary resources 
Key to the first mechanism is the idea that political institutions could determine how 
income from oil exports is distributed among domestic groups. If the institutional 
architecture of a petrostate creates conditions for resource predation and rent-seeking 
behaviors, a greater portion of that income will end up in the hands of the ruling elite, as 
private benefit. Conversely, if the institutional setup favors redistributive policies, oil 
income will be spread more widely, with a larger portion of it channeled into public 
goods provision. Therefore, political institutions could have an intervening effect on 
income allocation and, ultimately, on a government's leeway to spend money on 
discretionary pursuits, including foreign-policy revisionism. Bueno de Mesquita et al., in 
discussing government fiscal policy choices and management of tax revenues, have 
suggested that "the resources at a leader’s disposal are endogenous to the institutional 
configuration of the state."157 While this is not entirely true for petrostates, whose natural 
riches are a geographical given, it is certainly the case that those states' institutions can 
"endogenize" the process by which financial inflows from oil exports are channeled 
domestically. 
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One way to identify which regime institutions favor redistribution and which elite rent 
appropriation is to draw upon insights from selectorate theory. If political leaders' 
primary goal is to stay in office—a minimalist assumption commonly made in political 
incentives analysis—they would distribute oil income in a manner compatible with that 
goal. Such compatibility would exist when leaders choose income distribution that 
maximizes their domestic power and, at the same time, is neither overly generous nor 
inadequate to secure the loyalty of key supporters. The discretionary amount subject to 
leader maximization is the difference between the financial inflows from the sale of 
petroleum and the outlays required to buy domestic political support. For a given level of 
oil income, then, lowering outlays would increase a leader's disposable resources and 
chances for political survival. As selectorate theory suggests, however, the ability of 
leaders to manipulate expenditures depends on the size of the winning coalition: the 
smaller the coalition, the larger the amount leaders can withhold for discretionary use; the 
larger the coalition, the smaller that amount.158 
Taking this logic a step further, one could conjecture that elite income appropriation 
would occur more frequently in petrostates with personalist institutions. As noted earlier, 
coalition size can be mapped to the regime types proposed by Geddes et al., with that size 
being the smallest in personalist regimes and the largest in democracies.159 Because 
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personalists rely on the support of a small group of elite insiders, they will be able to 
spend the least on maintaining that support, in the form of private benefits, maximizing 
their discretionary capital. As coalition size increases, and the value of providing private 
benefits declines (because of a growing number of beneficiaries), more oil revenue will 
be channeled into public goods provision and out of the control of the ruling coalition.160 
While similar redistributive processes of heterogeneous income allocation by regime type 
could occur in the absence of oil, they would likely hold greater importance, and be 
stronger, in the case of petrostates, whose oil abundance creates disincentives for the 
development of alternative sources of state revenue, such as taxation.161 
These insights can be derived even without the formalism of selectorate theory. Recent 
research focusing on economic outcomes in oil-rich countries has shown that the quality 
of political institutions—quality gauged through subjective (expert) assessments of the 
effectiveness of internal governance processes and bureaucratic structures162—could 
affect the flow of resource rents in the domestic economy.163 Polities with bad 
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institutions, in which corruption, weak rule of law, and disregard for citizen and property 
rights are pervasive, have been found to "invite political rent appropriation" and "rent 
grabbing" by ruling elites.164 Indeed, these qualities are often cited as characteristic of 
personalist regimes. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, for example, have equated 
"personal rule" with "kleptocracy," showing how Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican 
Republic (1966–78) and Mobutu Sese Seko of the Congo (1965–97) managed to use 
"divide-and-rule" strategies, along with military coercion, to seize billions of dollars of 
state revenue, much of it from natural resources.165 Peceny et al. have observed that 
personalist regimes are based on a "clientelistic patronage network" bound by "graft and 
corruption,"166 and Geddes has noted that the main incentive for participation in a 
personalist government is "access to rents and illicit profit opportunities."167 
This line of reasoning is closely linked to the problem of transparency. As pointed out by 
Michael Ross, citizens in oil-exporting countries know that their governments receive oil 
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revenues, but they may not know the size and uses of those revenues.168 When such 
knowledge is nonexistent or limited, domestic constituents have no grounds to demand 
income redistribution, thus surrendering discretionary control over oil receipts to their 
rulers. While judgments about how budgetary transparency varies across different regime 
arrangements are difficult to make, it stands to reason that the extremely closed nature, 
and small coalition size, of personalist regimes would create informational opaqueness 
that is more difficult to achieve in other types of governance systems.169 In single-party 
regimes, many of which are ideologically committed, leaders are likely to provide 
information to party members,170 and party bureaucracies are more likely to be involved 
in the budgetary process. The same may hold for military and monarchic regimes, in 
which leaders may be compelled to share information with, respectively, members of the 
military or the aristocracy. Clearly, concealment is least likely in democracies, in which 
voters receive information from both government and independent sources and can 
extract concessions for greater public goods provision.171 Informed civil action through 
trade unions and labor parties could also increase calls for welfare spending and 
consumption and, thus, reduce executive discretionary control over oil revenue. 
But if leaders in personalist regimes have a greater ability to amass oil wealth and 
secretly monopolize its allocation, what does this mean for their propensity to initiate 
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militarized disputes? One possibility is that such discretionary resource could be used for 
offensive purposes; another, discussed in the next section, is that it could lower the 
decisional constraints imposed on political leaders. Conflict involves significant financial 
costs, and the greater a government's flexibility to allocate oil rents away from social 
spending and productive activity, the greater its actual or perceived ability to cover these 
costs. The rents offered by petroleum exports are unparalleled by those of any other 
resource, and some of this additional financial capability is likely to provide personalists 
with relatively more opportunities to pursue revisionist foreign policy objectives. In 
addition, oil money could be used to finance friendly regimes or meddle in the internal 
affairs of neighbors, and this type of indirect involvement could increase the prospect for 
adversarial, and potentially direct, interstate interactions. Under the personal rule of 
Muammar Qaddafi, for example, Libya provided financial support to various substate 
actors, both in the country’s immediate neighborhood and beyond, and these activities 
contributed to recurring tensions and conflict with other states. 
Greater discretionary control over oil income could also affect the prospect for arms 
buildup. While personalists may use their countries' natural wealth to maintain lavish 
lifestyles, they also have incentives to develop strong coercive capabilities. Weeks has 
observed that personalist institutions select leaders with greater desire for international 
goods,172 and such outward-oriented ambition cannot be pursued without hard power. 
When personalists enjoy monopolistic control over oil revenue, they have the means to 
enhance their offensive capabilities and, thus, broaden their portfolio of foreign policy 
options. The concentration of financial capital in the hands of a single individual is also a 
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honey pot for external arms suppliers, typically great powers, who compete for well-
financed clients free to enter contractual arrangements. Indeed, the procurement efforts of 
despotic rulers have been impressive. Qaddafi's massive arms purchases of the 1970s, 
made possible by the leader's exclusive control over Libya's National Oil Corporation, are 
one notorious example.173 Saddam Hussein's decades-long weaving of a global web of 
front companies tasked with arms procurement is another, again achieved through the 
appropriation of tens of billions of oil dollars, this time from the Iraqi oil chest.174 
But personal ambition need not be the only incentive for such large-scale arms 
acquisitions. Objective factors, both internal and external to the state, could be equally, if 
not more, important. Domestically, personalists consolidate power through successive 
power grabs,175 and physical elimination of challenger groups and severe punishment for 
dissent are common instruments for such consolidation.176 Lacking broad-based 
institutional structures that could legitimize their rule, despots rely heavily on force to 
achieve and maintain social control. Internationally, these leaders also face legitimate 
security concerns. Geddes has noted that some of the most potent threats to personalists 
stem from external sources,177 and Peceny and Butler have reported that, compared with 
other regime types, personalist regimes are more frequent dispute targets.178 If these 
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observations are correct, the channeling of discretionary oil wealth into arms buildup 
could be a rational response to elite insecurity. In the case of Iraq, for example, Hussein 
had to hedge against both internal and external security threats, from Kurdish separatism 
(backed by Washington and Tehran) in northern Iraq, to Shia uprisings and coup 
attempts, to long-standing territorial disagreements with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab. 
Whether endogenously or exogenously motivated, the arms buildup afforded by oil rents 
could create a more permissive context for conflict initiation: as geographical contiguity 
opens more channels for negative interstate interactions, so does an enhanced coercive 
capacity present more opportunities for its own use. This is not to suggest, however, that 
military opportunism, especially one involving the actual use of force, would pay off. 
Conflict outcomes depend on many factors, including soldiers' morale, individual 
initiative, and warfighting skill.179 In personalist regimes, these very qualities may be 
undermined by the dictator's incentive to suppress potential challenges emanating from 
the military establishment. As pointed out by Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow, 
personalists "control military promotions, promote their cronies, and eliminate 
individuals who they deem to be disloyal."180 While these measures of power 
consolidation could increase a leader's control over the arms forces, they could also 
reduce the internal cohesion and warfighting proficiency of those forces. Therefore, the 
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question of conflict initiation should be treated separately from that of conflict 
outcomes.181 
Decisional constraints 
The foregoing analysis is theoretically minimalist, in the sense that it does not explicitly 
address how regime-based income allocation could influence the decisional constraints 
imposed on petrostate leaders' foreign policy choices. Superimposing the former onto the 
latter is a logical next step of investigation. Decisional constraints are unique to the 
institutional setup of the state, and depend on the composition and internal power 
structure of a governing arrangement. Scholars studying conflict behavior have 
distinguished between ex ante constraints, or institutional barriers to foreign policy 
implementation, and ex post accountability, or the degree to which leaders can suffer 
costs or be punished for failed or poorly crafted policies.182 Both types of constraints can 
influence executive decisionmaking, but accountability mechanisms have generally been 
seen as more important.183 Although previous research has looked at decisional 
constraints to investigate dispute initiation across Geddes et al.'s regime types, it has not 
considered the potential impact of oil income on the strength of these constraints. 
Before considering this impact, it is useful to examine how decisional constraints could 
vary on the basis of institutional characteristics alone. A handful of earlier studies, some 
already identified, have suggested that personalist regimes may be less constrained than 
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both democracies and other autocracies,184 an expectation largely in line with 
conventional arguments found in the democratic peace literature. According to these 
accounts, external restraint is less likely in personalist regimes, because they lack strong 
institutions and domestic audiences that could veto executive decisions or sanction 
leaders who adopt unwise foreign policies.185 Policy choices are largely at the discretion 
of the ruler, and the ruler is not formally or otherwise compelled to seek popular consent 
or consult with others in making them. In democracies, restraint is seen as considerably 
more likely, because legislatures, courts, and opposition parties can block the 
implementation of risky foreign policies and elections can empower voters to punish 
(remove from office) executives whose military initiatives fail to deliver. 
Although single-party, military, and monarchic regimes are less institutionalized than 
democracies, they also have formal institutions and organized domestic audiences that 
could impose ex ante or ex post decisional constraints on leaders. In monarchies, these 
constraints stem from the aristocracy, which could derive veto or punitive power from the 
"quality of lineage" or, in systems that are not purely hereditary, from unequal access to 
means of coercion.186 In single-party and military regimes, rulers formulate foreign 
policy within collegial institutional settings, such as party committees or military 
councils, which have established rules for power sharing and consultation.187 In addition, 
institutional membership allows ruling elites to collectively bargain with the dictator and 
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influence foreign policy decisions.188 In the event of a major foreign policy failure, such 
membership could also reduce barriers to elite coordination and allow military officers or 
high-ranking party functionaries to depose an incompetent leader.189 
While this picture is broadly consistent with the regime characterizations proposed by 
Geddes et al., it tends to underplay the decisional constraints faced by personalists. One 
confounding issue is related to the empirical observation that these leaders' historical 
record on the battlefield has been less successful than that of both democracies and other 
autocracies. Personalist regimes have not won a single war since 1945, lost 12, and drew 
in 4.190 By comparison, over the same period, single-party regimes have prevailed in five 
wars (lost one and drew in eight) and democracies have won most of their contests.191 
Why would personalists initiate conflicts with historically poor odds for success? One 
possibility is that their tenure is comparatively less sensitive to unfavorable war 
outcomes, and a recent study of this relationship has provided some support for this 
claim.192 Still, the rational basis for implementing costly policies with consistently 
negative returns is not obvious. As noted by Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, 
"[d]efeat in war almost always alters the losers freedom of action by some measure, 
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reducing the nation's autonomy over its own foreign policy or depriving the vanquished 
state of sovereignty over some portion of its citizens, territory, or national product."193 
The conditional effect of war outcomes on personalist tenure also may have been 
underestimated. The number of wars initiated by despotic regimes is small, and wars are 
historically rare events even at higher levels of regime aggregation. In addition, empirical 
work focusing on the domestic effects of autocratic military interventions (as opposed to 
wars) has found that personalists' external use of force generates elite unrest both 
contemporaneously with the dispatch of forces and as a military intervention 
progresses.194 This effect, which is either absent or weaker in single-party and military 
regimes, suggests that the key constituents in personalist regimes may be more willing to 
stand up against their rulers than is commonly assumed. Even if such challenges are less 
likely to result in leader ouster than commensurate challenges in other regimes, they 
certainly do not benefit personalists' domestic standing. To this end, Pickering and 
Kisangani have observed that the "domestic positions [of personalists] are made 
significantly worse by the use of force abroad since it generates substantial unrest within 
their core constituency."195 
A second analytical difficulty arises with regards to the severity of punishment after 
leader ouster. In democracies, that severity is arguably the lowest, given that most 
democratic leaders who are voted out of office in the wake of foreign policy debacles can 
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transition to a quiet and profitable retirement, albeit one marked by disgrace.196 By 
comparison, the post-ouster fates of autocratic rulers are both harsher and heterogeneous 
across nondemocratic regime subtypes. Geddes et al. have reported that, after removal 
from power, 69 percent of personalists face "exile, imprisonment, or death," a figure that 
goes down to a significantly lower 37 percent for leaders in single-party regimes and to 
estimates between these two extremes for rulers in monarchic and military regimes.197 
These percentages likely reflect institutional differences across autocracies. Although 
leaders in nonpersonalist autocratic regimes have fewer pathways to a painless exit than 
their democratic counterparts, they may still manage to avoid the harshest of punishment, 
either by rejoining the lower ranks of the institutions through which they have risen to 
power or by negotiating a peaceful transition that shields them from prosecution.198 
The comparatively bleaker fate of deposed personalists has normally been discounted in 
research on conflict onset. Weeks, for example, has argued that, because of the low 
probability of ouster in despotic regimes, the fears generated by the prospect of severe 
punishment are "unlikely to overwhelm."199 While this dismissal of personalists' 
sensitivity to costs may prove inconsequential in empirical tests, its theoretical 
justification is debatable. A rational, forward-looking leader contemplating the initiation 
of conflict is likely to assess the risk of such action on the basis of, on the one hand, the 
probability of ouster and, on the other, the severity of punishment, conditional on ouster. 
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While in personalist regimes that risk corresponds to a low probability but high 
consequence event, in other regimes it reflects a comparatively higher probability but 
lower consequence event. Therefore, the overall level of risk across cases, though 
unsusceptible to precise quantification, is qualitatively similar. This insight implies 
analytical indeterminism that cannot be easily sorted out without consideration of other 
factors.200 
A less ambiguous picture could emerge in a constraints-based analysis that takes into 
account resource effects. Because petrostates differ in institutional setup, the impact of oil 
income on their leaders' decisional constraints—and, hence, those leaders' propensity to 
initiate disputes—would not be uniform. The mechanism of heterogeneous income 
allocation laid out in the previous section implies that, given their greater discretionary 
control over oil revenue, personalists may find it relatively easier to overcome decisional 
barriers to accepting foreign policy risks. Oil wealth could affect how these leaders assess 
the costs of threatening or using military force, as well as their perceived ability to 
manipulate these costs, get around domestic voices of dissent, and prevail over 
adversaries. In petrostates of other regime types, the decisional effects of oil are more 
likely to be subdued, both because of comparatively weaker mechanisms of elite rent 
appropriation (and less discretionary oil funds at executive disposal) and because of 
audience identity and compositional characteristics less conducive to such effects. 
Although leaders in personalist regimes do not face strong, organized domestic 
audiences, they still rely on the support of a small, informal group of elite insiders. As 
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literatures. See, for example, Desch, "Democracy and Victory," 24; and Schultz, Democracy and Coercive 
Diplomacy, 14–15. 
62 
 
suggested earlier, this group's main motivation for participation in government is access 
to pecuniary and other material rewards. As long as these benefits continue to flow, the 
group's loyalty is secured; when they are threatened or insufficient—as may be the case 
during costly conflicts or after lost ones—elite unrest is more likely to ensue.201 The high 
value personalist insiders place on the provision of private benefits is an important 
audience characteristic, because it increases their sensitivity to material inducements. 
Discretionary oil wealth thus emerges as a powerful tool at the disposal of leaders in 
petrostates with personalist institutions, as it makes it easier for them to co-opt insider 
support for confrontational policies.202 In the event of elite unrest, personalists could also 
employ divide-and-rule strategies (selective bribing) to disrupt coordination among 
challengers or use their oil-financed coercive apparatus to purge disloyal members of the 
elite.203 Therefore, by lowering personalists' vulnerability to costs and ouster, the 
additional resources offered by oil create conditions less conducive to foreign policy 
restraint. 
Similar constraint-reducing effects could occur in nonpersonalist petrostates, but they are 
likely to be weaker. Having less discretionary control over oil income, and facing more 
veto points from ruling coalition members shielded by unifying domestic institutions, 
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executives in such regimes would have a reduced ability to co-opt or coerce elite support 
(either en masse or as part of a divide-and-rule strategy) for external aggression. 
Decisionmaking in larger coalition systems requires greater coordination and 
cooperation, and, given those systems' tendency to favor broader distribution of benefits, 
collective action problems over controversial foreign policies are more likely to persist. 
Not less important, however, are the identity characteristics of nonpersonalist civilian and 
military audiences. Geddes has observed that these audiences participate in office for 
reasons more diverse than those of members of personalists' inner circle.204 Although 
access to oil rents could be one such reason, other motivations—including political 
ideology, institutional allegiance (as one could expect, for instance, from a career military 
officer), or the opportunity to influence policy—may be just as important. This insight 
implies that ruling coalition members in nonpersonalist petrostates may be less inclined 
to trade ex ante policy support or ex post loyalty in exchange for material rewards.205 
While government elites pose the greatest domestic threat to autocratic leaders,206 
popular challenges from below—i.e., from poor, disenfranchised segments of the 
population—remain a possibility, particularly in times of crisis.207 Costly conflicts, or 
conflicts gone badly, could have two effects: one weakening the repressive apparatus of 
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incumbents and one damaging the domestic economy.208 If these effects are strong, they 
can increase the likelihood of popular uprising, both by opening windows of opportunity 
for potential challenger groups and by making economic grievances more acute. Whether 
this type of violent threat would materialize or succeed, however, depends partly on the 
resources available to leaders. In personalist petrostates, government resilience to 
rebellion should be comparatively greater, because despotic rulers' discretionary access to 
oil funds allows them to selectively redistribute rents (to buy off the most threatening 
domestic factions and intensify the collective action problem among them) and to more 
quickly recover military assets (and loyalties) and repress segments of the population that 
do indeed rebel.209 Perhaps the most vivid testament of this resilience was Saddam 
Hussein's impressive ability to withstand and crush popular uprisings during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, periods that followed two wars (both initiated by Hussein) that 
devastated oil-rich Iraq. 
It is important to stress that the ex post aspects of the preceding argument concern 
leaders' perceptions about possible outcomes, not actual outcomes. Prior to conflict 
initiation, leaders do not know with certainty whether their military actions would 
succeed or fail, how costly a conflict would be, or whether they would be punished 
severely. In this sense, all decisional constraints are ex ante constraints: they are 
probabilistic assessments (about outcomes) influenced by mediating factors (in this case, 
institutional characteristics and oil resources). The central role of human perception in 
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this process points to another, psychological channel with potentially important effect on 
the strength of decisional constraints: leaders' beliefs about their odds to prevail in 
conflict. If such perceptions are elevated, they would, by implication, make executives 
less sensitive to costs, as such costs would be seen as less likely in the first place. 
Previous research, starting with the early work of Geoffrey Blainey, has, in fact, shown 
that the presence of inflated optimism about the prospect for winning can contribute to 
conflict initiation.210 Such condition tends to manifest in "aggressive and risky military 
planning" and "hawkish and provocative policies," which increase the likelihood of 
bargaining failure.211 
Overconfidence could arise as a result of both unmotivated and motivated biases.212 The 
former, which are independent of preferences and interests, typically take the form of 
"bounded rationality," or a heuristic cognitive frame that could make leaders less attentive 
to conflicting information and more prone to misjudging the capabilities of adversaries 
(and their own).213 Motivated biases, on the other hand, are purposive and driven by 
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leaders' emotional needs. Political psychologists have found that most adult individuals, 
particularly men, have the tendency to exaggerate their intellectual and physical abilities, 
a disposition conducive to "illusion of control" and a sense of invulnerability.214 This 
tendency is usually stronger when decisionmakers are in "implemental mindsets," that is, 
when they focus on carrying out a policy and resist further deliberation and cognitive 
updating with new information.215 Motivated biases also strengthen perceptions of 
overconfidence by promoting policy choices based on "wishful thinking" rather than 
objective assessment of the situation; as observed by Jack Levy, "the desirability of an 
outcome often influences the perceived likelihood that it would occur."216 
It is reasonable to expect that these biases—and, therefore, foreign policy judgments less 
sensitive to costs and ex post accountability—would occur more frequently among 
leaders in personalist petrostates. Psychological mechanisms of choice under conditions 
of risk are stronger at the individual level,217 and decisionmaking in despotic regimes is, 
indeed, largely at the discretion of a single ruler whose beliefs are rarely second-guessed 
by elite insiders.218 Moreover, personalist institutions may select leaders with greater risk 
tolerance and greater desire for international goods,219 establishing even more fertile 
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grounds for the emergence of both unmotivated and motivated biases. Discretionary oil 
wealth, along with the coercive capacity afforded by it, would only amplify these 
attitudes, by increasing a personalist ruler's confidence in his or her ability to intimidate 
neighbors, conduct military operations, and absorb the costs of conflict. By comparison, 
in nonpersonalist regimes, collective decisionmaking in formal civilian or military 
institutions, coupled with reduced executive control over oil funds, would tend to 
suppress biases of overconfidence.220 More deliberation in decision processes and greater 
preference diversity among elite constituents would also minimize the odds that 
implemental mindsets and motivated biases would take root. 
Illustrative evidence in support of this argument is not hard to find. As noted earlier, one 
of the empirical puzzles associated with the foreign policy choices of personalists is their 
tendency to initiate conflicts with consistently poor outcomes, and the presence of 
inflated optimism is one probable contributor to such self-defeating behaviors.221 This 
interpretation is consistent with recent work by Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 
who have written that "expecting a lot and gaining little [from conflict] implies 
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overconfidence."222 Despots in petrostates appear particularly prone to this condition. 
Under the leadership of Qaddafi and Hussein, for example, Libya and Iraq initiated very 
costly, ultimately unsuccessful, conflicts, which brought no tangible payoffs to either 
country. Hussein's belief in the strength of his armed forces remained upbeat even shortly 
before the U.S. launch of Operation Desert Storm (January 1991), when, in October 
1990, he instructed his generals in Kuwait to “stay motionless under the ground [during 
the anticipated U.S. air raids] just a little time.... On the ground, the Americans will not 
be able to put forces as strong as you are.”223 In the case of Libya, Qaddafi's diplomatic 
provocations and military aggression continued well into the second half of the 1980s, 
and their scope and intensity were grossly outsized for a country with a population of just 
four million. 
A note on diversion 
A potential objection to the argument presented so far could come from accounts 
focusing on diversionary incentives as a driver of autocratic conflict behavior. As 
discussed previously, a major study by Lai and Slater has seen military regimes as the 
most likely users of diversionary force, whereas another by Pickering and Kisangani has 
predicted the same for single-party regimes.224 In the former case, the prospect for 
diversion has been linked to reduced levels of government security and legitimacy, or 
infrastructural power, under the assumption that this condition is both more common 
among military regimes and sufficient to drive external aggression. In the latter, which 
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has tied diversionary motives to winning coalition size, autocrats in larger coalitions have 
been thought to have greater incentives to divert, because of their more limited 
discretionary funds for political survival. 
Neither of these accounts, however, has made a persuasive empirical or theoretical case. 
Lai and Slater's statistical tests have grouped personalist and military regimes in a single 
category, thus sidelining institutional differences between these two types of autocracy 
and casting doubt on the validity of their results. Using more fine-grained regime data, 
recent replications of the authors' work have found no support for the infrastructural 
power perspective.225 Pickering and Kisangani's regression analyses provide additional 
reasons for skepticism, some of which extend to their own theoretical predictions. The 
authors' results indicate that the external use of force creates substantial mass unrest in 
military regimes and cedes no political benefits to leaders in single-party regimes. 
Therefore, reciprocal models, considered essential to ascertaining the presence of 
diversionary motives,226 imply that the causal mechanisms offered in comparative 
accounts based on diversionary war logic are, at best, exaggerated or, at worst, 
unfounded. 
These empirical issues likely reflect gaps in theory.227 In Lai and Slater’s framework, 
decisional process and constraints, central to the present argument, have been given no 
causal importance. This approach is questionable because the decision to initiate conflict 
is the product of individual judgments, group deliberations, and bargaining routines that 
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are not identical across different institutional arrangements. In addition, it is not clear 
whether military governments enjoy less legitimacy than other regimes or that military 
leaders are particularly fond of threatening or using external force; indeed, a number of 
scholars have asserted quite the opposite.228 Although Pickering and Kisangani have 
adopted a more nuanced research design based on reciprocal models, they have been 
unable to demonstrate an unambiguous relationship between conflict payoffs and 
diversionary motives. This setback points to the plausibility of an explanatory channel in 
which the excess, rather than the lack, of discretionary resources contributes to dispute 
initiation—precisely the theoretical niche tapped here. 
3.2 External sources of variation 
The theory laid out so far suggests that, all else equal, institutional differences across 
petrostates—in particular those along the personalist–nonpersonalist fault line—could 
explain differences in those states' conflict behavior. Implicit in this account is a 
conceptual experiment whereby domestic attributes of actors are allowed to vary, 
whereas external environments—understood broadly as exogenous structures that 
constrain strategic choice—are assumed invariant and independent of actor 
characteristics.229 It is clear, however, that the international circumstances in which 
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petrostates find themselves could differ over time and across space, and when they do, 
different petrostate behaviors may ensue. That this is the case is attested by earlier 
empirical examples showing that, even in the absence of domestic institutional variation, 
the propensity of petrostates to initiate disputes has varied both temporally and spatially. 
To account for these patterns, it is important to abstract from petrostates' regime-type 
attributes and to identify exogenous conditions that could make petroagression more or 
less likely—an approach informed by David Lake and Robert Powell's observation that 
"changes in the environment may explain why the behavior of different groups of similar 
actors change."230 
There is another reason why this conceptual experiment is needed. Petrostates, by virtue 
of their unique geography and place in the global economy,231 are of special interest to 
the international community, particularly its most powerful members. Therefore, one 
could reasonably expect that their foreign policy choices will be affected by factors 
located at the international level. One possibility, recognized by the strategic-oil 
proposition, is that oil exporters will enjoy greater protection from powerful oil 
importers, with the implication that the former's military behavior will be less constrained 
externally. As argued at length in the previous chapter, however, strategic oil is an 
account concerned with differences between petrostates and nonpetrostates; it cannot, by 
design, explain why protection sometimes breaks down and why some petrostates are 
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more belligerent than others. Moreover, the proposition fails to acknowledge that it is 
precisely petrostates' unique economic status that also creates strong incentives for 
external powers to constrain those states' freedom of action (see section 2.2). For 
petroagression to occur, then, there must be environmental conditions under which these 
constraints are relaxed. 
The purpose of this section is to identify these conditions. The chosen analytical approach 
is a system–subsystem one, focusing on the overall international system's structural 
properties, understood in relative power terms (polarity), and its interaction with the 
regional subsystems within which petrostates exist and make foreign policy choices. 
Consistent with this realist framework,232 special attention is given to the most powerful 
members of the global system—superpowers (the system's "poles")—and their intrusion, 
or penetration, in subordinate systems containing petrostates. It is argued that, depending 
on the number of penetrating superpowers and, in some specifications, local structural 
conditions, regional subsystems could be more or less competitive, over time and across 
geography, thereby altering the structural bounds—and, thus, the external constraints and 
opportunities—that condition petrostate conflict behavior. 
3.2.1 The relevant environments 
One can distinguish between two environments, or systems, in which states, including 
petrostates, exist and interact: a global, or dominant, system; and regional, or subordinate, 
                                                 
232 Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in Regionalism in World Politics, eds. 
Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 47. 
73 
 
subsystems.233 Delineating the former is uncontroversial because, naturally, it represents 
the entire globe, with all its constituent nation-states; there can be no system larger than 
the whole.234 What constitutes a regional subsystem—or a "region"235—is less settled, 
however. Some scholars have opted not to define it, instead using proper geographical 
names suitable to their analysis. Others have offered more formal, though sometimes 
contested, definitions. David Lake and Patrick Morgan, for example, have used the term 
"regional security complex," first coined by Barry Buzan,236 defining it as “a set of states 
continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct 
geographical area.”237 As observed by Buzan and Ole Waever, however, this definition is 
unsatisfactory because, by focusing on security externalities, it implies "unimaginable 
multiplication of issues (and thereby security complexes)."238 It is more sensible, the 
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authors suggest, to see regional complexes as geographically delineated "clusters of close 
security interdependence."239 
Despite definitional disagreements of this kind, most conceptualizations of regional 
subsystems share some key similarities. These are prominently laid out in William 
Thompson's early, yet still authoritative work on the subject.240 In it, Thompson 
identified 21 different attributes used by scholars to define regional subsystems. Looking 
for points of convergence, he isolated three common attributes: a regular interaction 
between two or more states, general geographical proximity between those states, and 
internal and external recognition of the region as a distinct "theatre of operation."241 The 
first two criteria appear most consistently in the literature on regionalism and, as 
observed by Thompson himself, "proximity and regular interaction come closest to 
supplying the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of regional 
subsystem."242 Therefore, the latter conceptualization, which is similar to that proposed 
                                                 
239 Ibid., 43. 
240 William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional 
Inventory," International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1973): 89–117. 
241 A similar observation appears in Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), where Russett writes that "[t]here is no consensus on what 
constitute the characteristics of an international subsystem, though geographical contiguity, interaction, and 
belonging to a distinctive community are frequently offered" (7). 
242 Thompson, "The regional subsystem," 96. 
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by Buzan and Waever, as well as others,243 is the preferred theoretical construct adopted 
here.244 
But why pay attention to petrostates' regional environments? The most basic reason is 
that the region represents the immediate context of interstate military interaction. Security 
interdependence tends to cluster geographically, an insight often linked to Kenneth 
Boulding's notion of the loss-of-strength gradient, which suggests that the ability of states 
to project hard power dissipates with distance.245 As noted by Buzan, "threats, 
particularly political and military ones, are most strongly felt when they are at close 
range."246 It makes little sense to think of, say, Iraq (a petrostate) as a military threat to 
Argentina, or Venezuela (also a petrostate) as a menace to Syria. The distances—and the 
physical barriers—separating the countries in those pairs are such that, given their 
capabilities, not much security interaction could be expected, even if one were desired. 
Moreover, geography affects not only states' "opportunity" to engage militarily with one 
another, but also their "willingness" to do so.247 States that are physically proximate tend 
                                                 
243 See, for example, Douglass Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 59–60, 69; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987), 276–277. 
244 The concept allows for different empirical operationalizations. The specific regions used in the 
quantitative analysis are presented in chapters 4 and 5. They are based on classifications proposed in 
Lemke, Regions of War and Peace; and Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers. 
245 See Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 
78–79. Boulding argued that, because of distance's discounting effect on power, states exert most of their 
influence in geographically limited areas, or "zones of viability." 
246 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 188. 
247 See, for example, Harvey Starr, "Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality: The Geography of International 
Conflict," International Studies Review 7 (2005): 387–406; Paul F. Diehl, "Geography and War: A Review 
and Assessment of the Empirical Literature," International Interactions 17, no. 1 (1991): 11–27; Benjamin 
A. Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Columbia: University of South 
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to see each other as more important and the issues at stake in their relations as more 
salient.248 When the use of force is facilitated by distance, it may become the preferred 
policy choice in resolving common issues of interstate contention, such as territorial 
disagreements (including those over natural resources) or negative cross-border 
externalities. 
Bifurcating the external environment into regional and global also serves the central 
analytical objective pursued here, namely, explaining variation in petrostate conflict 
behavior. Most states normally considered petrostates—and all included in the sample for 
this dissertation (see next chapter)—are lesser powers located in what Buzan and Waever 
have called "standard" regions, or geographical areas without great powers.249 
Consequently, for reasons already discussed, the security interactions of those states will 
be locked into regional clusters of limited military viability, which are, in turn, embedded 
into the global system. To the extent that one can identify characteristics of these 
environments that are pertinent to petrostate conflict initiation—a task tackled in the next 
section—the system–subsystem framework permits an investigation whereby the 
"spatiality" of petroagression can be revealed. Even without statistical analysis and 
formal delineation of regional subsystems, anecdotal evidence suggests that spatial 
differences in petrostate belligerence do indeed exist; oil exporters clustered in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carolina Press, 1989), 23; and Harvey Starr, "Opportunity and Willingness as Ordering Concepts in the 
Study of War," International Interactions 4 (1978): 363–378. 
248 Starr, "Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality," 391. Starr writes that "proximity makes states (or other 
units) that are close to one another 'relevant' to one another through some combination of both opportunity 
and willingness." 
249 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 55. 
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Middle East, for example, seem to have outdone their counterparts in South America or 
Sub-Saharan Africa on that count. 
What makes the system–subsystem perspective particularly valuable, however, is that it 
presents a venue for examining the interaction between the global and regional levels, 
with a focus on their most relevant structural traits and actors. A key part of this 
interactivity is what Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel have termed the "intrusive 
system," which "consists of the politically significant participation of external powers in 
the international relations of the subordinate system."250 Neither a purely global nor a 
purely regional perspective can account for this dimension, and sidelining one or the 
other could be a significant theoretical omission, because the two levels do not 
necessarily operate in parallel. Accounting for the intrusive system could also help one 
capture temporal variations in local environmental conditions, since a structural change in 
the global system is likely to be transmitted to the regional level. 
3.2.2 Structural bounds, superpower penetration, and regional orders 
To be analytically useful, the proposed system–subsystem framework should specify 
system-level properties, both regional and global, that could affect, either directly or 
indirectly, the conflict behavior of petrostates. In neorealist terms, these properties can be 
described as "structural," in the sense that they represent "a set of constraining 
conditions," external to actors, that shape foreign policy choices "by rewarding some 
behaviors and punishing others."251 In international security, the strongest constraint on 
                                                 
250 Cantori and Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions, 25. By "politically significant involvement," 
the authors mean involvement that could produce an "alteration in the balance of power in the region" (26). 
251 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 73–74. 
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state action is arguably that imposed by relative power. This follows from the observation 
that, as an exercise of strength, the use or threat of military force can be countered in 
kind, and its perceived prospect for success or failure is contingent upon the capabilities 
of others. Therefore, calculations about relative power dictate the range of likely conflict 
behaviors in a system and the competitiveness of that system. 
As observed by Kenneth Waltz, while power is a state-level attribute, its distribution 
among states is a structural characteristic.252 Typically, the distribution of capabilities is 
conceived in terms of "polarity," a notion reflecting the number of power centers, or 
"poles," in a given system. At the global level, polarity is determined by the most 
powerful states dominating world politics—countries often referred to as great powers 
and, since World War II, superpowers.253 A shift in polarity (that is, a change in the 
number of poles) signifies a major structural transformation in the international system 
and the level of competition within it. For the period of analysis used in this dissertation 
(1971–2001), one such transformation took place—from a highly competitive bipolar 
system during the Cold War to a less competitive unipolar system after it.254 In that 
transformation, one of the poles, the Soviet Union, imploded and fell from superpower 
status, abjuring its external security commitments in various parts of the world and 
withdrawing from its hegemonic competition with the United States (the other pole). 
                                                 
252 Ibid., 98. 
253 In this dissertation, the terms "great power" and "superpower" are used interchangeably; see Birthe 
Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics: A Theory and Its Implications (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 5, especially footnote 2.  
254 Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein, "Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War," in 
Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, eds. Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. 
Kapstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
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In principle, the concept of polarity can also be applied to the regional level. This 
possibility is of interest because the region is the proximate environment in which 
petrostates interact, and knowledge about its structural makeup could aid understanding 
about the security nature of that interaction. If different regional subsystems exhibit 
different configurations of power, it may be that the conflict behaviors of their members 
would differ as well. In discussing the structure and functioning of regional security 
complexes, for example, Lake and Morgan have suggested that regions could vary "not in 
terms of the variables [that describe them], but in the values attached to those 
variables…one region might be bipolar in structure, another unipolar, a third 
multipolar."255 In a similar vein, Buzan has written that "in analyzing a security complex 
in terms of its distribution of power, the logic is the same as that for analyzing the 
polarity of the system as a whole."256 
Security analyses based on regional polarity, however, are of dubious validity, a problem 
recognized even by the scholars who have entertained them. The reason is that the region 
is an "open" system embedded into a larger, "closed" one, and, hence, is not insulated 
from external influence and global structural impacts.257 Superpowers can provide local 
actors with military, economic, and political support—a condition often termed 
                                                 
255 Lake and Morgan, "The New Regionalism in Security Affairs," 9. See also Lake, "Regional Security 
Complexes: A Systems Approach," in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, eds. David 
Lake and Patrick Morgan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 60. 
256 Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 211. 
257 This issue has compelled scholars to second-guess their own accounts. Buzan (People, States, and 
Fear), for example, has noted that, since regional polarity is "easily upset and distorted" by external forces, 
it "has never proved very useful" and is a "much less reliable guide to security relations in the periphery 
than...at the centre" (188–189). Making a similar point, Lake ("Regional Security Complexes") has 
observed that analyses based on regional polarity are "very tentative" and "problematic" (60). 
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penetration or interference258—profoundly distorting the power configuration among 
them and changing the structural backdrop against which foreign policy choices are 
made. This dynamic is aptly illustrated by power relations in the Middle East during the 
Cold War. The general consensus about the local configuration of power in that region, 
which has the highest concentration of petrostates anywhere in the world, is that it is 
multipolar.259 During the Cold War, however, the Middle East was divided into two 
competing camps, each backed by one of the superpowers,260 replicating the bipolar 
character of the global system. The confounding influence of superpower penetration was 
also felt in the power standing of states in particular dyads. U.S. withdrawal of support 
for Iran in 1979, for example, significantly improved the relative position of Iraq, a much 
weaker regional state, and undoubtedly played a major—and perhaps even decisive—role 
in the onset of the Iran–Iraq War.261 
These considerations suggest that superpower penetration is an essential structural feature 
of regional subsystems.262 For the present investigation, it is also of primary interest 
                                                 
258 See, for example, Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 50–51; and Buzan and Waever, Regions and 
Powers, 46. 
259 See, for example, Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 37; and contributions in Lake and Morgan, 
Regional Orders. 
260 The two camps were those of "radical" states, supported by the Soviet Union, and "moderate" states, 
backed by the United States. Although the membership of each camp changed somewhat over time, the 
bipolar configuration remained largely intact until the end of the Cold War in 1989. See Birthe Hansen, 
Unipolarity and the Middle East (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2000), 22. 
261 The historical evidence also suggests that the United States played a nontrivial role in sanctioning Iraqi 
aggression. See, for example, Hiro, The Longest War, 71; and Said Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics 
of Revenge (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), 194–195. 
262 Counting penetration as a structural variable does not violate the Waltzian warning against reduction. 
Although it implies something about superpower interest, it is exogenously imposed on the regional 
subsystem and its constituent units. As noted by Waltz (Theory of International Politics), definitions of 
structure should be "free of the attributes and interactions of units...so we can distinguish between variables 
at the level of the units and variables at the level of the system" (79). Buzan and Waever (Regions and 
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because, as argued earlier, the most powerful members of the international system are 
likely to have an impact on what petrostates do or do not do in their immediate 
neighborhoods. Therefore, it is logical to ask what penetrative qualities would weaken or 
amplify the constraints placed on petrostate behavior. There are two plausible ways to 
theorize about this question: one that sees penetration as independent of regional power 
structures and one that sees it as mediated by them. 
Penetration imposed 
A strong globalist perspective of superpower penetration would suggest that the latter 
occurs independently of the indigenous power relations of the region. Having global 
interests and an overwhelming preponderance in military and economic capabilities, 
superpowers can impose themselves on the periphery irrespective of the wishes of local 
states. As noted by Douglas Lemke, "it has been conventional wisdom that the strong do 
as they will while the weak suffer as they must."263 When penetration does occur, it will 
override the power distribution of the local subsystem, engendering a specific "regional 
order."264 In principle, two such orders can be distinguished: "balance of power," in 
which power is distributed more equally among system units, and "hegemonic," in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
Powers) have argued that regional structures should also be defined in terms of their "patterns of amity and 
enmity" (50). Expanding the notion of structure in this way, however, has two major disadvantages. First, 
by focusing on idiosyncratic regional characteristics, it precludes the development of a general theory that 
could be applied in cross-regional comparisons. Second, by assuming that regional structures are shaped by 
state attributes and interactions, it cannot isolate the causal effect of either. 
263 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 50. 
264 In this dissertation, the concept of "regional order" is defined narrowly in terms of relative power. 
However, the broader literature on regional security, in particular that influenced by constructivism and 
liberal theory, has proposed other conceptualizations (security concerts, pluralistic security communities, 
etc.). See, for example, Patrick Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," in Regional 
Orders: Building Security in a New World, eds. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 
82 
 
power is heavily concentrated in a single system member.265 Since intrusive superpowers 
are active participants in the security relations of penetrated regions, they can be treated 
as power centers in those regions.266 Therefore, the number of penetrating superpowers 
would determine the regional order in which local states, including petrostates, interact. 
By definition, the number of penetrating superpowers cannot exceed the number of poles 
in the global system. For the time span considered here, two logical possibilities emerge: 
(1) bipolar or unipolar penetration during the period of global bipolarity and (2) unipolar 
penetration during the period of global unipolarity. In cases with bipolar penetration, the 
local configuration of power will be restructured in bipolar terms, with the regional order 
assuming a balance-of-power character.267 In this scenario, local states will coalesce 
around the two extraregional powers, readjusting their foreign policies to the parameters 
set by those powers. Likewise, in cases with unipolar penetration, the local configuration 
of power will be restructured in unipolar terms, with the regional order assuming a 
                                                 
265 The term "balance of power" has different meanings. The one adopted here is descriptive, denoting an 
equal, or roughly equal, distribution of power among two or more system units. It does, however, has a 
behavioral implication, namely, that power equality creates conditions for competitive behaviors that are 
not expected in systems with lopsided power distributions. For an overview of the various meanings of the 
term, see Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," World Politics 5, 
no. 4 (1953): 442–447. 
266 Scholars have debated whether or not external great powers should be counted as part of the regional 
subsystems they penetrate. (See, for example, Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 80.) The present 
argument sides with Lake's assessment that the issue is one of semantics rather than substance; see Lake, 
"Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order," Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 
35–58, 35. 
267 This framework can be extended to multipolar global systems, which allow for multipolar penetration. 
Regions penetrated by more than two superpowers could also be expected to assume a balance-of-power 
character. 
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hegemonic character. Here, local states, being dwarfed by a much stronger state, would 
eschew balancing and heed to the preferences of the unipole.268 
Variations in the type of order produced by penetration can be expected to affect the 
security competiveness of a region and, by implication, the conflict propensity of 
petrostates (and other lesser powers) located in that region. Balance-of-power orders are 
likely to be particularly conflict prone, because equal power distributions tend to breed 
more intense security competition than lopsided power distributions.269 When two 
superpowers penetrate a region, they would vie for regional influence by forming 
opposing networks of local clients, dramatically increasing the power level of the 
subsystem.270 Under such competitive conditions, these intrusive powers will have 
reduced incentives to constrain oil-rich states harboring aggressive designs, as this could 
cost them potentially valuable regional allies. They could also see significant benefit in 
                                                 
268 For a compelling perspective on how unipolarity restricts the choices and behavior of lesser powers, see 
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the 
Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
269 This argument sides with the broad group of "hegemonic stability" theories, such as power transition 
theory, which contend that power parities drive competitive behaviors and system instability by elevating 
each side's belief that it could prevail in a military confrontation. The idea is famously articulated by A.F.K. 
Organski, who has written that "nations are reluctant to fight unless they believe they have a good chance 
of winning, but this is true for both sides only when the two are fairly evenly matched, or at least when they 
believe they are...a preponderance of power, on the other hand, increases the chances for peace, for the 
greatly stronger side need not fight at all to get what it wants, while the weaker side would be plainly 
foolish to attempt to battle for what it wants"; see Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1968), 294. See also Blainey, The Causes of War; A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); Jacek Kugler and Douglass Lemke, "The Power Transition 
Research Program" in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus Midlarsky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000); and Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 
(1992): 309–341. For hegemonic stability theory, see Arthur Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 
1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World 
Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the 
Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–347. 
270 As noted by Buzan and Waever (Regions and Powers), superpower penetration in the Middle East 
during the Cold War "raised the overall level of military capability in the region" (200). 
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sanctioning, or even encouraging, petrostate revisionism. A superpower would likely 
deem petroagression—and the economic disturbances it might produce—acceptable 
insofar it does not affect its core hegemonial objectives or is directed against the interests 
and allies of the opposing superpower. Petrostates' oil money could also be an asset in 
such proxy competition, allowing superpowers to conserve their own resources and, at 
the same time, realize economic gains through the sale of arms and military 
equipment.271 
For their part, petrostates in regions with bipolar penetration will enjoy greater room to 
maneuver. If a petrostate has revisionist objectives that do not align with those of a 
superpower patron, it can seek a recourse to a competing superpower. Depending on the 
issues at stake, the superpower facing defection may or may not sanction the aggressive 
dispositions of a client. If it does, petroagression is likely to proceed with its overt 
support or tacit inaction; if it does not, the prospect for defection will increase, opening 
pathways to conflict initiation backed by the opposing side. Although this so-called 
double option can be exploited by all regional states,272 petrostates are in a particularly 
favorable position to do so. One of the primary means through which a penetrating 
superpower can constrain the behavior of a local client is by manipulating its military 
supply.273 However, having access to oil rents and being able to borrow money against 
future oil income, petrostates may find it easier to shift to a new supplier and to reduce 
                                                 
271 After the oil crisis of the early 1970s, oil-rich states became the primary drivers of superpower arms 
transfers. See, for example, contributions in Steven L. Spiegel, Mark Heller, and Jacob Goldberg, eds. The 
Soviet–American Competition in the Middle East (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988). 
272 Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East, 23. 
273 For a historical discussion of how the superpowers used arms transfers to influence the conflict behavior 
of Third World clients, including oil exporters, during the Cold War, see Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, 
Aid, and the Superpowers," Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5 (1988): 1044–1066. 
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their dependence on an old one. Superpowers are also more likely to prefer clients of 
economic value. Starting in the early 1970s, the United States, facing negative trade 
balances, and the Soviet Union, hit by a hard-currency crunch, scaled back the use of 
grants (military aid) in their arms dealings in the Third World.274 This shift made cash 
buyers, such as petrostates, more valuable clients in contested regions, enhancing their 
opportunities for strategic realignment.275 
Balance-of-power regional orders could also push otherwise nonrevisionist petrostates 
into more belligerent military postures. Although a penetrating superpower would afford 
some level of protection to a petrostate client, the presence of a regional competitor of 
roughly equal strength would render such protection more precarious. Indeed, states of 
greater value as clients for one side would most certainly be seen as states of greater 
value as targets by the other side. Therefore, bipolar penetration would increase the 
density of indigenous military threats faced by petrostates, elevating their actual or 
perceived insecurity. A petrostate operating in such threat environment is more likely to 
relate negatively with neighbors of unlike superpower alignment and, when proximate 
military threats arise, opt for preemptive tactics against potential challengers. Contrary to 
claims made by some scholars, bipolar penetration could also serve as a multiplier of 
issues of local contention: superpowers can export their competing ideological views to 
penetrated regions or even foster the creation and sustenance of new political entities in 
                                                 
274 See, for example, Efraim Karsh, The Cautious Bear: Soviet Military Engagement in Middle East Wars 
in the Post-1967 Era (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 7; and Steven L. Spiegel, "U.S. arms transfer 
and arms control policies," in Spiegel, Heller, and Goldberg, eds. The Soviet–American Competition, 35. 
275 Libya and Iraq provide illustrative examples of this type of petrostate realignment, with the former 
shifting from U.S. to Soviet alignment in the mid-1970s and the latter shifting from Soviet to U.S. 
alignment in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
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those regions.276 Such intrusive inputs are likely to breed negative security externalities, 
creating new threats and focal points around which hostile relations could form. 
All of these pathways to instability will be attenuated in the case of unipolar penetration. 
Absent regional competition with another superpower, the unipole will have no strategic 
incentives to sanction or encourage petroagression. Protection of friendly oil-rich states 
will be less likely to break down, reducing the security concerns of those with status-quo 
preferences. At the same time, the constraints imposed on petrostate foreign policy 
choices will be stronger. As the sole manager of the subsystem, the unipole has interest in 
establishing a stable hegemonic order, whereby local oil economies can function without 
unwarranted security disruptions. Although some regional petrostates, particularly those 
previously aligned with another superpower, may be unsatisfied with this order, their 
options for revision will be severely curtailed. Being at a large power disadvantage 
(individually or collectively) and lacking a recourse to a competing superpower (the 
double option), these states will be in no position to counterbalance or otherwise rival the 
unipole. As argued by Birthe Hansen, under such circumstances, lesser powers would 
either "flock" to the polar power (i.e., follow it) or "free ride" (i.e., take no action and 
seek relative gains).277 
                                                 
276 In discussing processes of regional securitization, Buzan and Waever (Regions and Powers) have argued 
that local patterns of amity and enmity are "not imported from the system level, but generated internally in 
the region" (47). That this claim is dubious, if not downright false, can be shown in many different ways, 
but perhaps the most obvious one is a recourse to historical events in the Middle East shortly after World 
War II, in particular the creation of Israel in 1948 and the overthrow of Iran's democratically elected Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. These developments, both pushed for and orchestrated by the 
United States (with a subordinate role of the United Kingdom), produced some of the most intractable, still 
lingering, focal points of regional contention. 
277 See Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics, 19. The limited strategic choices of lesser powers located 
in unipolar systems are nicely laid out by William Wohlforth: "The only options available to second-tier 
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One may ask what would occur if there is no penetration. The present theoretical 
specification (a strong view of penetration) assumes that penetrative interest exists in 
both bipolar and unipolar global structures. This assumption is not unreasonable given 
that either structural condition creates incentives for penetration: in the former case, these 
incentives stem from superpower rivalry at the global level; in the latter, they arise from 
the fact that the global unipole, unconstrained by an equally matched opponent, is free to 
fill power voids in oil-rich areas and establish political and economic order of its own 
liking. Despite these incentives, penetration may still not occur if a superpower has 
insufficient capability to meaningfully penetrate a region. In such cases, regional polarity, 
being unaffected by the intrusive system, could be a guide to analysis. Two important 
qualifications should be made, however. First, balance-of-power orders based on local 
bipolarity will exhibit significantly lower power levels than balance-of-power orders 
based on bipolar penetration.278 Second, in the absence of strategic backing by competing 
superpower patrons, local states would see their costs of conflict increase.279 For these 
reasons, it could still be expected that, in comparative terms, bipolar penetration—the key 
variable of interest here—would create conditions most conducive to petroagression. 
                                                                                                                                                 
states are to bandwagon with the polar power (either explicitly or implicitly) or, at least, to take no action 
that could incur its focused enmity. As long as their preferences are oriented around the power and 
preferences of the sole pole, second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for 
security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party would 
prevail. Moreover, the unipolar leader has the capability to be much more interventionist than earlier 
system leaders"; see Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 
(1999): 5–41, 25. See also Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance; and contributions in Mastanduno 
and Kapstein, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War. 
278 Subsystems with lower levels of power can be expected to be less revisionist. See Binder, "The Middle 
East as a Subordinate International System," 414–415. 
279 Making a similar point, Benjamin Miller has observed that strategic backing by great powers (e.g., arms 
resupply, diplomatic assistance, regime support) reduces the "costs and risks" for regional clients 
contemplating military aggression, increasing the likelihood of regional instability and conflict. See Miller, 
"When and How Regions Become Peaceful," International Studies Review 7 (2005): 229–267, 238. 
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Penetration invited 
While superpower penetration can be viewed as occurring independently from local 
power relations, it is also possible that it is mediated by them. Lake has argued that a 
region's autonomy from external interference is a function of its polarity, suggesting that 
unipolar regional systems, which are stabilized by one dominant local state, will be more 
autonomous than those with a greater number of poles.280 Although the theoretical basis 
for this claim is not fully developed, it rests on the idea that different regional power 
distributions exhibit different propensities to "invite" external meddling from the global 
system. Invitation may or may not involve an intentional act. In one form, it could be 
purposeful, as would be the case when local states seek military support from external 
powers. In another form, it could be an agency-free structural pull, whereby local power 
structures engender behaviors with negative security externalities that transcend regional 
boundaries and activate the intrusive system. 
This perspective allows one to probabilistically gauge superpower penetration (or lack 
thereof) on the basis of regional and global power distributions. Table 3-1 presents a two-
by-two matrix that shows the type of expected penetration for a given polar combination, 
along with the regional order (in parentheses) corresponding to that type. (Again, the 
possible number of penetrating superpowers is constrained by the polarity of the global 
system.) Regions with bipolar and multipolar configurations of power, which create 
conditions for competitive balancing behaviors, are shown as likely penetrated (cells I 
and II), for two reasons. First, because these regions are open systems, local states located 
in them can balance not only intraregionally but also extraregionally, inviting superpower 
                                                 
280 Lake, "Regional Security Complexes," 60; and Lake, "Regional Hierarchy," 36. 
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participation in the local balance of power. Second, because regional power parity is 
conducive to more intense military competition, it is likely to breed more negative 
security externalities, increasing the likelihood of superpower regional involvement. 
Neither of these forms of invitation is expected to operate in unipolar regions (cells III 
and IV). Having only one power center, these regions are less likely to see balancing 
behaviors and more likely to exhibit hegemonic management. To the extent that negative 
security externalities arise, they will be managed by the local unipole and be less likely to 
affect extraregional powers.281 
Table 3-1. Penetration and regional orders based on local and global power distributions 
Regional power 
distribution 
Global power distribution 
Bipolar Unipolar 
Bipolar/multipolar (I) Bipolar penetration likely 
(balance of power) 
(II) Unipolar penetration likely 
(hegemonic) 
Unipolar (III) Penetration unlikely 
(hegemonic) 
(IV) Penetration unlikely 
(hegemonic) 
Note: Expected regional orders are shown in parentheses.  
 
While table 3-1 problematizes the question of penetration with an indigenous structural 
component, it does not change the basic expectations laid out in the previous section. 
Regions with bipolar penetration (cell I) are still expected to be most competitive and, for 
reasons already discussed, most likely to create conditions for petroagression. It should 
be noted, however, that the designations in the table are only probabilistic: the autonomy 
                                                 
281 As noted by Lake ("Regional Security Complexes"), "unipolar regional security systems...will most 
easily manage negative security externalities and produce positive security externalities; the single pole is 
likely to reap a large absolute gain from managing the externality, and is most likely to form an effective k-
group" (60–61). 
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of unipolar regions is not guaranteed, nor is the penetration of regions with more than one 
pole assured. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
This section distills the key propositions advanced in sections 3.1 and 3.2, setting the 
stage for the empirical analyses presented in the next two chapters. The theory offered in 
section 3.1 was built upon the idea that while oil income can contribute to petroagression, 
its effects would be mediated by domestic political institutions. In particular, it was 
argued that, among petrostates of different regime types, those with personalist 
institutions would be more conflict prone than those of other institutional makeup, all else 
equal. This prediction was attributed to the unique compositional and identity 
characteristics of ruling elites in personalist regimes—characteristics including small 
winning coalition size, poor institutional quality, concentration of decisionmaking power 
in a single individual, elite loyalty based on material rewards, and leadership with a 
greater desire for rent-seeking and international goods and recognition. These 
institutional features were posited as factors that could influence how oil income is 
distributed domestically—a determinant of the discretionary resources under leadership 
control—and how such discretionary wealth could affect leaders' actual or perceived 
costs of threatening or using military force. In sum, the theory laid out in section 3.1 
yielded the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Petrostates with personalist regime institutions are more likely to initiate 
interstate conflict than petrostates with no such institutions. 
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Section 3.2 looked at the problem of variation from a different perspective, abstracting 
away from petrostate domestic institutional attributes (a necessary conceptual 
experiment) and focusing on the external environments in which petrostates exist and 
make strategic choices. These environments were analyzed within a system–subsystem 
framework, whereby special attention was paid to global and regional power structures 
and the penetration of superpowers in subordinate systems containing petrostates. This 
theoretical exercise was motivated by, among other things, the fact that petrostates 
operate in zones of limited military viability, the recognition that their economic 
importance as oil exporters creates unique constraints and opportunities for external 
action, and the expectation that these constraints and opportunities would be influenced 
by the global system's strongest of states. It was argued that petrostate regions penetrated 
by two (or more) superpowers would create conditions more conducive to petroagression. 
Bipolar penetration was posited as likely to increase the power level and threat density of 
regional security relations, reduce superpower incentives to constrain oil-rich states, 
present those states with more options for strategic realignment and militarization, and 
reduce their costs of threatening or using military force. In short, the argument converged 
on the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 2: Petrostates located in regional subsystems with bipolar superpower 
penetration (balance-of-power orders) are more likely to initiate interstate conflict than 
petrostates located in subsystems with unipolar or no penetration. 
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4 Quantitative analysis 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are predictive statements about the mediating effects of, respectively, 
internal regime characteristics and exogenous structural conditions on the conflict 
behavior of petrostates. Neither of these hypotheses implies anything about the specific 
targets of petrostate military aggression or the security interactions within particular pairs 
of states—instead, the focus is on individual countries. For that reason, the research 
design adopted here is monadic, positing the state-year as the unit of analysis.282 The 
monadic design, although chosen on the basis of theory, also presents some 
methodological advantages, such as minimizing missing-data problems, common in 
dyadic research, and increasing the frequency of conflict observations.283 
The study period used in all regressions runs from 1971 to 2001, with the ending year 
reflecting data-collection limitations. The starting year was chosen for three reasons. 
First, in 1971, Great Britain terminated its Persian Gulf Residency, lifting its colonial 
footprint from an area flush with oil resources.284 Because of this development, three new 
political entities—Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (a merger of six Gulf 
sheikhdoms)—entered the international scene as independent oil-exporting countries 
unencumbered by British political and economic control. Second, the early 1970s marked 
the beginning of a new oil age, a time when a massive wave of oil-industry 
                                                 
282 A monadic perspective suggests that "countries can in principle fight any other country"; see Russett and 
Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 93. 
283 Monadic and dyadic research designs both have advantages and disadvantages. For a concise discussion 
of this topic, see Patrick J. McDonald, "Capitalism, Commitment, and Peace," in Assessing the Capitalist 
Peace, eds. Gerald Schneider and Nils Peters Gleditsch (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 51–52. 
284 For a historical account of the end of Pax Britannica in the Gulf region, see R. P. Owen, "The British 
Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf," The World Today 28, no. 2 (1972): 75–81. 
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nationalizations swept the developing world, giving national governments greater control 
over their indigenous petroleum wealth and putting upward pressure on oil prices.285 In 
the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973, the price of petroleum nearly quadrupled, sharply 
increasing the cash inflows to the coffers of oil-exporting countries.286 Third, quality data 
on oil income—the basis for determining petrostate status—are not available for the pre-
1970s period. Therefore, extending the empirical analysis to earlier decades would be ill 
advised, as it could compromise the inferences drawn from statistical results.287 
4.1 Petrostate sample and regional classification 
4.1.1 Sample 
There is no universal definition of a petrostate, and no definition is perfect or appropriate 
for addressing all research questions. The present analysis uses a petrostate sample 
constructed in a two-step process. The first step aimed to identify countries whose annual 
revenue from oil exports accounted for at least 10 percent of gross domestic product 
                                                 
285 Before 1971, control over oil production in most developing countries was largely in the hands of 
foreign oil companies. With the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Country's "Declaratory Statement 
of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries" of 1968, "the ground was prepared on the exporters' side for the 
nationalization and participation movement of the 1970s in which many of today's NOCs [national oil 
companies] were created"; see Valérie Marcel, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 23. 
286 Oil's price performance after the early 1970s was markedly different from that in earlier periods. At no 
point since 1973 did the price index for oil converge with that for metals and other minerals. (Even during 
the oil-price dip of the late 1990s, the oil index was about 3 times higher than the broad index for metals 
and minerals.) See Roberto F. Aguilera and Marian Radetzki, The Price of Oil (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11–13. 
287 As noted by Walt and Mearsheimer ("Leaving theory behind"), in their desire to obtain a greater number 
of observations, scholars have often erred by including "cases for which the data are poor instead of 
analyzing a smaller number of cases where the data are more reliable" (442). Expressing a similar 
sentiment, Russett and Oneal (Triangulating Peace) pose a rhetorical question: "Is it better to use flawed 
information in a precise statistical test, or not to make a test at all?" (308). 
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(GDP).288 The 10-percent threshold is commonly used in the literature on petroagression 
and represents a suitable indicator for a state's economic dependence on the oil sector.289 
Scholars have sometimes generated continuous measures of oil abundance, including 
metrics based on oil production and reserves (often expressed in per capita terms or 
relative to GDP).290 However, methodological and theoretical considerations render such 
measures less useful for the present investigation. Measures of oil reserves do not provide 
information about a county's oil income and, as argued in the theoretical chapter, that 
income is integral to the decisional mechanisms hypothesized to affect petrostate conflict 
behavior. Furthermore, continuous measures fall short of unambiguously ascertaining 
petrostate status, because they are constructed under the assumption that "a state that has 
a higher value [on the continuous measure] is 'more of a petrostate' than a state that has a 
lower value, and it is not always clear that this assumption is warranted."291 
The second step in constructing the sample was to ascertain that the countries included in 
it meet or exceed the 10-percent threshold for at least 80 percent of the years in the 1971–
2001 period. While arbitrary, this condition was imposed to ensure that petrostate status 
was maintained consistently for an extended period of time. Initially, the sample was 
constructed under a more demanding condition whereby states were required to meet the 
                                                 
288 Data for this metric are from Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments," and available at 
https://sites.google.com/site/jeffdcolgan/data. 
289 See, for example, Colgan, Petro-Aggression; and De Soysa, Gartzke, and Lie, "Blood, Oil, and 
Strategy."  
290 See, for example, Strüver and Wegenast, "The Hard Power of Natural Resources." 
291 Colgan, Petro-Aggression, 48–49. Sachs and Warner ("The Curse of Natural Resources," 830) also warn 
that per capita measures are problematic because they do not capture a resource's importance in the 
economy. 
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threshold for all years in the study period.292 It was judged, however, that relaxing this 
criterion would be methodologically beneficial, both by increasing the size of the sample 
(and, thus, the number of state-year observations) and by widening the sample's 
geographical scope. Moreover, a brief retreat from the oil-exports threshold was deemed 
unlikely to cast much doubt about a country's petrostate status, especially since oil 
income is not necessarily spent in the year obtained. By contrast, there were some cases 
in which a country's oil export met the 10-percent threshold for only a few years in the 
three decades under analysis. Including such marginal cases would have been 
theoretically and empirically indefensible, because the goal here is to capture oil income 
as a persistent backdrop against which foreign policy decisions are made. 
This identification strategy yielded a sample of 16 petrostates.293 These countries are 
listed in table 4-1, along with the years, between 1971 and 2001, in which they met or 
exceeded the 10-percent oil-exports cutoff. Most of these states (except for Congo, 
Oman, and Trinidad) have been long-standing members of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was established in September 1960 by 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Thirteen of the countries met the oil-
exports threshold for each year in the study period, and three states did so for well over 
                                                 
292 Regression results for this truncated sample were consistent with those for the full sample. 
293 Bahrain and Brunei are excluded due to their small populations and poor data quality; see Colgan, "Oil 
and Revolutionary Governments," 676. 
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80 percent of the years in the period.294 In two cases (Ecuador and Trinidad), a 1-year 
break occurred in 1998, likely because of the oil-price crisis of that year.295 
Table 4-1. Petrostate sample, 1971–2001 
Country Years meeting oil-exports cutoff(1) 
Algeria 1971–2001 
Angola 1975–2001 
Congo 1973–2001 
Ecuador 1973–86, 1988–97, 1999–2001 
Gabon 1971–2001 
Iran 1971–2001 
Iraq 1971–2001 
Kuwait 1971–2001 
Libya 1971–2001 
Nigeria 1971–2001 
Oman 1971–2001 
Qatar 1971–2001 
Saudi Arabia 1971–2001 
Trinidad and Tobago 1972–97, 1999–2001 
United Arab Emirates 1971–2001 
Venezuela 1971–2001 
(1) Oil exports equal to or greater than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Note: Data for the oil-exports-to-GDP metric are from Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments," 
and available at https://sites.google.com/site/jeffdcolgan/data. Bahrain and Brunei are excluded due to 
their small populations and poor data quality. Data for Angola start in 1975 because the country gained 
independence from Portuguese colonial rule in that year. 
 
                                                 
294 The period for Angola starts in 1975 because this is the year in which the country gained independence 
from Portugal. 
295 For the causes and price dynamics of the crisis, see Robert Mabro, The Oil Price Crisis of 1998 (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1998). 
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4.1.2 Regions 
Testing hypothesis 2, which purports a causal linkage between superpower penetration 
and petrogression, requires the identification of regional subsystems, subject to 
penetration, that contain petrostates. It has been common practice for scholars to equate 
regions with continents or to employ regional taxonomies found in general-use data 
compilations, such as the Correlates of War (COW) Project database. While convenient, 
these approaches are not particularly persuasive, not only because they are adopted with a 
blind eye to theory but also because they produce overly broad subsystem delineations. 
Viewing the "Western Hemisphere" as one region,296 for example, sidelines the obvious 
geographical boundaries and asymmetric security relations that separate South from 
North America.297 Likewise, treating "Africa" as a single region neglects the fact that the 
vast expanse of the Sahara, roughly the size of the United States, serves as a natural 
buffer between the countries of the Maghreb and the rest of the continent, or that the 
sparsely populated, mostly weak sub-Saharan states have no capacity to form a 
monolithic area of security interaction.298 
While Thompson's notion of regions as clusters of states linked by proximity and regular 
interaction (see section 3.2.1) can go a long way toward avoiding such conceptual issues, 
                                                 
296 The "Western Hemisphere" is coded as a distinct region in the COW Project database. 
297 As noted by Buzan and Waever (Regions and Powers), "South America has some spillover security 
effects in North America, but most issues that upset Canada will be of minor relevance to Brazil and vice 
versa" (263). See also David R. Mares, "Regional Conflict Management in Latin America: Power 
Complemented by Diplomacy," in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, eds. David Lake 
and Patrick Morgan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 197. 
298 The weakness of the Sub-Saharan African state is described at length in Christopher Clapham, Africa 
and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). For a discussion of how such state weakness limits security interaction, see Buzan and Waever, 
Regions and Powers. 
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it is open to different operationalizations. The principal regional classification adopted in 
the quantitative analysis is borrowed from recent empirical work by Lemke, who 
combines Thompson's two criteria to draw subsystem boundaries on the basis of states' 
ability to interact militarily with one another.299 Using a modified version of Bueno de 
Mesquita's formula of Boulding's loss-of-strength gradient, Lemke calculates each state's 
area of military reach, or "relevant neighborhood," and then delineates regional 
subsystems by identifying local clusters of countries whose neighborhoods overlap.300 
Factors with implications for force projection, such as natural barriers (mountains, 
jungles, seas, etc.), are also taken into account. Generally, Lemke's approach tends to 
produce smaller regions than those normally found in other datasets.301 The regions 
pertinent to the present analysis are listed in table 4-2, along with the petrostates located 
in them. 
Table 4-2. Petrostate regions 
Region Petrostate membership 
Arabian Peninsula Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates 
Northern Rim Iran, Iraq 
Maghreb Algeria, Libya 
Gulf of Guinea Nigeria 
South Atlantic Coast Angola, Congo, Gabon 
Northern Tier Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago(1), Venezuela 
(1) Added due to close proximity to Northern Tier. 
Note: Regions are based on a classification presented in Lemke, "Dimensions of Hard Power," and 
Lemke, Regions of War and Peace. 
                                                 
299 See Douglas Lemke, "Dimensions of Hard Power: Regional Leadership and Material Capabilities" 
(paper prepared for the first Regional Powers Network conference at the German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, September 15–16, 2008); and Lemke, Regions of War and Peace. 
300 For further methodological detail, see Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, chapter 4. 
301 See Lemke, "Dimensions of Hard Power." 
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Lemke's classification offers two main advantages. First, it comes with corresponding 
determinations for great power "interference" in regional subsystems, which can be used 
to measure superpower penetration in petrostate regions. (See section 4.3.2.) Second, it is 
developed specifically for the study of interstate conflict, as opposed to other topics of 
general interest, and relies on classification criteria that are objective and measurable. 
Alternative operationalizations of regions informed by Thompson's definitional standard 
are also possible on the basis of observed security interaction rather than interaction 
opportunity, and Buzan and Waever's delineation of regional security complexes is 
perhaps the most systematic recent effort in this direction.302 However, the authors' 
classification, like that of others,303 is derived from case study work that relies on 
qualitative judgments, making regional delineations idiosyncratic and less useful in 
quantitative tests. Despite these considerations, four of Buzan and Waever's regional 
complexes with petrostate membership—Middle Eastern, West African, South African, 
and South American—were used in addition to Lemke's regions in models adopting a 
weak view of penetration (i.e., penetration through invitation; see section 3.2.2). 
4.2 Dependent variable: militarized disputes 
The dependent variable employed in the statistical analysis is the count of militarized 
interstate disputes (MIDs) initiated by a petrostate in a given year. A militarized 
dispute—the most widely used measure of conflict involvement in the security 
literature—is defined as "a set of interactions between and among states involving threats 
to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force" that "must be 
                                                 
302 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers. 
303 See, for example, contributions in Lake and Morgan, Regional Orders. 
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explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned."304 In its most severe form, 
war, a MID is recorded as a military confrontation resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related 
deaths.305 All dispute data are from the most recent version (v. 4.01) of the COW Project 
database.306 
Because the hypothesized relationships are concerned with conflict initiation—as 
opposed to any type of conflict involvement—the dependent variable captures only 
disputes in which a petrostate was the first to threaten, display, or use military force. The 
COW Project database allows for this type of identification by coding the dispute initiator 
as "Side A."307 For example, the database indicates that, in 1995, Ecuador was involved 
in two militarized disputes, but initiated only one of them. While the initiating side may 
include more than one state, it is always composed of parties involved from the outset 
(start date) of the dispute, rather than joiners (i.e., states that enter the dispute at a later 
point in its lifecycle). The Side-A indicator is the most widely used measure of conflict 
initiation and is the one adopted here. Occasionally, scholars have employed a different 
metric, reported in more recent versions of the MID dataset, that indicates whether a 
disputant was "revisionist," or "dissatisfied with the status quo prior to the onset of a 
                                                 
304 Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984): 585–615, 586. See also Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer, and J. 
David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical 
Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2 (1996): 163–213. 
305 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980 (Beverly 
Hills, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982).  
306 Glenn Palmer, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane, "The MID 4 Data Set: Procedures, 
Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 2 (2015): 222–242. The 
MID 4.01 dataset is available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs. 
307 Ibid. See also Michael R. Kenwick, Matthew Lane, Benjamin Ostick, and Glenn Palmer, "Codebook for 
the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 4.0" (The Pennsylvania State University, Correlates of War 
Project, December 13, 2013). 
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militarized interstate dispute."308 Using this metric as an indicator of initiation, however, 
is controversial, because the revisionist state is not necessarily the initiating state, that is, 
the party that took the first militarized action. Moreover, ascertaining revisionist intent is 
by no means straightforward, and relying on disputants' observable behaviors, such as the 
issuance of military threats or demonstrations of force, is arguably the more reliable 
empirical strategy.309 
One potential concern related to using militarized disputes as an operational extension of 
the general concept of interstate conflict is that they span a wide range of hostile actions 
initiated by states, from mere military threats to a full-scale war. Looking at this broad 
spectrum of violent behaviors, however, is not a disadvantage. Wars are extremely rare 
events, and focusing only on them would limit one's ability to reveal systematic patterns 
in conflict behavior, especially in analyses, such as the present one, that look at a subset 
of international system members and a relatively limited time frame. Very few military 
conflicts reach the 1,000 lethality cutoff that would qualify them as wars, and those that 
do and are initiated by petrostates in the sample (during the period of analysis) number 
only six.310 Besides yielding methodological benefits, broadening the concept of conflict 
to militarized hostilities short of war also offers theoretical advantages, because the 
causal mechanisms of conflict initiation—and those of escalation—are similar across 
different forms of military aggression. As observed by Bruce Russett and John Oneal, 
                                                 
308 For a detailed explanation of the "revisionist" variable, see Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized 
Interstate Disputes," 178. For a study that uses it as an indicator of conflict initiation, see Colgan, Petro-
Aggression. 
309 The revisionist measure was used in robustness tests and did not materially alter the results. 
310 These wars were initiated by Angola (1998), Iraq (1990, 1980, 1973), Libya (1979), and Saudi Arabia 
(1973). 
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"most wars begin with some threat or more limited use of violence" and "the influences 
and constraints that affect the occurrence of wars do not appear to differ much from those 
that are relevant to militarized disputes in general."311 
To add nuance to the results, however, the analysis does employ a variant of the all-
inclusive dependent variable. The COW Project database categorizes militarized disputes 
by their level of hostility, with the levels being—in ascending order, by severity—"threat 
to use force," "display of force," "use of force," and "war."312 The former two levels, 
while representing hostile militarized actions, do not involve any combat and do not 
extend beyond demonstrative applications of force, such as naval maneuvers close to the 
territory of an adversary. The latter two, by contrast, do involve actual military standoffs 
or engagements (blockades, clashes of regular armed forces, declarations of war, etc.), 
marking notably higher points on the conflict escalation ladder.313 A count variable 
combining petrostate dispute initiations for only these two levels was constructed as a 
way to reveal whether the hypothesized relationships operate at higher levels of military 
hostility. It could be that, for one or another reason, these relationships hold for cases 
involving "cheap talk" but not for those involving costly military action. 
                                                 
311 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 94. 
312 See Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes"; and Kenwick et al., "Codebook for the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute Data," 3. 
313 See Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," especially "Table 3. Definitions of 
Uses of Force," 173. 
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4.3 Independent variables 
4.3.1 Personalism 
The principal predictor variable in hypothesis 1 is whether or not a petrostate is governed 
by a personalist regime. As argued in the theoretical discussion, personalism and oil 
could be a dangerous mix, increasing the likelihood of conflict initiation above that for 
other regime type–oil combinations. To measure this form of autocracy, the statistical 
analysis employs a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for each year in which 
a petrostate exhibited personalism and 0 otherwise. Overall, about 13 percent of all state-
years in the data are coded as personalist. In some model specifications, a breakdown of 
the nonpersonalist ("zero") category is also presented, using additional dummies for 
single-party, military, and monarchic autocratic regimes, as well as democracy (used as a 
reference category). Since the theory makes no definitive predictive claims about the 
relationship between various nonpersonalist regimes and petrostate belligerence, this 
breakdown is included only for exploratory purposes. 
All regime data, except those for Trinidad and Qatar,314 are from the latest version (v. 
1.02) of Geddes et al.'s Autocratic Regimes Data Set.315 Improving upon its predecessors, 
                                                 
314 Geddes et al. exclude Trinidad and Qatar from their dataset because of minimum-population restrictions. 
Qatar has maintained monarchial rule since it gained independence from Great Britain in 1971 and was 
coded accordingly. Regime determinations for Trinidad were derived from Polity IV scores 
(www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html), which indicate that the petrostate was a "consolidated 
democracy" in each year of the study period. Because Geddes et al.'s distinction between democracies and 
autocracies is based on minimal requirements for electoral competitiveness—a characteristic captured in 
Polity data—there is no reason to suspect issues with coding consistency. Dropping Trinidad and Qatar 
from the sample did not materially change the results. 
315 Geddes et al., "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions." The latest version of the dataset is 
available at http://dictators.la.psu.edu/. 
104 
 
this dataset differentiates between democratic and autocratic regimes,316 assigning states 
to the latter category if one of the following three conditions is met: executive power is 
gained through means other than competitive (democratic) elections, the executive is 
elected democratically but limits competitive elections after assuming office, or the 
military establishment bans one or more popular parties from electoral participation.317 
As long as the institutional rules and the leadership group associated with one of these 
conditions persist, a state retains its autocratic coding. Autocracies are further subdivided 
into the aforementioned four autocratic subtypes, on the basis of the identity of the elite 
group that selects leaders and makes policy. Personalist regimes, which are of primary 
interest here, are defined as those in which "control over policy, leadership selection, and 
the security apparatus is in the hands of...a narrower group [narrower than that of other 
regimes] centered around an individual dictator."318 
Geddes et al.'s regime data are suitable for the present investigation. Most other datasets 
that attempt to classify autocratic regimes come short of achieving the same level of data 
quality and country-year coverage. Critically, they typically do not identify personalist 
                                                 
316 Geddes's original data, which appeared in 1999, excluded democracies and monarchies; see Geddes, 
"What do we know about democratization." 
317 Geddes et al., "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions," 317. 
318 Ibid., 318. While Geddes et al.'s dataset also codes hybrid regimes (party–personal–military, personal–
military, etc.), these are collapsible into four categories (personalist regimes, party-based regimes, military 
regimes, and monarchical regimes). (See Geddes et al., "Autocratic Regimes Code Book, version 1.02," 
http://dictators.la.psu.edu/.) Iraq, a personal–party hybrid during 1971–79, was coded as party based for the 
period 1971–75 and personalist for the period after 1975. While some scholars have used personalist 
coding for the entire period (see, for example, Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men"), it was not until the 
mid-1970s that the country's political institutions became decisively personalized. At that time, Ahmed 
Hassan al-Bakr, Iraq's president, was stricken by illness and turned over real political power to his deputy, 
Saddam Hussein. Hussein quickly made himself commander of the armed forces (1976); installed relatives 
and loyal protégés in key security, intelligence, and government positions; and began to treat the cabinet 
and party institutions as rubber stamps. See Mark Lewis, "Historical Setting," in Iraq: A Country Study, ed. 
Helen Metz (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1988), 59. 
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forms of authoritarian governance and instead subcategorize autocracies as civilian, 
military, and, in some cases, monarchic.319 Moreover, in operationalizing and coding 
regimes, Geddes et al. break from common practice and take into account not only formal 
but also informal institutions, thus capturing the identity characteristics (and, hence, 
interests) of leadership groups.320 This data feature is conceptually important, because 
much of the theory offered in the previous chapter emphasizes the role of such 
characteristics in the relationship between oil income, personalism, and conflict initiation. 
4.3.2 Superpower penetration 
Measuring superpower penetration in regional subsystems presents various challenges. 
One obvious difficulty stems from the myriad of ways in which penetration could 
manifest itself. A superpower can influence regional security relations by establishing 
troop presence on the territory of regional clients, providing those clients with arms and 
military equipment, or even engaging directly in combat operations against local actors, 
either on its own behalf or that of a protégé. But penetration could also assume more 
subtle, though still important, forms, such as intelligence sharing, electronic warfare 
support, political and economic backing, participation in operational planning, or the 
provision of military training and advising services. Clearly, all of these intrusive inputs 
could be of varying scale and overtness—and, hence, more or less difficult to observe—
                                                 
319 For examples of popular datasets in this category, see José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and 
James Raymond Vreeland, "Democracy and dictatorship revisited," Public Choice 143 (2010): 67–101; and 
Arthur S. Banks, Cross-national Time-Series Data Archive (Jerusalem: Databanks International, 2007), 
http://www.cntsdata.com/. 
320 Highlighting the importance of informal institutions, identities, and interests, Geddes at al. ("Autocratic 
Breakdown and Regime Transitions") write that regimes are "basic formal and informal rules that 
determine what interests are represented in the authoritarian leadership group....[t]hese interests in turn 
influence the dictatorship's policy choices" (314). 
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and many are not susceptible to quantitative measurement.321 Even those prone to 
quantification are of limited use, because no systematic, quality data on most of them 
exist, and the collection of such data, if at all possible, would be a daunting task that is 
beyond the scope of this investigation.322 While penetration has been discussed in 
previous research on regional security, this has been done as part of case study work, in 
the context of specific regions.323 
To overcome these challenges, the present analysis adopts two indirect ways to measure 
superpower penetration. The first reflects the strong view of penetration (see section 
3.2.2) and relies on Lemke's determinations of great power interference in minor power 
regions.324 These determinations, which are similar to those used to draw regional 
boundaries but relax the requirement for mutual reachability, are based on calculations 
about a state's ability, or lack thereof, to "overcome the tyranny of distance" and move 
more than 50 percent of its power to a local subsystem.325 Using Lemke's reporting, a 
dichotomous independent variable was constructed to capture, for each country-year, 
whether or not a petrostate was located in a region with bipolar superpower penetration. 
As predicted by hypothesis 2, such petrostate residence is likely to increase the chances 
                                                 
321 As noted by Lemke (Regions of War and Peace), "data quality varies dramatically from great power to 
great power (some being better able, or more motivated, to hide their [regional] interference) as well as 
from region to region" (147). 
322 David Lake's efforts to collect data on great power military personnel stationed in subordinate states (an 
indicator of what he calls "security hierarchy") are illustrative of such data-collection difficulties. While 
Lake manages to compile troop figures for the United States, he identifies gaps and discrepancies in 
existing data sources and notes that similar data for other countries are not available; see Lake, Hierarchy 
in International Relations (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 68. 
323 See, for example, case studies in Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers; and Lake and Morgan, 
Regional Orders. 
324 See Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, especially chapter 6. The author is grateful to Professor Lemke 
for his sharing of data and responding to questions. 
325 See ibid., 147–148. 
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for petroagression. Coding for this binary covariate was based on the information 
presented in table 4-3. For example, the table shows that, for the 1971–89 period, 
penetration in the Northern Rim of the Middle East is best characterized as bipolar, 
because both the United States and the Soviet Union had the ability to move a significant 
portion of their military resources to that subsystem. By contrast, for the same period, 
penetration in the South Atlantic Coast of Sub-Saharan Africa is best characterized as 
unipolar, because the Soviet Union had limited ability to project power there. By 
theoretical construction, bipolar superpower penetration is possible only during the 
period of global bipolarity; in a unipolar global system, penetration is the prerogative of 
only one superpower.326 
Table 4-3. Superpower penetration, by petrostate region 
Region 
Penetration 
1971–89 1990–2001 
Arabian Peninsula Unipolar (U.S.) Unipolar (U.S.) 
Northern Rim Bipolar (U.S., Soviet Union) Unipolar (U.S.) 
Maghreb Bipolar (U.S., Soviet Union) Unipolar (U.S.) 
Gulf of Guinea Bipolar (U.S., Soviet Union) Unipolar (U.S.) 
South Atlantic Coast Unipolar (U.S.) Unipolar (U.S.) 
Northern Tier Bipolar (U.S., Soviet Union) Unipolar (U.S.) 
Note: Superpower penetration is derived from interference determinations reported in Lemke, Regions of 
War and Peace, 148–151. 
 
                                                 
326 Because Lemke's calculations are limited to the Cold War period, determinations for U.S. penetration 
for 1990–2001 represent extrapolations. Since U.S. military power has not contracted post 1990, there is no 
reason to suspect that the United States has experienced any decline in its ability to transport military 
resources to previously reachable petrostate regions. Indeed, as noted by Russett and Oneal (Triangulating 
Peace, 186), the share of U.S. power (among major powers) increased sharply after the end of the Cold 
War, reaching 29 percent in 1992. 
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The second approach to measuring superpower penetration was informed by the 
penetration-through-invitation theoretical perspective presented in section 3.2.2. Because 
this perspective suggests that penetration is mediated (made more or less likely) by local 
power structures, the approach required the measurement of regional polarity. Absent 
previous quantitative efforts in this direction, polarity was obtained with the use of a 
simple procedure for calculating annual power differentials among all states residing in a 
petrostate region.327 If, in a given year, the strongest state in a region was found to be at 
least 50 percent stronger than the next strongest state, the region was identified as 
unipolar in that year.328 If that condition was not met, the same comparison was repeated 
for the second and third strongest states, and so on, to determine whether the region was 
bipolar or multipolar. Once these determinations were made, the two-by-two matrix 
presented in table 3-1 was consulted to identify regions with expected bipolar superpower 
penetration. This information was then used to code, on a country-year basis, an indicator 
variable capturing whether or not a petrostate fell within a region of that type. The coding 
was implemented for both Lemke's and Buzan and Waever's regions identified earlier.329 
                                                 
327 It is common practice for scholars to identify polarity of regional subsystems on the basis of expert 
judgment, without offering much in the way of objective criteria for such identification. Buzan and Waever 
(Regions and Powers), for example, state that "polarity is defined wholly by regional powers" and, without 
further ado, identify South Asia as bipolar, the Middle East as multipolar, and so on (55). The purpose of 
the procedure adopted here is to make such determinations quantitative and more objective. 
328 These calculations were performed with the use of annual figures for GDP, whose correlation with the 
COW Project composite capability index is greater than 0.9. 
329 Because models using a penetration measure based on Buzan and Waever's regions produced results 
very similar to those using Lemke's regional classification, they are not reported in regression tables. 
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4.4 Control variables 
Given the complexity of international politics, it would be surprising if a petrostate's 
decision to initiate conflict is influenced only by personalist institutions and superpower 
penetration. To account for the effects of other potentially important factors, the 
statistical analysis includes a series of control variables. Realists have argued that 
wealthier and more populous states have a greater ability to engage in conflict.330 To 
address this concern, the analysis employs two logged measures—population size and 
GDP per capita—as proxies for such ability.331 In addition, adherents to Kantian 
liberalism have asserted that trade openness and economic interdependence make states 
more pacific, both by increasing their vulnerability to commercial disruption and by 
triggering Deutschean processes of transnational socialization.332 Since some evidence 
for this claim has been provided in monadic context,333 the analysis includes a variable 
for trade openness constructed as the ratio of a country's total trade (exports plus imports) 
to GDP.334 
                                                 
330 In expounding on offensive realism, for example, Mearsheimer (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics) 
writes that population and wealth "are the main building blocks of military power" (43). 
331 Population data are from the COW Project database, and GDP per capita data are from Colgan, Petro-
Aggression (https://sites.google.com/site/jeffdcolgan/data). Colgan's measure is based on Penn World 
Tables data used by Fearon and Laitin ("Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War") and, for missing values, on 
information from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
332 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 129–130. See also Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, "War, Peace, and 
the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization," International Studies 
Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 561–586; Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace"; and Margit Bussmann, "Foreign 
Direct Investment and Militarized International Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 
143–153. 
333 See Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace; and Mark Souva and Brandon Prins, "The Liberal Peace 
Revisited: The Role of Democracy, Dependency, and Development in Militarized Dispute Initiation, 1950–
1999," International Interactions 32, no. 2 (2006): 183–200.  
334 Data for this measure are from Strüver and Wegenast, "The Hard Power of Natural Resources." 
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Besides these standard controls, two additional variables, often sidelined in extant 
research, are included. The first is a binary measure indicating whether or not a petrostate 
was a challenger in a territorial dispute in a given year.335 Territorial disputes, which 
involve a "disagreement between states over where their common homeland or colonial 
borders should be fixed,"336 have long been singled out as a potent driver of crises and 
wars—purportedly even more potent than other common sources of interstate contention, 
such as economics or ideology.337 They have also been a persistent feature of the political 
landscapes of Africa, the Middle East, and South America, all areas with a high 
concentration of petrostates.338 Instead of accounting for territorial disputes, monadic 
tests in conflict research have typically controlled for the number of contiguous borders a 
state has with other states. However, it is not clear whether any observed correlation 
between this measure and conflict is due to a simple border count (a proxy for interaction 
opportunity) or the fact that a number of shared borders are disputed.339 
The statistical analysis also controls for civil war, using an indicator variable that equals 
1 for each country-year marred by an ongoing civil war and 0 otherwise.340 As reported 
                                                 
335 Data for this measure are from Paul Huth's Territorial Disputes dataset and obtained directly from the 
author. 
336 Paul Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998), 19. 
337 Ibid., 9. For a recent overview of the key arguments and findings in the literature on territorial conflict, 
see Dominic D. P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, "Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial 
Conflict," International Security 38, no. 3 (2014): 7–38. 
338 Huth, Standing Your Ground, chapter 3. 
339 The author owes this insight to feedback received from Professor Huth during discussions for this work. 
340 The civil war variable is from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). (See Nils Petter Gleditsch, 
Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946–
2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–637.) The regressions were also 
run with two alternative measures of civil war: the "civwar" variable from the Center for Systemic Peace 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html) and the "war" variable (ongoing civil war in country year) 
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in chapter 2, previous research has suggested that internal political turmoil can increase 
the likelihood of conflict initiation through processes of externalization and spillover. 
While this variable is often excluded from statistical tests, it is potentially important, 
because a number of empirical studies concerned with the domestic political 
manifestations of the resource curse have shown that, contra scarcity arguments, oil 
richness (and resource abundance more generally) is positively and significantly 
associated with domestic violence.341 It should be noted, however, that civil war could 
reduce a state's external belligerence by weakening its coercive apparatus and by shifting 
its leaders' attention to domestic affairs. Therefore, while the need to control for civil war 
is present, the effect of that variable on dispute initiation is theoretically ambiguous. 
Lastly, all statistical tests account for temporal dependence in the time series. The 
problem with temporal dependence arises because the occurrence of conflict in one year 
may not be independent of the occurrence of conflict in previous years; in such cases, 
statistical assumptions about temporal independence of conflict observations would be 
violated.342 To control for this possibility, all regression estimations include a control 
                                                                                                                                                 
from Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" 
(https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html). The use of these variables indicated 
even stronger effects of personalism and penetration. It also suggested significant effects of civil war on 
petrostate conflict initiation, a result not obtained in regressions using the PRIO measure. 
341 These findings are typically justified with the argument that resources increase the value of the state as a 
target of rebel groups and provide those groups with a source of financing. For a review and critique of 
various claims advanced in the relevant literature, see Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil 
War." 
342 Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-
Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 
(1998): 1260–1288. 
112 
 
variable (with cubic splines) representing the number of years that have passed since the 
last militarized dispute.343 
4.5 Results 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested using a negative binomial regression. This method was 
chosen because the dependent variable in both hypotheses is a count measure of the 
number of petrostate dispute initiations in a given year. While Poisson regression is an 
alternative method for analyzing causal relationships with count outcomes, it does not 
correct for overdispersion in the dependent variable, and signs of such overdispersion are 
present in the data.344 The equation of the principal negative binomial model to be tested 
takes the form 
log(MID counti) = b0 + b1(personalist regime1i) + b2(superpower penetration2i) + 
b3(territorial dispute challenger3i) + b4(trade openness4i) + b5(population5i) + 
b6(GDP per capita6i) + b7(civil war7i) + b8(peace years8i) + ei, 
where b0 is the constant, b1 through b7 are the estimated coefficients, right-hand-side 
parenthetical covariates are the predictors described earlier, and ei is the error term. 
Table 4-4 shows the effects of the independent variables on petrostate dispute initiation. 
Model 1 includes only the control covariates, providing some expected and some 
unexpected results. Both the population and GDP variables have positive and highly 
                                                 
343 This variable, along with its cubic splines (with three knots), is included in all models but not reported in 
regression tables. 
344 Summary statistics indicate that the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the mean, and 
such difference violates Poisson assumptions about mean–variance equality. Negative binomial models add 
a parameter that accounts for overdispersion.  
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significant coefficients, lending support to realist claims that states with greater capacity 
to initiate conflict are indeed more likely to do so. The estimates for other controls, 
however, defy expectations. The signs of the territorial dispute and trade openness 
coefficients are the opposite of what one might expect, although the coefficient for 
territorial disputes is not significant and that for trade openness barely rises to 
significance (and drops from significance in subsequent models).345 While the coefficient 
for civil war is positive, consistent with arguments claiming a linkage between domestic 
conflict and dispute initiation, it does not reach significance. As noted earlier, it may be 
that governments of petrostates embroiled in civil war have reasons to shift their attention 
and resources to dealing with domestic political troubles and to temper their aggressive 
designs.346 
Models 2 and 3 introduce the two key independent variables: personalism and 
superpower penetration. Because the analysis uses two alternative measures of 
penetration, model 3 is estimated twice—once with the "penetration imposed" measure 
(model 3.1) and once with the "penetration invited" measure (model 3.2). Adding the 
covariate for personlism (model 2) provides support for hypothesis 1. The variable's 
coefficent is both positive and highly significant, indicating that personalist petrostates 
intiate disputes at higher rates than nonpersonalist petrostates. This result is unchanged in 
model 3, which adds the two covariates for superpower penetration. Consistent with 
                                                 
345 Replacing the territorial dispute variable with a control for border counts and rerunning the models 
produces similar results. 
346 As noted earlier, however, the significance of the civil war variable depends on the data source used. 
Models run with data from the Center for Systemic Peace and Fearon and Laitin ("Ethnicity, Insurgency, 
and Civil War") indicate significant impacts of civil war. The effects of other predictors in these models 
remain materially unchanged, except for the indicator for single-party regimes, which drops from 
significance in models breaking up the nonpersonalist category. 
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theory, the coefficients of these predictors move in the expected direction and are both 
significant, suggesting that petrostates in regions with bipolar penetration are more 
conflict prone than petrostates in regions with unipolar or no penetration. It is 
noteworthly that the effect of penetration is present regardless of how penetration is 
measured, increasing confidence in the results. The estimates obtained for the control 
variables are in line with those reported for model 1. While the measure for trade 
openness changes sign in model 3, it is not significant. 
Table 4-4. Negative binomial regression analysis of petrostate dispute initiation, any MID 
Variable (1)  
Control 
variables 
(2)  
Plus 
personalist 
regime 
(3)  
Plus superpower penetration 
(3.1)  
Penetration 
imposed 
(3.2)  
Penetration 
invited 
Personalist regime — 1.398***     
(.288) 
1.142*** 
(.285) 
1.204*** 
(.273) 
Penetration imposed — — .714*** 
(.223)      
— 
Penetration invited — — — .851*** 
(.208) 
Territorial dispute 
challenger 
-0.280 
(.222) 
-.443* 
(.216) 
-.345 
(.211) 
-.353 
(.207) 
Trade openness .009* 
(.004) 
.0001 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
Population (log) .817***  
(.113) 
.843*** 
(.115) 
.738*** 
(.118) 
.779*** 
(.113) 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
.467** 
(.162) 
.610*** 
(.202) 
.590*** 
(.170) 
.625*** 
(.166) 
Civil war .091 
(.408) 
.255 
(.406) 
.271 
(.409) 
.091 
(.397) 
Constant -12.142***   
(2.172) 
-13.585***  
(2.252) 
-12.742***  
(2.286) 
-13.473***   
(2.207) 
N 465 465 465 465 
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Log-likelihood -327.675 -315.797 -311.031 -308.165 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models include a temporal control (not shown) 
with cubic splines with three knots. All models are significant at p < .0001. 
 
The results reported in table 4-4 lend credence to hypotheses 1 and 2, indicating that 
personalism and bipolar penetration have independent effects on petroagression. But do 
they hold when the dependent variable is restricted to disputes exhibiting higher levels of 
hostility? It is possible that personalist leaders are all talk and no action, or that, fearing 
escalation, superpowers penetrating petrostate regions pressure their clients to refrain 
from more costly forms of military aggression. In both cases, the variational relationships 
revealed so far may be suppressed. To examine this possibility, the models from table 4-4 
are replicated in table 4-5, this time using the dependent variable capturing only the count 
of dispute initiations involving "use of force" and "war" (see section 4.1.3). As can be 
seen from the table, the results are similar to those reported earlier. The coefficients on 
the personalist and penetration variables in model 3 are all positive and highly significant, 
and the control covariates behave as noted previously. Overall, the estimates in table 4-5 
suggest that the hypothesized relationships operate at higher levels of military hostility. 
Table 4-5. Negative binomial regression analysis of petrostate dispute initiation, use-of-force 
MIDs 
Variable (1)  
Control 
variables 
(2)  
Plus 
personalist 
regime 
(3)  
Plus superpower penetration 
(3.1)  
Penetration 
imposed 
(3.2)  
Penetration 
invited 
Personalist regime — 1.565*** 
(.352) 
1.289*** 
(.347) 
1.368*** 
(.332) 
Penetration imposed — — .843** 
(.271) 
— 
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Penetration invited — — — 1.026*** 
(.256) 
Territorial dispute 
challenger 
-.252 
(.277) 
-.511 
(.269) 
-.404 
(.259) 
.677  
(.540) 
Trade openness .010* 
(.005) 
-.0003  
(.005) 
-.002  
(.005) 
-.415  
(.100) 
Population (log) .965*** 
(.147) 
1.002*** 
(.150) 
.883*** 
(.152) 
.924*** 
(.144) 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
.311 
 (.202)    
.454* 
(.204) 
.430* 
(.206) 
.466*  
(.199) 
Civil war .255 
 (.480) 
.483 
(.478) 
.532  
(.482) 
.302  
(.458) 
Constant -12.579*** 
(2.667) 
-14.121*** 
(2.736) 
-13.192*** 
(2.765) 
-13.958***   
(2.646) 
N 465 465 465 465 
Log-likelihood -260.760 -250.879 -246.449 -243.662 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models include a temporal control 
(not shown) with cubic splines with three knots. All models are significant at p < .0001. 
 
Although the results presented in tables 4-4 and 4-5 are in line with the theoretical 
arguments developed in chapter 3, it is useful to examine the substantive effects of the 
principal independent variables. Table 4-6 reports incidence rate ratios (IRRs) for the 
personalist and penetration covariates, using model 3 from tables 4-4 and 4-5 as a base. 
These estimates, which are the exponentiated regression coefficients from the model 
equation, reveal sizable and significant impacts on petrostate conflict initiation. 
Depending on how penetration is measured (model 3.1 or model 3.2), personalist 
petrostates exhibit odds of dispute initiation (of any type) that are 3.1–3.3 times those of 
nonpersonalist petrostates. Likewise, petrostates located in regions with bipolar 
penetration have odds that are 2.0–2.3 times those of petrostates with no such residence. 
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Restricting the analysis to use-of-force disputes (bottom panel of table 4-6) produces 
similar results. 
Table 4-6. Substantive effects: incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of principal predictors (model 3), 
any MID and use-of-force MIDs 
Variable IRR 
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 
Any MID 
Personalist regime 3.133*** 
(.893) 
3.333*** 
(.910) 
Penetration imposed 2.043*** 
(.457) 
— 
Penetration invited — 2.342*** 
(.488) 
Use-of-force MIDs 
Personalist regime 3.628*** 
(1.257) 
3.928*** 
(1.302) 
Penetration imposed 2.324** 
(.631) 
— 
Penetration invited — 2.791*** 
(.713) 
**p < .01; ***p < .001 
Note: IRRs are based on models 3.1 and 3.2 in table 4-4 (any MID) and table 4-5 (use-of-force MIDs). 
 
To add further intuition to the substantive interpretation of regression estimates, table 4-7 
reports the marginal impacts of the principal predictors while holding all other covariates 
at their means. These impacts reflect the increase in the number of dispute initiations 
when a predictor experiences a change in value. As shown in the table (top panel, any 
MID), moving from value 1 to value 2 on the personalist variable (i.e., moving from a 
nonpersonalist petrostate to a personalist petrostate) leads to an increase of 0.311 in the 
average number of annual dispute initiations. To put this figure into perspective, it 
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represents a 71.8-percent rise from the mean number of dispute initiations (0.433). A 
similar examination for superpower penetration reveals that moving from value 1 
(unipolar or no penetration) to value 2 (bipolar penetration) on that variable results in an 
increase of 0.137 (model 3.1) or 0.167 (model 3.2) in the number of dispute initiations. 
Thus, depending on how penetration is measured, these figures represent, respectively, a 
31.6-percent rise and a 38.6-percent rise from the mean number of initiations.  
Notable substantive impacts are also evident in the estimates for use-of-force disputes 
(bottom panel of table 4-7). Although these estimates are smaller than those for the all-
inclusive dependent variable, they are still considerable given that the mean number of 
use-of-force disputes is also smaller (0.339). Thus, a value change in, say, the personalist 
covariate corresponds to an increase of 0.185 in the number of use-of-force dispute 
initiations—a 54.6-rise from the mean number of such initiations. Over a 10-year period, 
a petrostate led by a personalist regime would initiate roughly two more use-of-force 
disputes than a petrostate with no such leadership. 
Table 4-7. Marginal effects of principal predictors on the incidence of petrostate dispute 
initiation (model 3), any MID and use-of-force MIDs 
Variable Value 1 Value 2 Change in number of MID 
initiations moving from value 1 to 
value 2 of the independent variable 
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 
Any MID 
Personalist 
regime 
0 1 0.311 0.341 
Penetration 
imposed 
0 1 0.137 — 
Penetration 
invited 
0 1 — 0.168 
Use-of-force MIDs 
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Personalist 
regime 
0 1 0.185 0.211 
Penetration 
imposed 
0 1 0.083 — 
Penetration 
invited 
0 1 — 0.107 
Note: Change in the number of MIDs is obtained by subtracting the predicted number of MID initiations 
for value 1 of a given covariate from the predicted number of MID initiations for value 2 of that covariate. 
Calculations are performed by holding all other predictors at their means. Estimates are based on models 
3.1 and 3.2 in table 4-4 (any MID) and table 4-5 (use-of-force MIDs). 
 
Lastly, to add nuance to the analysis, table 4-8 shows results from a negative binomial 
model including a breakdown of the nonpersonalist category. Unlike previous models, 
this breakdown presents regime estimates in relation to democracy, the excluded 
(reference) group. In line with expectations, the table indicates that personalist petrostates 
initiate disputes at significantly higher rates than democratic petrostates—a result holding 
for both variants of the count dependent variable. Exponentiating the regression 
coefficients of the personalist covariate also indicates that the difference is sizable across 
model specifications: the odds of personalist petrostates initiating disputes are about 5 
times those of their democratic counterparts, all else equal. The coefficient for party-
based autocratic petrostates is also significant, but of smaller magnitude. Perhaps 
surprisingly, neither military nor monarchic petrostates exhibit odds of dispute initiation 
different from those of democratic petrostates. The result for military regimes is of 
special note, because it runs counter to arguments alleging an offensive bias among 
military elites. A further look into the identity of these elites and their foreign policy 
behavior in conditions of oil dependence is thus warranted. 
The estimates for other covariates are consistent with those presented earlier. The 
coefficients for superpower penetration are positive and significant, and their magnitude 
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is similar to that noted for previous models. The control variables also perform as 
described earlier. 
Table 4-8. Negative binomial regression analysis of petrostate dispute initiation, with 
nonpersonalist regime breakdown referenced to democracy 
Variable Any MID Use-of-force MID 
Penetration 
imposed 
Penetration 
invited 
Penetration 
imposed 
Penetration 
invited 
Personalist 1.706*** 
(.381) 
1.742*** 
(.365) 
1.657*** 
(.448) 
1.676*** 
(.440) 
Party 1.329*** 
(.419) 
1.212** 
(.353) 
1.190* 
(.516) 
1.042* 
(.515) 
Military -.573 
(.585) 
-.343 
(.594) 
-1.086 
(.724) 
-0.848  
(.727) 
Monarchy .405  
(.399) 
.357  
(.391) 
.037 
(.486) 
-.017  
(.477) 
Penetration 
imposed 
.648** 
(.236) 
— .697*  
(.282) 
— 
Penetration invited — .671** 
(.228) 
— .758** 
(.276) 
Territorial dispute 
challenger 
.311 
(.273) 
.216 
(.271) 
.333 
(.350) 
0.220 
(.347) 
Trade openness -.001  
(.004) 
-.001 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.005) 
-.002 
(.005) 
Population (log) .710*** 
(.118) 
.756*** 
(.113) 
.851*** 
(.155) 
.897*** 
(.149) 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
.578** 
(.198) 
.643*** 
(.197) 
.425  
(.237) 
.484* 
(.233) 
Civil war .093  
(.401) 
-.013 
(.394) 
.325 
(.462) 
.200  
(.450) 
Constant -13.345***   
(2.326) 
-14.234***  
(2.278) 
-13.640*** 
(2.753) 
-14.459***   
(2.670) 
N 465 465 465 465 
Log-likelihood -302.443 -301.948 -239.268 -238.638 
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*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Note: Democracy is the reference (base) category. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All 
models include a temporal control (not shown) with cubic splines with three knots. All models are 
significant at p < .0001. 
 
Overall, the statistical results obtained from the monadic analysis provide strong support 
for the variational propositions advanced in hypotheses 1 and 2. Irrespective of model 
specification, the regression coefficients of the key predictors behave as expected, are 
significant, and reveal sizable substantive impacts on petrostate conflict initiation. 
Personalist petrostates in the sample are overwhelmingly more conflict prone than 
nonpersonalist petrostates, a result consistent with some recent reporting in the broader 
literature on personalism and dispute initiation. Likewise, petrostates conducting foreign 
policy in regional environments characterized by bipolar superpower penetration appear 
to initiate conflict at elevated rates. Given that this result persists for two alternative 
measures of penetration (and two different regional classifications), confidence in its 
empirical validity is relatively high. Future research should verify and refine these 
preliminary findings with the use of other measurement techniques and alternative 
statistical methods. 
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5 Case study analysis: Libya (1969–2005) 
Using a detailed case study, this chapter provides an additional test of hypothesis 2, 
illustrating its underlying causal mechanisms. One advantage of the case study method 
over statistical testing is its focus on explanation rather than simple confirmation. As 
pointed out by Stephen Van Evera, "Overall, large-n methods tell us more about whether 
hypotheses hold than why they hold. Case studies say more about why they hold."347 
Even scholars skeptical of the use of case studies as a basis for drawing valid causal 
inferences have recognized that such studies can result in "more focused and relevant 
description" during theory testing and should be viewed as complementary to, rather than 
competitive with, quantitative approaches.348 This advantage is particularly relevant in 
the case of hypothesis 2. In proposing that petrostate conflict behavior is influenced by 
structural bounds engendered by superpower penetration in regional security systems, 
this hypothesis suggests causal processes of petrostate–superpower interaction (see 
sections 3.2.2 and 3.3) that naturally call for a more descriptive approach to testing. 
Another advantage of the case study method, and one that makes it suitable for assessing 
hypothesis 2, is its avoidance of measurement limitations intrinsic to statistical 
analysis.349 The complexity of international politics presents considerable challenges to 
the operationalization and measurement of complex concepts, and research on resource 
conflict is not immune to these types of methodological problems. There is much 
controversy, for instance, about the way scholars measure even basic variables, such as 
                                                 
347 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 55. 
348 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 45. 
349 For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Mearsheimer and Walt, "Leaving theory behind." 
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oil scarcity and abundance. The quantitative handling of more abstract concepts, such as 
superpower penetration or petroagression, presents even bigger challenges. The case 
study method allows for a more nuanced and flexible treatment of such concepts. For 
example, in examining penetration, one can focus not only on quantitative indicators but 
also on more subtle aspects of superpower interference in regional security affairs (see 
section 4.1.3). Likewise, in uncovering instances of petroagression, one can look at a 
broader set of petrostate hostile behaviors (e.g., subversive activities in other states, 
support for international terrorism), extending the concept of conflict beyond militarized 
disputes.350 
Given these insights, the empirical approach adopted here combines congruence and 
process-tracing methods of analysis,351 where case selection is made with the aim of 
reasonably illustrating the hypothesized relationships. This type of selection has two 
notable advantages.352 On the one hand, by focusing on specific combinations of 
independent and dependent variables, it emphasizes the importance of the causal process. 
To that end, Gary Goertz has argued that the approach is not what some call selection on 
the dependent variable, but rather an attempt to "see the causal mechanism in action."353 
                                                 
350 This flexibility is an advantage, not a drawback. Data-quality problems plague even the most widely 
used datasets on interstate conflict, namely, the MID dataset and the International Crisis Behavior dataset. 
For example, Mearsheimer and Walt (see ibid., 441) have laid bare significant data problems in these 
datasets, such as the inclusion of "crises where no explicit threats were made" or "threatening actions 
unauthorized by national leaders." 
351 In process tracing, "the investigator explores the chain of events of the decision-making process by 
which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes"; see Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 64.  
352 See Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004). 
353 Gary Goertz, "Case Studies, Causal Mechanisms, and Selecting Cases" (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, August 2012), 13. See also Goertz, 
"Multimethod Research," Security Studies 25, no. 1 (2016): 3–24. 
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On the other hand, this type of selection is particularly valuable when the causal 
mechanism suggests a "sequence of events for more than one value of the independent 
variable."354 Hypothesis 2 is a prime candidate for such exploratory exercise. It allows 
one to examine the temporal connection between different foreign policy options 
contemplated by a petrostate (e.g., initiate conflict or stay put), the mediating influence of 
penetrating superpowers (given prevailing structural conditions), and resulting conflict 
outcomes. 
Consistent with this approach, the case selected for study is Libya from 1969 to 2005. 
Three main criteria are imposed on case study selection: oil availability, uniformity in 
regime type (and leadership), and variation on the penetration (independent) and conflict 
(dependent) variables that underpin hypothesis 2. Focusing on a state with substantial oil 
wealth is important, because it eliminates ambiguity with respect to petrostate status. As 
noted in section 4.1.1, there is an ongoing debate about the advantages and disadvantages 
of using alternative measures of oil availability in ascertaining such status. In the case of 
Libya, however, the question is unambiguous: the state has consistently ranked in the top 
echelon of countries with large oil reserves and production,355 and its oil exports revenues 
unequivocally put it in the petrostate category for the entire study period (see table 4-1). 
Further, choosing a state with substantial oil endowments is theoretically advantageous, 
                                                 
354 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods," in The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 1173. 
355 See, for example, BP Statistical Review of World Energy—underpinning data, 1965–2016 (British 
Petroleum, amended June 23, 2017), http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-
review-of-world-energy/downloads.html.  
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because it highlights both that state's strategic and economic importance to superpowers 
and its ability to finance a military buildup. 
The second criterion for case selection—uniformity in regime type—is a methodological 
necessity. If regime type were to vary, one would be unable to determine whether conflict 
outcomes were causally influenced by that variation or by superpower penetration. By 
keeping regime type constant—that is, by controlling for it—one could eliminate its 
potentially confounding influence. Indeed, Libya is a perfect case allowing for this type 
of controlling procedure. It not only maintained a personalist regime type throughout the 
period of analysis, but also had the same ruler at the helm of power.356 Qaddafi, the 
longest serving leader in the Arab world, sustained his despotic control over Libya for a 
total of 42 consecutive years (1969–2011) and was the sole decider of the country's 
foreign policy over that period. It should also be stressed that the within-case character of 
the proposed analysis provides a natural control for other, unobserved variables. This 
control mechanism is made possible by the "uniform background conditions of the 
case,"357 such as culture and historical experience. 
Selecting a case with variation on the independent and dependent variables (third 
criterion) adds another methodological benefit by allowing for both longitudinal 
(congruence) analysis and process tracing. During the period of interest, Libya fell in a 
region that saw a marked shift in superpower penetration (resulting from a global 
structural change in 1989) and, thus, changing structural conditions. Moreover, as 
discussed in greater detail later in the chapter, it exhibited a significant shift in its conflict 
                                                 
356 In principle, a single autocratic regime could have multiple autocratic rulers. See Geddes et al., 
"Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions," 316. 
357 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 52. 
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behavior over time. These variations permit a congruence testing procedure, whereby the 
goal is to check for congruence (or incongruence) between the predicted and observed 
values of the independent and dependent variables.358 In addition, this type of analysis 
allows for revealing the "causal chains" by which the independent variable causes the 
dependent variable—the paramount advantage of the case study method. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that bipolar penetration would give rise to phenomena such as militarization and 
realignment (double option), elevating the prospect for petroagression. Therefore, a 
process-tracing approach to testing would seek evidence for such phenomena, 
ascertaining their presence in the "sequence and structure of [historical] events."359 
Lastly, it is worth noting that the petrostate selected for study is a difficult case for the 
theory. Qualitative methodologists have insisted that researchers should choose cases that 
are more likely to falsify the argument being assessed, and Libya presents one such case. 
Qaddafi is frequently described as one of the most unruly and unpredictable personalist 
leaders in modern history. If this description is any close to the truth, it would suggest 
Libyan external behavior that is less responsive to structural conditions and superpower 
influence. Therefore, if one is able to demonstrate that these conditions and influence 
had, in fact, a systematic impact on Libyan foreign policy, such demonstration would 
constitute a strong test for the theory. 
5.1 General patterns 
Qaddafi's Libya is a textbook example of a petrostate with notoriously aggressive foreign 
policy. Its belligerent behaviors, fueled by oil income, spanned a wide range of activities, 
                                                 
358 Ibid. 
359 Ibid., 65. 
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including diplomatic coercion, financial and military support for rebel groups (or 
incumbent governments), involvement in international terrorism, and direct military 
engagements with other states. Many of these activities also appear to have conformed to 
a pattern of tactical escalation, whereby diplomatic efforts aiming to establish Libyan 
influence in a foreign country were followed by more nefarious subversive actions and, in 
some cases, outright military intervention.360 Under Qaddafi's leadership, Libya ventured 
into a series of costly and lengthy conflicts with its southern neighbor, Chad, and a brief 
war with Egypt in the east. Its military also intervened on the side of Idi Amin in Uganda 
and even provoked minor incidents with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf of Sirte. Besides 
these engagements, Libya sponsored or took part in numerous coup attempts, national 
liberation movements, assassination plots, and acts of terrorism. 
In trying to explain these behaviors, scholars have typically delved into the internal 
politics of the Libyan state, in particular its autocratic character and the psychological 
traits and ideological convictions of its leader. Alison Pargeter, for example, has 
highlighted Qaddafi's outsized international ambitions as the main driver of his external 
revisionism, writing that "Libya was always going to be too small for Qaddafi," who 
sought to conduct foreign policy that "befitted a leader of world class calibre."361 Others, 
such as Ronald Bruce St John and René Lemarchand, have seen ideology as the linchpin 
of Libyan foreign exploits, emphasizing Qaddafi's deep, and allegedly stable, beliefs in 
                                                 
360 René Lemarchand, "Beyond the Mad Dog Syndrome," in The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies 
in Africa, ed. Lemarchand (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 8. 
361 Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2012), 118. 
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anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism.362 The autocratic, personalist character of Libyan 
domestic politics has also been put forth as a powerful force in foreign policy formation 
and conduct, with George Joffe observing that "the neo-patrimonial system dominated by 
Qaddafi" enabled him to execute "radical alterations, even reversals, of Libyan foreign 
policy without exciting resistance within its institutions."363 
Many of these accounts are consistent with the theory laid out in section 3.1: personalist 
institutions were hypothesized to select leaders with greater desire for international goods 
and, when coupled with oil income, to impose fewer constraints on their foreign policy. 
However, these accounts reach a natural limit when it comes to explaining variations in 
conflict behavior in conditions of uniform regime type and leadership. The number, 
scope, and intensity of Qaddafi's foreign adventures changed considerably over time, and, 
as shown below, these changes followed a clear pattern. Explanations emphasizing 
ideology as the foundation of Libyan foreign policy also face inconvenient paradoxes, 
such as Qaddafi's support of Ethiopia (predominantly Christian) against Numeiry's Sudan 
(largely Muslim) or, more strikingly, his backing of Iran (Persian) against Iraq (Arab) 
through most of the 1980s. Libya's efforts in the 1990s to appease the United States (and 
its European allies) and to distance itself from the Palestinian question have been a puzzle 
of its own right, with some observers seeing them as an indication that Qaddafi's 
"ideological commitments were nothing more than rhetoric."364 
                                                 
362 See, for example, Ronald Bruce St John, Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy 1969–1987 
(London: Saqi Books, 1987), 19; and Lemarchand, "Beyond the Mad Dog Syndrome," 3. 
363 George Joffe, "Prodigal or Pariah? Foreign Policy in Libya," in Libya since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution 
Revisited, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 201. 
364 Ibid., 192. See also John P. Entelis, "Libya and Its North African Policy," in Libya since 1969, 173. 
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While these puzzles cannot be explained convincingly with an inward-looking theory, 
they can be accounted for with the outward-looking one underpinning hypothesis 2. Most 
students of Libyan foreign policy have either brushed aside or deemphasized the external 
realities (constraints and opportunities) faced by Qaddafi during his long tenure. If the 
theory presented in section 3.2 is correct, however, one should expect the structural layer 
of superpower regional interference to operate strongly over the period of analysis. 
Specifically, confirmative evidence for the theory would include observations of (1) 
increasing or high external aggression in conditions of bipolar penetration and (2) 
decreasing or low external aggression in conditions of unipolar penetration. Table 5-1 
provides a high-level overview of the key variables, by period, showing both the 
expected and observed values of the dependent variable. 
Table 5-1. Mapping of key variables, Libya, 1969–2005 
Variable 
1969–89 
1990–2005 
1969–73 1974–89 
Superpower penetration Bipolar Bipolar Unipolar 
External aggression 
Expected 
Observed 
 
High 
Moderate (increasing) 
 
High 
High (peaking mid-
period) 
 
Low 
Low (decreasing) 
 
The table provides support for the theory, suggesting that, rather than being erratic, the 
foreign policy behavior of Libya was based on strategic opportunism. Most of Qaddafi's 
hostile activities, being they diplomatic, military, subversive, or terrorism related, were 
concentrated in the 1969–89 period of bipolar superpower penetration. Within that 
period, one can also discern two subperiods: a brief initial stretch of about 4 years (1969–
73) during which Libya's foreign policy was becoming increasingly revisionist and a 
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longer, 15-year span (1974–89) of more intense external belligerence. This behavioral 
evolution is not surprising and, as detailed later, reflects the causal processes expected to 
operate in conditions of bipolarity, in particular those related to militarization and 
superpower realignment (see section 3.2.2). In contrast to the 1969–89 period, the post-
1989 years saw a sharp decline in Libya's destabilization efforts. In terms of militarized 
dispute initiation, for example, the country's foreign policy adventurism came to a 
standstill, with no major dispute initiated after 1989.365 This reversal is consistent with 
the prediction that petrostate conflict behavior would respond to the structural constraints 
imposed by unipolarity. 
Given that few lasting changes in international politics occur overnight, the years 
separating the periods in table 5-1 should not be construed as signifying instantaneous 
shifts in variable values. Rather, they are demarcation points around which a transitional 
process spanning a few months to a few years tends to gravitate. For example, Libya's 
foreign policy became increasingly conflict oriented before the midpoint of the 1970s, 
and Qaddafi started to temper his aggressive ambitions a year or two before the end of the 
bipolar period (especially after his 1987 defeat in the Toyota War with Chad). 
Nonetheless, demarcating the periods is useful both in revealing important causal chains 
and in guiding the historical narrative. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next two sections provide 
accounts of, respectively, superpower penetration in the Middle East and North Africa 
(hereafter referred to simply as the Middle East) and salient features of the history of 
                                                 
365 Libya initiated 18 militarized disputes between 1969 and 1989 and only 2 disputes between 1990 and 
2005. These figures represent a tenfold drop in the average annual number of dispute initiations (from 
about 1 dispute per year in 1969–89 to about 0.1 dispute per year in 1990–2005). 
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modern Libya during the rule of King Idris al-Sanusi (1951–69). This discussion provides 
context for understanding the external environment in which Qaddafi had to formulate 
and conduct his foreign policy, the hegemonic rivalry and local interests of the 
superpowers, and the legacy of the Sanusi monarchy in terms of its economic and 
security relations with those powers. The chapter then proceeds with a section examining, 
by period, how the implications of the theory underpinning hypothesis 2 played out 
during Qaddafi's tenure. In unpacking key historical developments, the analysis is guided 
by questions such as the following: Did the bipolar structural condition of 1969–89 allow 
Libya to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy agenda, and, if so, how? What did the 
transition to unipolarity in the late 1980s mean for Libya's strategic choices? Were these 
structural realities a meaningful influence on conflict patterns or, conversely, a backdrop 
of no discernible consequence? 
5.2 Regional penetration 
Libya, a Maghreb country, is part of the larger Middle East, a region extending from 
Morocco in the west to Iran in the east.366 While countries in the Horn of Africa, such as 
Sudan, and in the central lowlands of the Sahara, such as Chad, are typically not counted 
as part of the region, they are often discussed as "peripheral state actors" closely tied to it, 
both because of significant security interdependence and because some of them (Sudan, 
                                                 
366 The precise boundaries of the Middle East are disputed. Experts on the subject contend that North Africa 
(the Maghreb), the Levant (the Mashreq), the Gulf (the Khalij), and the non-Arab Israel, Turkey, Iran, and 
Cyprus are all part of it. See Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967–91: Regional 
Dynamic and the Superpowers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 59; and Buzan and Waever, Regions 
and Powers, 187. 
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Somalia, and Djibouti) are members of the Arab League.367 Although Libya's conflict 
interactions involved actors both inside and outside the Middle East, it was security 
dynamics and focal issues of contention found in that region that most strongly 
influenced the country's foreign policy. Moreover, these issues, among which are Arab 
nationalism and anti-Zionism, were tied, both dialectically and historically, to the 
intrusive system and the interests and competitive behaviors of the global powers. 
Therefore, to provide context for understanding Libya's foreign policy during the period 
of interest, it is important to shed light on the history and overall patterns of regional 
great power interference. 
During the Cold War, the Middle East was heavily penetrated by the two superpowers 
and, as pointed out by some observers, became a "secondary external battlefield" after 
Europe.368 In the late 1980s, responding to a global structural shift, this bipolar 
penetration gave way to a unipolar one, with the Soviet Union retracting from its regional 
involvement and the United States retaining, and even expanding, its own. Unlike 
Europe, an area subjected to superpower "overlay,"369 the Middle East saw penetration 
dominated by informal and entente-like arrangements rather than formal, "hard" 
                                                 
367 See Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 59; and Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 188, 
231. According to Buzan and Waever (Regions and Powers, 232), most of these countries reside in 
"unstructured" areas (as opposed to coherent security complexes) because of their weakness and 
"premodern" state of development. It could be argued that the links of those countries to states in the 
Middle East are stronger than the links to other neighbors. 
368 Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East, 23. See also Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 197; 
and David J. Pervin, "Building Order in Arab–Israeli Relations: From Balance to Concert?" in Regional 
Orders: Building Security in a New World, eds. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 275.  
369 The difference between overlay and penetration is that, in an overlay, external powers "dominate a 
region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations ceases to operate" (Buzan and Waever, Regions 
and Powers, 61). 
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alliances.370 In the bipolar period, this condition created more opportunities for 
realignment, although the division between camps tended to be symmetrical and 
increasingly stable after the mid-1960s.371 In penetrating the region, the superpowers 
adopted a wide range of intrusive techniques, including "soft" defense agreements, 
stationing of troops and advisors on client soil, arms transfers, military and intelligence 
support for local protégés, economic and diplomatic backing, and, at times of crisis and 
high-stakes security developments, direct military intervention (often demonstrative). 
5.2.1 Colonial legacies, structural realities, and superpower interests 
Before the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers in the wake of 
World War II, the Middle East was subjected to two great power rivalries, both fueled by 
the decline of the Ottoman Empire and gaining momentum in the late 19th century. In the 
northern (Central Asian) part of the region, Russia and Great Britain competed for control 
over Iran, Turkestan, the eastern Caucasus, and Afghanistan (a "buffer" country 
sometimes counted as part of the Middle East).372 This competition, often referred to as 
the Great Game, eventually led to the partition of Iran and Afghanistan in the Anglo-
Russian Agreement of 1907, with Russia gaining hold of northern Iran.373 In the rest of 
the region, including the Maghreb, a second rivalry raged among the colonial powers of 
the European state system, with Great Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Germany 
and Italy, emerging as the main contenders for influence in the Mediterranean and Red 
                                                 
370 Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East, 43. 
371 Ibid., 24. 
372 Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East, 14. 
373 Ibid., 15. 
134 
 
Sea areas.374 By the beginning of World War I, Great Britain had solidified its foothold in 
the Persian Gulf and Egypt, France in Algeria and Morocco, and Italy in Libya. After the 
end of the war, Britain and France, both victors posed to divvy up the spoils from the 
defeated Ottoman Empire, took administrative control over the territories of the Fertile 
Crescent as part of the postwar mandate system established by the League of Nations.375 
These regional struggles and arrangements saw little involvement from the United States 
and, after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, from the newly formed Soviet Union. 
During the interwar period, both countries were preoccupied with internal problems.376 
The United States embarked on a path of international isolation and, in the 1930s, had to 
battle the economic malaise brought about by the Great Depression. For its part, the 
Soviet Union, torn by domestic political struggles in the immediate postrevolutionary 
years, tried to normalize relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan,377 and later, under 
Joseph Stalin, suffered through that ruler's brutal policies of power consolidation and 
agricultural collectivization. As a result, for most of the first half of the 20th century, 
neither country had its sights set on external expansion. 
                                                 
374 Ibid., 9. See also Remy Leveau, "France's Arab Policy," in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The 
International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, ed. L. Carl Brown (London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2004), 4. 
375 Under the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which initiated the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain 
was awarded mandates over Iraq and Palestine, and France over Syria and Lebanon. 
376 Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East, 18. 
377 After the 1917 revolution, in a reversal from the Tsarist policy of expansion, the Soviet Union reduced 
its presence in northern Iran and signed a treaty of friendship with Turkey in 1921. See Alvin Z. 
Rubenstein, "The Middle East in Russia's Strategic Prism," in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The 
International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, ed. L. Carl Brown (London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2004), 78–79. 
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This condition was not to last, however. At the end of World War II, the dramatic 
improvement in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
both on the winning side of the conflict, secured them superpower status, transforming 
the international system from a multipolar to a bipolar one. At the same time, the old 
great powers of the European continent, severely weakened by the war, reevaluated their 
external commitments and started a gradual process of decolonization. Partitioned under 
the designs of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Middle East saw the 
emergence of new sovereign states, including Israel in 1948,378 a country whose 
existence was to have the most lasting impact on Arab politics. Great Britain lost its 
mandate over Palestine, and France over Syria and Lebanon. The resultant power void, 
together with the emerging global structural and ideological conflict between the 
superpowers, set the stage for U.S. and Soviet penetration of the region. Although Great 
Britain and France, now firmly in the Western camp led by the United States, retained 
some regional influence for a time (particularly in North Africa), that influence was 
bound to decline precipitously or be channeled into the U.S. bipolar rivalry with the 
Soviet Union. 
Both superpowers had strong, albeit slightly different, interests in penetrating the Middle 
East. One shared incentive was the global hegemonic competition, which took the form 
of a zero-sum struggle whereby the regional expansion of one side was seen as a loss by 
the other. But the superpowers also had more focused interests specific to the region. The 
United States' primary objective was to secure petroleum supplies for itself and its 
European allies, protect the assets of U.S. oil companies operating on petrostate soil, and 
                                                 
378 As noted by Hansen (Unipolarity and the Middle East, 22), this partitioning was designed to reduce the 
regional influence of the European colonial powers. 
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gain economically from arms sales and petrodollar recycling. The importance of oil in the 
U.S. strategic approach to the region became apparent as early as 1950, when President 
Harry Truman gave the first security assurance to Saudi Arabia, announcing that "no 
threat to your kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern of 
the United States."379 While oil also figured prominently in the geopolitical calculus of 
the Soviet Union, both as a source of hard currency and a commodity needed by Soviet 
satellites in Eastern Europe, that superpower had additional security interests in 
penetrating the Middle East. Key among these were the region's close proximity and 
strategic waterways, which allowed Soviet access to warm-water ports beyond the Black 
Sea littoral.380 
5.2.2 From early struggles to lasting penetration 
During the first postwar decade, the superpower struggle for regional influence focused 
on the "northern tier" area of the Middle East. Aiming to solidify and expand its position 
along its southern periphery, the Soviet Union refused to lift its occupation of northern 
Iran in 1946, while encouraging Azeri and Kurdish separatism and obstructing the 
formation of a central government in Tehran.381 It also adopted a more threatening 
                                                 
379 Quoted in Dore Gold, "Toward the Carter Doctrine: The Evolution of American Power Projection 
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Brown (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 221. 
380 Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East, 34. 
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posture toward Turkey, requesting the return of Kars and Ardahan and seeking base 
rights in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.382 Besides these efforts, the Soviet Union 
sought to encourage communist subversion in northern tier countries, although this initial 
strategy lacked focus and, perhaps coming too early, did not resonate strongly with its 
targets, whose historical experience with Russia was anything but benign.383 
With Great Britain no longer capable to respond to these developments,384 the United 
States inserted itself into the region. It promptly backed Turkey and Iran, offering them 
economic, diplomatic, and military support.385 These efforts became part of the 1947 
Truman Doctrine, which aimed to block Soviet expansion in the northern tier (Turkey 
and Iran) and southeastern Europe (Greece). Under pressure from the United States and 
the U.N. Security Council, Stalin withdrew from northern Iran and was denied territorial 
concessions and base rights by Turkey. In 1952, Turkey (along with Greece) joined the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), becoming one of the staunchest U.S. clients 
in the region. With Dwight Eisenhower assuming the U.S. presidency in 1953, the 
American penetration strategy accelerated, further containing the Soviet Union and 
gaining greater access to oil resources. In August of that year, the Eisenhower 
administration, jointly with the British government, orchestrated a successful coup 
against Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq, solidifying the pro-U.S. 
monarchical rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and averting the nationalization of the 
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.386 In the next two years, Eisenhower, again with British 
assistance, went on to create the Baghdad Pact, an anti-Soviet defense body joined by 
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain.387 
In light of these developments, efforts by the Soviet Union to position itself in the region 
did not see much success during the first postwar decade. The one notable exception was 
Syria, with which Moscow had established close political and military bonds as early as 
1946. However, things were about to change, and from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s 
Soviet regional penetration, now steered by Nikita Khrushchev, expanded both in depth 
and geographical reach. Unlike Stalin's expansionist strategy, which focused on the 
northern tier, Khrushchev's was bolder and more astute. It took a turn to pragmatism, 
deemphasizing the spread of communism as a primary foreign policy objective and 
ramping up military and economic support for existing and prospective clients.388 In 
addition, despite some courting of Israel in the immediate postwar years, Moscow started 
to tilt toward the Arab states in the conflict over Palestine. As pointed out by Alan 
Taylor, the new expansionist strategy was to "win them over through military and 
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economic aid and expressions of sympathy with their problems and [nationalist] 
aspirations."389 
This strategic shift paid off, allowing the Soviet Union to firmly penetrate the region and 
increase its influence. With Syria already in its camp, Moscow bypassed the northern tier 
in 1955, winning over Egypt, a formidable, centrally located regional power. Vexed by 
the formation of the Baghdad Pact in the previous year, Egypt's nationalist leader, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, turned to the Soviet Union for help with weapons and the construction of 
the Aswan Dam, effectively inviting "the Russians to participate in the politics of the 
Middle East."390 Besides securing this major headway, which established a "patron–client 
relationship" with Egypt through a now famous arms deal,391 Moscow managed to make 
additional advances, consolidating and expanding its position in the region and 
weakening that of the United States. In 1958, General Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the 
pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and, in the following year, withdrew from the 
Baghdad Pact and moved to the Soviet orbit, receiving arms and aid in return.392 In late 
1962, the United States and Great Britain also faced challenges in Yemen, where a 
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republican coup backed by Egypt and the Soviet Union deposed the imam and triggered 
the Yemeni civil war.393 
In the early 1960s, Soviet penetration expanded apace, albeit in less depth, to the 
Maghreb, an area of the Middle East that, by that time, was mostly under the influence of 
the United States and its Western subordinates (Great Britain and France). After the end 
of the Algerian war of independence with France (1962), Moscow established close ties 
with the pro-Soviet regime of Ahmed Ben-Bella, who adopted sweeping socialist reforms 
and allowed Algerian communists to participate in government.394 To court its new 
client, the Soviet Union poured large amounts of economic and military aid into Algeria, 
and even decorated Ben-Bella as a "hero of the Soviet Union."395 Not less important than 
this regional breakthrough was the increasing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, 
particularly toward the end of the Khrushchev era. Guided by his global strategy of 
expansion, the Soviet leader pushed for the development of intercontinental ballistic 
missile capability and a "blue water fleet" composed of light surface vessels and 
submarines.396 By 1964, about 40 Soviet submarines had been equipped with nuclear 
missiles, and Soviet naval units started regular out-of-area operations in the 
Mediterranean.397 
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One would be amiss not to recognize the importance of the Suez crisis of 1956 in 
allowing the Soviet entry into the Middle East and in establishing a lasting condition of 
regional bipolar penetration. In October 1956, a few months after Nasser nationalized the 
Suez Canal (in response to an Israeli incursion in Gaza), Great Britain and France, joining 
in a secret military operation with Israel, attacked Egypt in a push for a regime change. 
Washington, uninformed about the plot, was quick to respond, with Eisenhower stopping 
and condemning the attack and, a year later, announcing his doctrine of offering U.S. 
assistance to any nation threatened by international communism.398 The crisis had 
significance for two reasons. First, it ended any illusions on the part of Great Britain and 
France, both heavily dependent on U.S. support for their economic and defense needs, 
that they had retained any independent clout in the region. After 1956, British and French 
influence, to the extent that it still existed, was subordinated to the prerogatives of U.S. 
foreign and security policy.399 Second, the crisis created a power vacuum that allowed the 
Soviet Union to solidify its local position and emerge as a friend of the Arab cause. With 
the pronouncement of the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, the global superpower struggle 
was brought firmly to the regional level.400 
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5.2.3 Polarization and structural transformation 
While the Khrushchev and Eisenhower's era saw both superpowers solidify their 
positions in the Middle East, the two and a half decades that followed the mid-1960s 
evidenced a dramatic polarization of the bipolar condition—a condition Qaddafi was 
about to face in 1969. Assuming power in late 1964, Leonid Brezhnev, the new Soviet 
leader, not only continued the expansionist policies of his predecessor but also brought 
them to a new, more confrontational level. Realizing that further advancement into 
Europe was not possible, Brezhnev directed Soviet resources to the Middle East, ramping 
up military and economic aid for Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria.401 Clearly a student of 
Khrushchev's pragmatism, the new leader also deemphasized ideology as a vanguard of 
penetration, relying instead on a clientelistic network based on relationships of 
dependence. Adding to this strategy of "muscular" expansion was a massive effort to 
shore up and deploy a full-fledged blue-water navy in the Mediterranean, a capability 
intended to counter the introduction of U.S. Polaris submarines in the area and to increase 
Soviet influence in the Maghreb.402 In subsequent years, Moscow used this capability 
both "to signal diplomatic interest to the other superpower and to demonstrate political 
support for the local client."403 
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The quality of superpower penetration also became increasingly tied to the Arab–Israeli 
conflict. Although the United States moved closer to Israel in the early 1960s,404 the 
"special relationship" between the two countries deepened markedly during and after the 
Six-Day War of June 1967, in which Israel defeated the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan.405 A few weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, the administration of Lyndon 
Johnson authorized the shipment of weapons and ammunition to Israel, facilitating the 
latter's invasion of Egypt.406 Also implicit in the crisis, Moscow passed false intelligence 
to Cairo about an imminent Israeli attack, compelling Nasser to expel U.N. forces from 
the border with Israel and to amass troops in the area.407 Striking preemptively, Israel 
achieved a swift victory, capturing the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Both 
superpowers supported their clients during the conflict, and both had something to lose 
and something to gain from it. For the United States, backing Israel meant alienating the 
radical Arab camp, but also regional expansion and a blow to Nasser's prestige. For 
Moscow, the war's outcome was a credibility setback, but also an opportunity to increase 
the dependence of key Arab clients on Soviet military support.408 
In the aftermath of the war, and especially since the pronouncement of the Nixon 
Doctrine in 1969, the superpower competition in the Middle East became increasingly 
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reliant on local surrogates.409 During the 1970s, Washington and Moscow focused on 
deepening and expanding their proxy networks, heightening regional tensions in the 
process. The United States increased its military support for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel 
(the three "pillars" of U.S. regional penetration) and strengthened (often secretly) its 
political cooperation with the sheikhdoms in the Gulf and with Morocco and Tunisia in 
the Maghreb.410 The Soviet Union, under pressure to restore its credibility as a 
superpower patron after the humiliating events of the late 1960s, engaged in a massive 
arms resupply of Egypt and Syria, both of which had broken diplomatic relations with 
Washington during the Six-Day War.411 In the following decade and a half, Moscow also 
embarked on a more assertive regional policy, concluding treaties of friendship and 
cooperation with Egypt (1971), Iraq (1972), Ethiopia (1978), South Yemen (1979), and 
Syria (1980) and expanding its influence (including access to naval facilities) in the Red 
Sea littoral and North Africa.412 In the late 1970s, and particularly after 1979 (which 
marked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah in Iran), Washington 
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countered Moscow's expansionism with the Carter and Reagan doctrines, which led to the 
creation of the U.S. Central Command.413 
As the superpowers deepened their penetration of the Middle East, the region became 
increasingly divided, with local states sorting themselves into pro-U.S. (moderate) and 
pro-Soviet (radical) camps.414 Not surprisingly, this bipolarization was bound to see some 
defections and realignments (see section 3.2.2): Egypt, with Anwar Sadat assuming 
power in late 1970, distanced itself from Moscow and moved to the U.S. orbit after the 
1973 Arab–Israeli War; Iraq followed suit after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and 
particularly in the early 1980s, when Washington openly sided with Baghdad in the Iran–
Iraq War; and Libya, taking the opposite course, joined the Soviet camp in the mid-
1970s. In trying to manage their surrogate networks and maintain parity, the superpowers 
also ramped up arms transfers to the region, elevating its power level. Between 1968–72 
and 1983–85, the share of U.S. military deliveries to the Middle East rose from about 10 
percent to about 45 percent of total (global) U.S. deliveries.415 The Soviet Union was 
similarly caught up in the arms race: during the 1970s, its military transfers to the region 
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exceeded (both quantitatively and qualitatively) those to Warsaw Pact countries.416 Given 
the oil-price revolution of the 1970s and the superpowers' growing insistence on cash 
deals, it is not surprising that petrostates topped the ranks of the local clientele. However, 
in arming the Middle East, the superpowers were guided not only by commercial but also 
by geopolitical motivations, providing military assistance to friends and withholding it 
from foes.417 
The heightened bipolar condition continued until the mid-1980s, started to subside in the 
second half of the decade, and gave way to a unipolar one after 1989. Many factors were 
responsible for this transformation, and while some are detailed later in the chapter, they 
are of no central importance to the present discussion. It is clear, however, that the Soviet 
withdrawal from the global superpower rivalry of the Cold War had a profound structural 
impact on the regional level.418 In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union ceased its political, 
economic, and military support for former clients in the Middle East (including its 
bastion, Syria) and, in 1989, pulled out of Afghanistan, signaling the end of its 
involvement in the region.419 Rather than reciprocating the Soviet move, the United 
States retained and even expanded its regional footprint, quickly replacing the bipolar 
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rivalry with U.S. dominance.420 With its core economic interests in the region still intact, 
Washington went on to reassure its traditional allies in the 1990s, contain revisionist 
powers by means of economic and military coercion, and launch diplomatic initiatives in 
an effort to deescalate the Arab–Israeli conflict.421 As observed by Buzan and Waever, 
after 1989, "global intervention took a unipolar form, with a dominant United States 
using its influence to dampen the interstate (but not intra-state) conflictual security 
dynamics" in the region.422 
5.3 The Sanusi monarchy: a prelude to Qaddafi's rule 
The modern Libyan state existed for less than 18 years before it entered the era of 
Qaddafi. In 1951, after nearly a decade of French and British administration (Italian 
colonial rule ended in 1943), Libya was granted independence by the United Nations, 
incorporating the provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan. Unlike its 
neighbors Tunisia and Algeria, which had to pay dearly for their freedom, the new 
country was an artificial creation of the great powers, particularly the United States, 
which had an overwhelming majority in the U.N. General Assembly. While France, 
Britain, and Italy presented plans for separate trusteeships over the three provinces, the 
Truman administration was quick to reject them, pushing instead for full political 
sovereignty.423 The U.S. approach, not unlike that adopted by the superpowers in other 
parts of the region, had two goals. One was to weaken the influence of the European 
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powers and compel them to fall in line with the course set by Washington.424 The second 
was to limit future political meddling by Moscow, which had veto power in the U.N. 
Security Council.425 These objectives were clearly articulated by Henry Villard, the first 
U.S. chief of mission to Libya, who stated that "as an independent entity, Libya could 
freely enter into treaties or arrangements with Western powers looking toward the 
defense of the Mediterranean and North Africa."426 
Shaped by the new realities of superpower politics, Libya emerged as a hereditary 
monarchy, the United Kingdom of Libya, brandishing a federal constitution and a 
parliamentary form of government, with King Idris al-Sanusi serving as a head of 
state.427 The new country faced significant difficulties, both political and economic. 
Politically, the main challenge was to forge national unity, a task complicated by the fact 
that the three provinces of the new kingdom had sharply divergent historical experiences 
and attachments, with Cyrenaica having close ties to Egypt, Tripolitania to Tunisia, and 
the Fezzan to Sudan and Chad.428 In addition, all three provinces, each striving to 
advance its own interests, aimed to maintain high degree of tribal and administrative 
autonomy, making federal governance easy on paper but difficult in practice.429 Adding 
to these political problems, which persisted even during the rule of Qaddafi, was the 
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abject economic condition of the country. In 1950, Libya was the poorest state in the 
Arab world, with an average annual income per capita estimated at just $35.430 The 
kingdom also suffered from large trade and public finance deficits, decrepit 
infrastructure, and high mortality and illiteracy rates. As pointed out by John Wright, 
these realities were "the hallmarks of a country in the greatest need of outside help."431 
Help did come, albeit at the cost of King Idris surrendering part of his country's 
sovereignty to the United States and its Western allies. In July 1953, Libya concluded a 
20-year treaty of friendship and alliance with Great Britain, which obtained access to 
airstrips and military facilities in the vicinity of Tripoli and at al-Adem near Tobruk.432 A 
year later, the monarchy signed a similar treaty with the United States, allowing U.S. 
forces to keep the Wheelus airbase near Tripoli (U.S. troops had been stationed in Libya 
even before the 1954 treaty was negotiated) and to develop communications 
infrastructure in the area.433 Although France also signed a security agreement with Libya 
in 1955, the terms of that agreement were not as favorable as those obtained by the 
United States and Britain.434 In exchange for the monarchy's opening to the Western 
camp, all three countries pledged financial and other economic aid. The lion's share of 
that assistance came from the United States. In addition to large shipments of wheat, 
American aid to Libya included financial support estimated at $64 million between 1953 
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and 1956 and $112 million between 1956 and 1960.435 In the 1950s, these levels of 
economic assistance were staggering, making the kingdom "the largest per capita 
recipient of U.S. aid in the world."436 
The American largesse was strategically placed. Although Libya had no resources of 
value at the time, its location offered major advantages in the emerging superpower 
rivalry. The kingdom provided the shortest crossings to Sub-Saharan Africa, convenient 
bases for naval power projection in the central Mediterranean, and easy access to Egypt, 
Sudan, and the Suez Canal.437 While oil was not discovered until 1959, Washington 
recognized Libya's hydrocarbon potential early on, starting exploration activities in the 
mid-1950s. The Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955, allegedly drafted by U.S. and British 
advisors,438 established a unique system of granting a large number, limited-size 
concessions to both "majors" (global oil multinationals) and "independents" (smaller 
firms new to the industry).439 Because these concessions were assigned on a first-come, 
first-served basis, U.S. oil companies, which dominated world production, had an 
advantage in penetrating the Libyan market.440 After 1959, when Esso (a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey) first discovered commercially viable quantities of petroleum 
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in the Sirte basin, the kingdom's oil industry started to develop quickly. In the wake of 
more discoveries and infrastructure development (mostly by U.S. companies) in the first 
half of the 1960s, Libya emerged as a full-fledged petrostate and a major player in the 
global oil market. By 1967, 2 years before Qaddafi's ascend, it supplied a third of the oil 
destined to Western Europe.441 
The newly found wealth helped Libya overcome some of its early economic difficulties, 
reducing its dependence on foreign aid. While encouraging corruption and not optimally 
managed, the windfall of oil revenues allowed for considerable investment in agriculture, 
infrastructure, and welfare, improving the lot of many Libyans.442 At the same time, a 
mixture of political and economic factors in the 1960s led to growing U.S. and British 
dissatisfaction with the monarchy.443 One major concern was King Idris's inability to 
effectively rule his country and to create a sense of national unity.444 Often described as a 
"reluctant monarch," Idris rarely left Cyrenaica, distanced himself from the daily 
pressures of politics, and, on a few occasions, even threatened to resign.445 This 
detachment was certainly posing risks to U.S. economic interests, which required an 
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orderly domestic environment conducive to contracting and investment. In 1960, when 
the Libyan oil industry was still in its infancy, a report by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development stated that "economic development demands unity of 
purpose and action" and that the discovery of oil could "help to weld the three provinces 
together and to create a new sense of national unity."446 Despite this veiled warning, a 
1962 secret memorandum to President John F. Kennedy described a "sheer financial 
chaos in Libya."447 
Although the federal formula was abolished in 1963, giving way to a unitary state,448 the 
centralization of power in the hands of the king and the royal diwan failed to assuage 
U.S. concerns. The monarchy came short of achieving national unity, made unwelcome 
amendments to the pricing mechanism of the 1955 Petroleum Law,449 and showed 
inability to deal effectively with anti-Western sentiments boiling up in Libya and the 
region. In January 1964, in response to Israeli plans to divert waters from the Jordan 
River, student demonstrations broke out in the streets of Benghazi.450 When the 
Cyrenaica Defense Force was dispatched to contain the protest, it killed a number of 
students, provoking further turmoil and strengthening the hand of Arab nationalists. In 
the following month, Nasser escalated the crisis, calling for the closure of U.S. and 
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British military bases in Libya and falsely claiming that these bases had been used against 
Egypt during the 1956 Suez episode.451 Caving under domestic and external pressure, and 
with King Idris threatening to resign, the Libyan government publically announced that it 
had no plans to renew its 20-year security agreements with the United States and Great 
Britain. It also asked Washington and London to enter into negotiations for setting the 
conditions (including timetables) under which their bases would be terminated.452 
After the events of the mid-1960s, the monarchy saw its domestic position significantly 
weakened. Although King Idris retained some support among loyal tribal groups, he was 
unable to stem the wave of Arab nationalism, and his inaptitude in governing the country 
and in defending Western interests eroded the trust of his foreign benefactors. By 1966, 
Britain withdrew most of its forces stationed in Libya (largely because of their declined 
strategic value), retaining small contingents at Tobruk and other locations in 
Cyrenaica.453 At about the same time, the United States started negotiations for the future 
status of its military bases, continuing to maintain presence at the Wheelus airfield.454 
The situation became increasingly heated in 1967, when King Idris's weak response to 
the Six-Day War triggered anti-Israeli and anti-American riots in Tripoli and Benghazi. 
In an effort to deescalate the crisis, the Libyan government renewed its calls for 
terminating the U.S. and British bases and, a year later, established the Libyan General 
Petroleum Corporation, seeking to tighten its grip on the oil industry.455 Perhaps coming 
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too late, however, these efforts failed to stave off domestic discontent, while further 
alienating Washington and London. In fairness to the king, he was dealt a difficult hand: 
he had to balance conflicting interests, and he proved unfit for the task. 
5.4 Libya's foreign policy, 1969–2005 
Qaddafi did not craft foreign policy in a vacuum; he did so in the context of changing 
external conditions and, initially, the legacy of his predecessor. Section 5.2 traced the 
historical evolution of great power penetration in Libya's regional environment, shedding 
light on its structural characteristics and the local issues that became tied to it. The 
discussion painted a picture of early colonial rivalries, gradual and uneven superpower 
penetration in the wake of World War II, intense and symmetric bipolarization during the 
1970s and most of the 1980s, and a shift to unipolarity after 1989. Section 5.3 went on to 
review the short formative history of monarchical rule that preceded Qaddafi's rise to 
power. Special attention was paid to salient aspects of King Idris's relationship with the 
United States, the first superpower to establish close commercial and security ties to 
Libya. The discussion that follows completes the analysis, providing further empirical 
illustration of the general patterns described in section 5.1. 
5.4.1 Navigating the bipolar condition (1969–89) 
The long despotic rule of Qaddafi began in a bloodless coup executed by a small group of 
junior military officers on September 1, 1969, at a time when the ailing King Idris was 
seeking medical treatment in Turkey. The group, calling itself Free Unionist Officers, 
faced no resistance from the Cyrenaica Defense Force, quickly establishing control of the 
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royal palace and key military locations in Tripoli and Benghazi.456 Despite their security 
agreements with the monarchy, neither the United States nor Great Britain made any 
effort to assist it, a decision undoubtedly influenced by their dissatisfaction with King 
Idris during the 1960s (see section 5.3). About a week after the coup, which came as no 
surprise to domestic and foreign observers, Qaddafi was announced as the chairman of 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the new (10-member) ruling body in charge 
of what was now called the Libyan Arab Republic. Although the RCC formed a new 
cabinet in the first months of its existence, attracting civilians in the process, Qaddafi 
made it abundantly clear who was the locus of power. As noted by Pargeter, he quickly 
"promoted himself to the rank of colonel and made himself commander of the armed 
forces."457 In addition, he subjected all cabinet decisions to the veto of the RCC, which he 
controlled as a chairman.458 While the new leader altered some of Libya's domestic 
institutions in subsequent years, he did so in a way that never relaxed his personalist grip 
on political power. 
There has been much debate about what drove Qaddafi's foreign policy during his 
tenure.459 As noted earlier, part of his external outlook was ideologically based. A student 
of Nasser, Qaddafi believed in, or presented himself as a believer in, pan-Arabism and 
Arab nationalism.460 Closely related to this revisionist attitude were anti-imperialism, a 
reaction to a long history of colonial humiliation, and anti-Zionism, an outward 
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expression of the Arab refusal to accept the post-World War II fate of Palestine. But 
ideology was not the only source of Qaddafi's foreign activism. Since his ascend to 
power, the young leader perceived Egypt and Sudan as major military threats to Libya, 
particularly after both countries started to receive heavy-handed support from the United 
States.461 Thus, security concerns were at least partly responsible for his hostile policies 
in the region and for his adventures in Chad, Libya's "soft underbelly."462 Adding to this 
mix of foreign policy drivers were Qaddafi's despotic traits—a disposition to violence 
and an inflated view of Libya's role in the world. Qaddafi demonstrated extreme cruelty 
as early as his formative years as an army cadet,463 and consistently held grand visions of 
a Libyan-dominated Saharan empire.464 
While all of these factors point to a leader set for external revisionism, they are partial 
determinants of actual behavior. Motives interact with opportunity structures, and, as 
argued in the theory chapter, these structures are shaped by the penetrative quality of the 
intrusive system. It is not surprising, then, that some observers have seen Qaddafi's 
foreign policy as "a policy of opportunity, conducted on the basis of rather constant 
principles."465 For the most part, this characterization is correct. On the one hand, 
Qaddafi had to operate within certain parameters imposed from without and, when 
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possible, create opportunities within those parameters. At the same time, pragmatic 
considerations led to the occasional suppression and, after 1989, even compromise of 
foreign policy principles, either in rhetoric or in deed. During the bipolar period, Qaddafi 
was a master manipulator of the superpower regional competition. Rather than being 
erratic, he dealt with the superpowers systematically, maximizing his leverage and 
freedom of action. This relationship developed in two distinct periods: one of 
"conciliation" with the United States (1969–73) and one of alignment with the Soviet 
Union (1974–89). 
U.S. conciliation 
Qaddafi assumed power at a time of intense regional bipolarization (see section 5.2.3), 
taking control of a country still on good terms with the United States and with no 
meaningful ties to the Soviet Union. Instead of seeking immediate divorce from 
Washington, he treaded carefully, choosing a conciliatory strategy based on pragmatism. 
In his very first message to the Libyan people and the world (Communiqué One), 
Qaddafi stated that he took "pleasure in assuring all our friends that they need have no 
fears either for their property or for their safety...our enterprise is in no sense directed 
against any state whatever."466 That this message was directed toward the United States 
and Great Britain is beyond reasonable doubt. From its inception, the RCC gave special 
treatment and access to diplomats from these two countries and was "especially 
solicitous" toward American officials.467 This accommodative behavior, which continued 
for a few years, was driven by practical imperatives. Qaddafi had no interest in an early 
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confrontation with a superpower that could threaten his political survival and foreign 
policy designs, and he was well aware that, at the time, the Libyan oil industry, whose 
income was central to the sustenance of his regime, depended heavily on U.S. production 
capacity, technology, and expertise.468 
It is true that, early on, Qaddafi asked Washington and London to evacuate their military 
bases and opened talks with the oil companies for increasing the posted price of oil (these 
talks culminated in the so-called Tripoli Agreement of 1971). Contrary to widespread 
belief, however, neither of these actions presented significant harm to U.S. interests and, 
in fact, both likely enhanced them. By the late 1960s, Great Britain had mostly completed 
its withdrawal from Libya, and the United States was in negotiations to do the same (see 
section 5.3). For both Washington and London, the military bases, whose 20-year leases 
were about to expire anyway, had lost their strategic value, particularly in the presence of 
U.S. Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean.469 In addition, closing the bases was a low-
cost way to placate nationalist voices, which were the main driver of domestic instability 
during the monarchy. With respect to Qaddafi's push for higher oil prices, the picture was 
similar. While higher prices were detrimental to independents, whose operations were 
confined to Libya, they were beneficial to the large, geographically diversified majors, 
which sought to maintain market dominance and found backing by the U.S. government 
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during price negotiations.470 Moreover, an increase in oil prices served Washington's 
strategic and commercial interests. Strategically, it provided a revenue boost to oil-rich 
U.S. regional surrogates (Iran and Saudi Arabia) at a time of Soviet assertiveness in the 
region.471 Commercially, it fueled the U.S. military-industrial complex by propping up 
American arms sales during a period of rising trade deficits.472 
To minimize potential frictions with Washington, Qaddafi often engaged in behaviors 
that emphasized his differences with the Soviet Union and deemphasized those with the 
United States. As noted by Jonathan Bearman, in the first few years of the new regime, 
"Libyan strategy frequently converged with, or worked to the advantage of, United States' 
objectives."473 While Qaddafi's rhetoric was critical of imperialism of all stripes, its early 
manifestations had a discernible anticommunist and anti-Soviet tilt. As late as September 
1973, Qaddafi publically stated that "the biggest threat facing man nowadays is the 
communist theory"474 and, a month later, announced that "the Soviet Union remains the 
main enemy of the Arab world."475 This hostility against Moscow had both foreign and 
domestic dimensions. Domestically, Qaddafi continued capitalist policies of development 
and spoke of socialism in general terms, as "social justice."476 He also cracked down on 
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Marxist groups and sympathizers and purged members of the Baath Socialist Party.477 In 
the foreign arena, Qaddafi took a number of diplomatic initiatives that pleased the Nixon 
administration. In 1971, he prevented a communist coup against President Numeiry of 
Sudan, capturing its leaders and turning them over to Khartoum for execution. In 
addition, he condemned the Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation with Egypt 
(1971) and Iraq (1972), encouraged the unification of North and South Yemen (contra 
Soviet interests in the radical south), and took the side of pro-U.S. Pakistan in its 1971 
war with India.478 
Although this early strategy did not produce a full-fledged U.S.-Libyan alliance (some of 
Qaddafi's revisionist objectives did not allow for that), it managed to foster a relationship 
of mutual tolerance. Exploiting the bipolar condition, Qaddafi confounded Washington 
about Tripoli's loyalties and relaxed the external restraints on Libyan foreign and 
domestic policy. For its part, the United States had strong reasons to accommodate the 
new regime, if only as a temporary marriage of convenience. With Egypt still in the 
Soviet camp in the early 1970s and with Moscow set on a regional offensive, Washington 
had no interest to deliver Libya in the hands of its main rival. In addition, it had 
significant economic stakes in the country. Besides a large number of American workers 
employed on Libyan soil, these stakes included U.S. oil assets estimated at $1.5 billion, 
the highest U.S. private investment in Africa.479 That these interests guided Washington's 
early approach to Qaddafi is beyond question. According to a 1981 interview with David 
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Newsom, the last U.S. ambassador to Libya under the monarchy (1964–69), the main 
U.S. priorities after the coup were the "protection of the large American community in 
Libya," the "preservation of the pro-Western orientation of the government to the extent 
possible," and the "prevention of the domination of Libya by an adversary power."480 
While some observers have claimed that the United States actively helped Qaddafi in his 
bloodless rise to power, their evidence is mostly circumstantial.481 It is clear, however, 
that, even if Washington was not complicit in the coup, it did nothing to reverse it or to 
confront the new regime in its first years in power. In fact, it did just the opposite. After 
the coup, it promptly recognized the new Libyan government and bluntly dismissed calls 
for help by royal emissaries dispatched by King Idris, instead preferring to deal with the 
officers of the RCC.482 Both the U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, and Newsom's 
successor as a U.S. ambassador to Libya, Joseph Palmer, believed that Qaddafi was a 
"malleable" Arab nationalist with a "natural" anti-Soviet and anticommunist 
orientation.483 Two years after the coup, an assessment by the U.S. embassy in Tripoli 
concluded that the new leader was "close to being the indispensible man" in Libya and 
that, should he be removed from power, "a period of instability in all likelihood would 
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ensue."484 Consistent with these attitudes, Washington protected Qaddafi until 1973, 
closing its eyes for policies it disliked and blocking plots against him in at least two, and 
probably more, occasions.485 Critically, it also agreed to continue Western arms supplies 
to the new regime, proceeding with U.S. deliveries of F-5 fighter jets and troop 
transports.486 In addition, Britain supplied ships, France Mirage aircraft, and Italy 
armored personnel vehicles (manufactured under U.S. license).487 
Soviet alignment 
The period of U.S.–Libyan conciliation ended in 1974, with Qaddafi taking advantage of 
the double option and moving closer to the Soviet Union. Both Tripoli and Washington 
had reasons for the breakup, recognizing the growing incompatibility between their 
regional objectives. For Qaddafi, one major concern was Sadat's deepening ties with the 
United States, especially after the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. This development, which came 
at a time of worsening Egypt–Libya relations, was perceived as a threat to Libya and to 
Libyan interests in Chad, a potential launch pad for Egyptian military attack.488 In 
addition, Washington's push for Arab–Israeli peace, in particular Henry Kissinger's step-
by-step diplomacy of 1973–75,489 isolated Qaddafi and ran counter to his anti-Zionist 
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designs and pan-Arab unification efforts, while increasing Israeli and Egyptian influence 
in the region.490 These issues led to Libyan behaviors that alarmed the United States. One 
warning sign came as early as late 1973, when Qaddafi claimed territorial ownership of 
the entire Gulf of Sirte, a claim Washington quickly disputed.491 It was developments in 
1974, however, that dissolved the relationship. In May 1974, Qaddafi sent his right-hand 
man, Prime Minister Abdessalam Jalloud, on a diplomatic and arms procurement mission 
to Moscow and, later that year, displayed Soviet SAM-3 missiles during a military parade 
in Tripoli. The Gerald Ford administration, which now had Egypt on its side, responded 
in due course, blocking U.S. deliveries of C-130 Hercules aircraft and strategic 
equipment to Libya in 1975, while increasing its military and economic commitment to 
Cairo.492 
Ignoring Qaddafi's anti-Soviet and anticommunist tilt during the early 1970s, Moscow 
ceased the opportunity to bring a new client to its protective fold. It did so for both 
economic and strategic reasons, taking into account the competitive pressures of regional 
bipolarity. As a prospective arms buyer and commercial partner, Libya was a valuable 
source of hard currency, which was always in short supply in Soviet coffers.493 This 
benefit was only about to grow, as Qaddafi's oil-company nationalizations and 
exploration and production-sharing agreements (EPSAs) of 1974 (another factor 
responsible for the U.S.–Libyan estrangement) strengthened his grip over the Libyan oil 
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industry at a time of rising oil prices. In addition, Tripoli was in position to offer 
preferentially priced, high-quality oil to Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, and Jalloud's 
extensive touring of the region in the mid-1970s was a testament to that. But Moscow's 
goals in courting Qaddafi went far beyond mercenary aims. The loss of Egypt in 1973 
and of Sudan in 1971 weakened the Soviet position in the Red Sea area, and winning 
over Libya was a way to compensate for that loss and to secure a base that could be used 
both for subversion against Cairo and for power projection into Africa.494 Moreover, 
Qaddafi's nationalist credentials and growing anti-American fervor converged with 
Soviet interests in reducing U.S. regional influence and in sabotaging Washington's 
efforts for Arab–Israeli peace. 
Although Qaddafi's militarization efforts were already underway during the period of 
U.S. conciliation, Moscow's opening to Tripoli brought them to a new quantitative and 
qualitative level. Besides producing major trade and technical agreements, Jalloud's 
pivotal trip to the Soviet Union in 1974 secured an arms deal estimated at $1.2 billion, the 
largest single purchase of any country to date.495 In May 1975, Soviet Premier Alexei 
Kosygin visited Libya to reciprocate Qaddafi's outreach, and the two countries concluded 
an even more ambitious arms agreement—a "multi-million-dollar addition" to what was 
negotiated a year earlier.496 From that point on, up until the end of the bipolar period, the 
Soviet–Libyan military relationship deepened on multiple fronts. Between 1974 and 
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1989, Libya spent at least $23 billion on Soviet arms497 and, by the early 1980s, already 
had "the highest ratio of military equipment to manpower in the world."498 A large 
portion of Soviet deliveries involved advanced offensive systems, some of which had not 
yet been introduced in Warsaw Pact countries. Examples of such systems include T-62 
and T-72 main battle tanks, MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighter aircraft, TU-22 supersonic 
bombers, SAM-5 missiles (with deliveries starting in late 1985), and Foxtrot-class 
submarines.499 
In addition to absorbing impressive quantities of military hardware, Libya became host of 
a large number of Soviet military advisors and general contractors. Qaddafi lacked 
sufficient manpower to maintain and operate all of the sophisticated equipment sent to 
him, and he depended on external support for a variety of military and nonmilitary 
infrastructure projects. Soviet military advisors in Libya numbered 2,000 in the fall of 
1975,500 over 6,000 in the early 1980s,501 and about 2,300 at the close of the Cold War.502 
These figures go into the tens of thousands if one counts Eastern European contractors in 
the civilian sector.503 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, such contractors started to 
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play an increasing role in the Libyan oil industry and in other vital areas of the country's 
economy. Qaddafi also received support for the construction of various military and 
strategic infrastructure. For example, the Soviet Union installed radar installations for 
intelligence collection, and Bulgaria, with Moscow's blessing, built a "Maginot Line" of 
antitank fortifications along the Libyan border with Egypt.504 During the second half of 
the 1970s, the Soviet Union also agreed to construct a 10-megawatt nuclear research 
facility and a 440-megawatt nuclear power plant on Libyan soil, presumably for civilian 
purposes.505 
All this support boosted Qaddafi's self-confidence, fueling his foreign adventures (see 
next section) and helping him overcome U.S. pressure during the Carter and Reagan 
administrations. As could be expected, it also worked to close many of the ideological 
and foreign policy gaps that separated Tripoli and Moscow in the early period of U.S. 
conciliation. After 1974, Qaddafi tamed his anticommunist rhetoric and made a sharp 
domestic turn to the left. In April of that year, in a clear signal to Moscow, he announced 
that he "had given up his administrative and political responsibilities in order to 'devote 
all his time to popular organization and ideological action'."506 From 1975 to 1979, he 
published The Green Book, a three-volume text advocating economic egalitarianism and 
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"direct rule" by the masses through "people's congresses" and "people's committees."507 
Although presented as a "third way" between capitalism and communism, Qaddafi's 
doctrine was for the most part an assault against Western parliamentary democracy and 
economic order. In 1977, he changed the name of the Libyan state to the Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and embarked on a broad nationalization campaign, 
taking over private businesses and property.508 It is improbable that this "rush to 
socialism" was only an internal affair, especially in light of Qaddafi's early focus on 
capitalist development and his reversal to economic liberalism in the late 1980s (see 
section 5.4.3). 
To maintain Soviet support, Qaddafi also drew closer to the general foreign policy course 
set by the Kremlin. The joint communiqué at the close of Jalloud's 1974 visit to Moscow 
noted "the identity" of Soviet and Libyan positions on the "most important international 
problems," which, according to both sides, included U.S. regional offensive and support 
for Israel.509 Between 1974 and 1975, Qaddafi recognized the communist regimes of 
North Korea and North Vietnam, closed ranks with Cuba, and signed a defense pact with 
pro-Soviet Algeria (the Hassi Messaoud Treaty of 1975), taking Algeria's side against 
Morocco in the dispute over the Western Sahara (a reversal from earlier support for 
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Rabat). Continuing this accommodation, Qaddafi visited Moscow for the first time in 
1976, announcing that Libya's relationship with the superpower was "strategic."510 After 
Sadat's peace trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, Tripoli spearheaded, with Soviet help, 
the creation of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, which opposed the opening to 
Israel and called for closer Arab ties with Moscow.511 In the late 1970s, Qaddafi also 
failed to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979),512 and, in line with Soviet 
expansionist efforts in the Red Sea area, sided with pro-Soviet Ethiopia and South 
Yemen, eventually concluding defense treaties with both countries in 1981. By 1983, he 
had "adopted all major Soviet international positions,"513 and, in April of that year, 
finally extracted Moscow's concession for an "agreement in principle" for a bilateral pact 
of friendship and cooperation. 
5.4.2 Conflict behavior (1969–89) 
The historical developments detailed in the previous section clearly illustrate the conflict-
inducing phenomena expected to arise under bipolar penetration. As described in the 
theory chapter, these phenomena, all pertinent to the Libyan case, include reduced 
superpower incentives to constrain an oil-rich client, higher prospect for petrostate 
militarization, and more opportunities for strategic (constraint-reducing) realignment (see 
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section 3.2.2). Indeed, during the brief phase of U.S.–Libyan conciliation, the United 
States, afraid to lose Libya to its superpower competitor and watchful of its oil interests 
in the country, made every effort to accommodate Qaddafi. It protected him against 
internal and external subversion, gave him the benefit of the doubt for policies it disliked, 
and, along with its Western allies, continued to supply him with arms and strategic 
equipment. During the phase of Soviet–Libyan alignment, Moscow embarked on a 
similar accommodative course, but went further, establishing deeper political ties with 
Tripoli and becoming, either directly or through Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, a 
vehicle for the total militarization of the Libyan state. In both cases, the hands of the 
superpowers were forced by the competitive pressures of bipolarity. In seeking to 
maintain and enhance their regional clientele and to draw economic benefits from Libya's 
oil wealth, they created a moral hazard problem, widening the bounds within which 
Qaddafi could operate and building up his offensive capabilities and self-confidence. For 
his part, Qaddafi was a skillful manipulator of the double option, choosing realignment 
when his foreign policy aims became more compatible with those of Moscow and 
opening new opportunities for external action. 
It is not surprising, then, that the bulk of Qaddafi's conflict behaviors were concentrated 
in the 1969–89 period of bipolar penetration. The discussion below provides an overview 
of these behaviors, focusing on the most significant ones and placing them within the 
larger context of the superpower regional competition. Since Qaddafi's external 
aggression took many forms, it is broken down into two main categories.514 The first 
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includes direct militarized engagements with other states, adopting a concept of conflict 
consistent with conventional uses of the term. The second category pools a broader set of 
behaviors, including aggressive diplomacy, subversive activities in other states (e.g., 
coups), and international terrorism. 
Military engagements 
Between 1969 and 1989, Qaddafi used his armed forces on multiple occasions. In some 
cases, Libya played a secondary role as a conflict belligerent, as in the 1973 Arab–Israeli 
War, when Qaddafi deployed a small air force unit in support of Egypt and Syria, or in 
the 1982 Lebanon War, when he dispatched a troop contingent to prop up the PLO and 
the Syrian army in southern Lebanon. In other cases, Libya was the main conflict party, 
either as an initiator of hostilities or as an instigator of tensions that provoked an action 
by the other side. Overall, during the bipolar period, Libya was involved in four principal 
military engagements, including militarized disputes with Chad, Egypt, Tanzania (in 
support of Uganda's Idi Amin), and the United States. Of these engagements, the one 
with Chad was by far the most significant, not only in terms of number and duration of 
conflict episodes but also with respect to their intensity. 
Chad 
Qaddafi's military adventures in Chad spanned almost the entire bipolar period. The 
reasons for this long spell of aggression are complex, and scholars still debate their 
relative importance. One major contributing factor was the status of the Aouzou Strip, a 
narrow but long stretch of desert in northern Chad that Libya disputed even during the 
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monarchy.515 Qaddafi's tentative claim over the strip was based on a 1935 Franco–Italian 
treaty (the so-called Mussolini–Laval Accord), which, while assigning the strip to Libya, 
was never ratified by the French parliament.516 The strip also hosted Muslim tribes with 
cultural ties to Cyrenaica and the Fezzan (southern Chad was mainly Christian) and was 
believed to hold substantial reserves of uranium and minerals, including oil. But 
Qaddafi's motives to intervene in Chad went beyond the Aouzou. Control of the country 
could serve both as a hedge against Egypt and Sudan (and other threats to the RCC 
emanating from the area) and as a staging grounds for subversion in those and other 
neighboring states.517 This rationale became increasingly important during the phase of 
Soviet–Libyan alignment, when Cairo and Khartoum banded with Washington518 and 
Moscow sought ways to counter that development and drive a wedge into central Africa. 
In addition, southward expansion into Chad was consistent with Qaddafi's territorial 
ambitions. Whether these ambitious included the creation of a full-fledged Saharan 
empire is still debated, but the fact remains that Qaddafi often described Chad as a 
"natural hinterland" belonging to Libya.519 
The spell of Libyan aggression started in the early 1970s, during the period of U.S.–
Libyan conciliation. Initially, Qaddafi increased support for the National Liberation Front 
of Chad (Frolinat), an insurgent group born in 1966 in reaction to Chadian President 
François Tombalbaye's political marginalization of Toubou Muslims in northern Chad. 
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Although Frolinat received backing by King Idris in the late 1960s, Qaddafi's assistance 
was more militant, with Libya harboring scores of rebel fighters on its territory and 
transferring large amounts of weapons and reinforcements across the border. Gradually, 
Frolinat turned into a "semiregular army, often clad in Libyan uniforms," with Libyan 
support becoming "tantamount to a declaration of war against Tombalbaye."520 Under 
pressure, and narrowly escaping a coup attempt in 1971, the Chadian president was 
forced to negotiate with Qaddafi, and, in 1972, the two leaders reached an agreement of 
"friendship." Ndjamena conceded to restore its diplomatic relations with Tripoli (broken 
in 1971) and to sever those with Israel, whereas Libya promised to cut its support for 
Frolinat (a promise it failed to keep).521 In 1973, under the cover of the agreement, 
Qaddafi moved troops into Chad, seizing the Aouzou Strip. Although Tombalbaye 
protested the move and made a counterclaim to the Fezzan,522 neither the United States 
nor France made any effort to reverse the occupation, and both countries continued to 
supply Libya with arms and equipment. However, Qaddafi did not push his luck, and, 
while he established permanent military presence in the strip, he did not proceed with its 
formal annexation. 
The situation was about to escalate after 1974, when Libya realigned itself with the 
Soviet Union. In 1975, emboldened by his new powerful backer, Qaddafi officially 
annexed Aouzou into Libya's Murzuq district,523 and, in the same year, Tombalbaye was 
assassinated and replaced by his chief of staff, General Felix Malloum. Malloum, staying 
                                                 
520 Ronen, Qaddafi's Libya in World Politics, 158. 
521 Lemarchand, "The Case of Chad," in The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies in Africa, ed. 
Lemarchand (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 114. 
522 Ronen, Qaddafi's Libya in World Politics, 159. 
523 St John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 187. 
173 
 
the course of his predecessor, opposed Qaddafi's annexation and tried to limit Libyan 
influence by seeking reconciliation with Muslims in the north. This effort, supported by 
Egypt and Sudan, both of which now received financial and military aid from the United 
States,524 led to a schism in Frolinat, with its leaders forming two factions in 1977—the 
Forces Armées Populaires (FAP), headed by Goukouni Oueddei and loyal to Qaddafi, 
and the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), led by Hissène Habré and more hostile to Libyan 
designs.525 Concerned with the prospect of losing ground in Chad, Qaddafi expanded his 
military presence in the Aouzou, constructing a large military base there,526 and ramped 
up arms supplies and training for the FAP.527 Starting in 1977, FAP and Libyan forces, 
equipped with advanced Soviet weaponry, pushed southward and, by 1978, took control 
of the strategic town of Faya-Largeau. After similar incursions into central Chad in 
subsequent months, and with the FAP (and also the FAN) closing in on Ndjamena, 
Malloum's government resigned in 1979, giving way to the formation of the 
Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT), a transitional body headed by 
the unlikely duo of Oueddei, now pronounced Chad's president, and Habré, the new 
defense minister. 
The rapprochement between Oueddei and Habré did not last, however. Soon after 
GUNT's creation, Habré was forced out of the pro-Libyan governing coalition, and FAP 
and FAN loyalists started to fight, plunging the country into a civil war.528 Backed by 
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Egypt and Sudan, Habré made progress on the battlefield, capturing Faya-Largeau in 
mid-1980 and making advances toward Ndjamena. It was at this point that Qaddafi 
sharply escalated his military involvement in Chad. In November, after raiding FAN 
positions around Faya and Ndjamena, he launched a massive invasion of the country, 
sending two infantry divisions (about 3,000–4,000 troops), along with T-55 tanks and 
TU-22 bombers, deep into Chadian territory.529 The invasion was planned jointly with 
Soviet and East German advisors during the summer and fall of 1980, and Soviet pilots 
carried out combat missions alongside Libyan forces.530 Grossly outpowered and taking 
heavy losses, FAN elements quickly disintegrated and, in mid-December, Libyan tanks 
and troops entered Ndjamena. Habré, wounded during the fighting, fled to Cameroon 
(and later to Sudan), trying to regroup remnants of his forces. In 1981, capitalizing on his 
decisive victory and leaving no doubt about his expansionist ambitions, Qaddafi 
announced (jointly with the GUNT) a Libya–Chad merger, an agreement allegedly forced 
on a reluctant Oueddei.531 
Qaddafi's military success raised high-pitch alarms in the capitals of U.S.-aligned Libyan 
neighbors and Western-leaning members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
The bipolar condition was once again the frame of reference for these concerns, as the 
Libyan offensive occurred concurrently and in coordination with Soviet inroads into the 
Red Sea area (Ethiopia and South Yemen) and Afghanistan (see sections 5.2.3 and 5.4.1). 
In Cairo, the offensive against Chad was described as a Soviet effort to "encircle" Egypt 
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and Sudan, and, in Khartoum, as a "direct Soviet intervention in the whole region."532 
After expressing similar concerns, the United States, along with France, dramatically 
increased its military and financial aid to Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco, while 
boosting its naval presence in the Mediterranean.533 Partly because of this pressure, but 
mostly because of his desire to secure the OAU presidency in 1982,534 Qaddafi played 
down the merger with Chad, withdrawing his troops (except those in the Aouzou) and 
allowing OAU peacekeepers to enter the country. Meanwhile, Washington was working 
actively to arm and train Habré's forces in Sudan, a covert operation carried out by the 
Central Intelligence Agency, which funneled an estimated $10 million in equipment to 
the FAN.535 In the spring of 1982, Habré returned to Chad and, unopposed by OAU 
peacekeepers, captured Ndjamena in June, overthrowing Oueddei and becoming the 
country's new president. Later in the year, in another blow to Qaddafi, the United States 
urged friendly African states to deny him the OAU chairmanship, which they did in due 
course.536 
With his fortunes in decline, Qaddafi once again resorted to the military option. In June 
1983, 2 months after Jalloud's visit to Moscow secured a Soviet arms resupply and a 
friendship agreement in principle, Libyan units, joined by Oueddei's forces,537 pushed 
against Habré's army positions in Faya-Largeau. The assault, which included twice as 
many Libyan troops as those used in the 1980 invasion, dislodged the enemy and forced 
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it into retreat.538 Washington was quick to respond, increasing support for Habré's forces, 
as well as for neighboring surrogates, while putting diplomatic pressure on France to 
intervene.539 The French government reluctantly complied, deploying 3,000 troops in an 
operation known as Manta (Stingray). These actions were sufficient to stop Qaddafi's 
advance, locking the conflict into a stalemate. In November 1984, the warring parties 
reached a ceasefire, with both Libya and France agreeing to withdraw their forces from 
Chad. While France pulled out its entire contingent, Libya withdrew only partially, 
leaving thousands of soldiers in the country's north.540 During 1985, a year of subdued 
hostilities, Qaddafi dug in, building a major airbase at Ouadi Doum (northeastern Chad) 
and occupying key oases south of the Aouzou.541 In October, he also made his last trip to 
Moscow, seeking more military support and a final signature on the friendship and 
cooperation treaty promised in 1983. While he obtained the former—including SAM-5 
missiles, 2,000 military advisors, and diplomatic backing for his role in Chad—he failed 
to achieve the latter,542 an early sign of Soviet backpedaling in the regional and global 
superpower competition. 
The final stage of the conflict commenced in 1986. France redeployed its expeditionary 
force in February and, in a related move (discussed below), the United States carried out 
air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi in April. American and French assistance to 
Habré also shot up, with both countries providing tens of millions of dollars in financial 
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assistance and military gear, including Toyota pickup trucks equipped with grenade 
launchers and antitank missiles. These developments, coupled with softening Soviet 
support, put Qaddafi on the defensive. In December, Habré, encouraged by Washington, 
initiated a major military push in northern Chad, crossing the sixteenth parallel. The 
Chadian offensive, now joined by Oueddei,543 produced a series of battlefield successes 
that ultimately ended the conflict. In January 1987, Qaddafi suffered a major defeat at 
Fada, a Libyan military stronghold, and, in late March, lost Ouadi Doum, "the nerve 
center of Libyan occupation forces."544 In the course of 3 months, about 4,000 Libyan 
soldiers were killed, and Chad's army captured over $1 billion in military equipment.545 
By June, most of Qaddafi's troops had retreated to the Aouzou, and, in September, the 
two sides reached a ceasefire, ending a conflict episode that came to be known as the 
Toyota War. (In 1994, the International Court of Justice ruled against Libya in the dispute 
over the strip.) 
Egypt 
In 1977, Libya fought a brief border war with Egypt. Although it is not entirely clear who 
took the first militarized action, it was Qaddafi's provocative behaviors that ignited the 
hostilities. After Nasser's death in 1970, Tripoli and Cairo gradually moved apart, with 
tensions heightening after 1973. The strengthening Soviet–Libyan military relationship, 
which led to Qaddafi's rapid arms buildup in the mid-1970s, was a major concern for 
Sadat, particularly because of its offensive character. In 1976, Libya constructed 
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fortifications along the border with Egypt, boosting its troop presence there, whereas the 
Soviet Union, in a move directly contributing to the conflict, built a radar installation 
designed to collect intelligence on Egyptian air defenses.546 Qaddafi's 1977 military 
expansion into Chad and his activism in the Red Sea area, both backed by Moscow, 
aggravated the situation, multiplying Egypt's vulnerabilities. Besides these developments, 
Tripoli undertook active efforts to destabilize the regime in Cairo. Qaddafi harbored deep 
animosity against Sadat, repeatedly calling him "a friend of Zionism and imperialism."547 
In January 1977, after intense Libyan propaganda and support for opposition groups, 
Egypt was hit by widespread food riots, which were "the most serious antigovernment 
protests since the 1952 revolution in terms of mass participation, loss of life and property, 
means used to restore order, and challenge posed to Sadat's hold to power."548 In June, 
aiming to block Sadat's peace overtures to Israel, Qaddafi sent thousands of Libyans in a 
march to Cairo, and, when the crowd was stopped at the border, Libyan artillery fired on 
Egyptian forces.549 
The breaking point was reached in the following month. On July 16, Libyan troops 
attacked Egyptian positions along the border, and, on July 21, Egypt countered with a 
punitive raid, sending planes and armor into Cyrenaica.550 In the 3 days of fighting that 
ensued, Egypt's military conducted airstrikes against Libyan radar installations (manned 
by Soviet advisors) and the al-Adem airfield, while also hitting some border villages. 
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Libya used air force and surface-to-air missiles, claiming to have downed nine Egyptian 
planes, and artillery, shelling the border town of Sallum. Each side suffered casualties 
and equipment losses, although estimates of their magnitude are uncertain.551 The 
fighting lasted until July 24, when Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), managed to broker a ceasefire. Both superpowers stood 
behind their respective clients during the conflict. The United States supplied combat 
intelligence to Egypt, while the Soviet Union jammed Egyptian radar systems and 
conducted reconnaissance flights from Libyan bases.552 The destabilization effects of 
superpower involvement were evident both before and after the onset of hostilities. The 
bipolar condition increased the density of security threats faced by both sides, brought 
their power levels to an unstable point of parity, and led to more intense hostilities (see 
section 3.2.2). It also had an immediate contagion effect, with pro-Soviet Algeria making 
military threats against Egypt and with pro-U.S. Sudan backing Cairo.553 
Tanzania 
Libya was involved in two conflict episodes with Tanzania (1972 and 1978–79), both 
resulting from Qaddafi's support for the brutal dictatorship of Uganda's Idi Amin. In 
January 1971, Amin, a virulent anticommunist at the time (just like his Libyan 
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counterpart), executed a military coup, overthrowing the regime of Milton Obote. The 
coup's success was largely due to assistance by Great Britain and Israel, both of which 
were alarmed by Obote's deepening ties with China and Soviet satellites in Eastern 
Europe.554 After his removal from power, Obote found refuge in neighboring Tanzania 
and, in the course of a year, mobilized a force of Ugandan exiles (the so-called People's 
Army) with Tanzanian logistical and military support. Enraged by these developments, 
Amin requested British and Israeli help, including the canceling of Ugandan debt and the 
supply of warships for an attack on Tanzania.555 After London and Jerusalem, now both 
having second thoughts, refused to meet these demands, Amin forged a closer 
relationship with Qaddafi, who offered oil, money, and military assistance, and severed 
diplomatic relations with Israel (March 1972).556 In September 1972, when Obote's 
forces, backed by Tanzanian troops, launched small-scale incursions against Uganda, 
Libya sent troops and military equipment to Amin, repelling the attackers. Libya and 
Tanzania narrowly escaped a full-scale war, thanks to mediation by Somalia's Siad 
Barre.557 Coming at a time of U.S.–Libyan conciliation, the episode saw no involvement 
from the United States, which had poor relations with Tanzania. 
The second, more significant Libyan intervention occurred in early 1979. After Qaddafi's 
strategic realignment of the mid-1970s, the military relationship between Libya and 
Uganda strengthened, and so did that between Moscow and Kampala. In March 1977, at 
a time of growing Libyan hostility against Egypt and Sudan, Qaddafi announced that 
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"whoever declares war on President Amin, declares it on Libya."558 In November, Amin 
boasted that Uganda hosted two Soviet squadrons of MIG-17 and MIG-21 planes, along 
with military advisors and, during the following 2 months, went on to sign trade and 
technical cooperation agreements with Tripoli and Moscow.559 Emboldened by this 
support, and facing army unrest in the fall of 1978 (unrest blamed on Tanzania), Amin 
attacked his southern neighbor in October, seeking to crack down on Ugandan exiles 
operating across the border and to annex the Kagera salient west of Lake Victoria. In 
November, Tanzania counterattacked with regular and exile forces, and the fighting 
intensified. In March 1979, with Amin losing ground and the Ugandan army in disarray, 
Qaddafi presented Tanzania with an ultimatum, threatening war if the latter failed to 
withdraw its forces within 24 hours.560 After Tanzania rejected the ultimatum, Libya 
attacked with 2,500 troops, tanks, and planes, hitting enemy targets on both Ugandan and 
Tanzanian soil. Despite achieving some initial success, the Libyans, who were 
outnumbered, suffered a series of subsequent defeats (and heavy losses), ultimately 
retreating to Kampala.561 The capital fell on April 11, and the remnants of Qaddafi's 
forces, along with the now deposed Amin, were flown out of the country. 
United States 
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During the 1980s, Libya and the United States faced off in three military incidents, two 
of which were related to the dispute over the Gulf of Sirte.562 While partly triggered by 
limited Libyan actions, these incidents also reflected the broader geopolitical frictions 
engendered by bipolar penetration. After Qaddafi exploited the double option in 1974, the 
U.S.–Libyan relationship entered a phase of precipitous decline. Vexed by Qaddafi's 
growing ties with Moscow, increasingly hostile behaviors (and rhetoric) against the 
United States and U.S. regional clients, and attempts to sabotage American efforts for 
Arab–Israeli peace, the Carter administration tried a number of countermeasures. In 1977, 
it put Libya on a list of "potential U.S. enemies,"563 and, a year later, refused to sell it 
"dual use" equipment worth $400 million,564 continuing the exports ban previously 
introduced by Ford. Over the next 2 years, it also blacklisted Libya as a "sponsor of 
terrorism" (1979) and, after the sacking of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli in December 
1979,565 ended its diplomatic presence in the country (1980). Under Reagan, whose 
inauguration speech described Libya as a "base for Soviet subversion,"566 these efforts 
went further, with Washington closing the Libyan embassy in 1981, embargoing the 
imports of Libyan oil in 1982, and freezing Libyan assets in the United States in early 
                                                 
562 Qaddafi's claim over the 275-mile-wide gulf contradicted the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of 
the Sea, according to which states could not claim ownership of territory extending more than 24 nautical 
miles from their shores. 
563 Libya ranked fourth, after the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. See Wright, A History of Libya, 
213. 
564 The equipment included 2 Boeing airliners and 400 heavy trucks. See Ronen, Qaddafi's Libya in World 
Politics, 17. 
565 According to William E. Eagleton, the senior U.S. diplomat in the embassy at the time, the incident 
looked like "a planned military event" (quoted in St John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 179). 
Qaddafi's support for the new Islamic regime in Iran also contributed to the crisis. See Joffe, "Prodigal or 
Pariah?" 203. 
566 Quoted in Bearman, Qaddafi's Libya, 229. 
183 
 
1986.567 While these actions heightened the tensions between Tripoli and Washington, 
Soviet support for Qaddafi—which remained strong from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s—either neutralized or circumscribed their deterrent effect. 
It was against this backdrop that Libya and the United States resorted to the limited use of 
force. The first incident came in August 1981, when a small number of U.S. warships and 
aircraft entered international waters in the Gulf of Sirte. Although the maneuver was part 
of a larger military exercise involving 16 U.S. naval vessels (including 2 aircraft carriers), 
it clearly aimed to test Libyan and Soviet resolve. On August 19, two Libyan SU-22 
fighters approached the task force, firing a missile against U.S. F-14 aircraft. 
Undamaged, the F-14s returned fire, downing the Libyan jets.568 Moscow responded 
immediately, stating that the incident "once again demonstrated the great threat which is 
presented by the constant presence of American naval and air forces...off Africa's eastern 
coastline" and citing it as a justification for the defense pact signed between Libya, 
Ethiopia, and South Yemen (all Soviet clients) on the same day.569 
The next two incidents took place in early 1986. On March 25, Libyan ships and a 
ground-based SAM-5 missile site hosting Soviet advisors (Qaddafi acquired the SAM-5s 
a few months earlier) fired on U.S. planes and naval vessels maneuvering in the Gulf of 
Sirte.570 The U.S. force struck back, sinking two Libyan patrol boats and inflicting 
damage on the missile site. Three weeks later, on April 15, in a raid launched in response 
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to alleged Libyan involvement in a bombing of a Berlin discotheque earlier in the 
month,571 Washington dispatched F-111 bombers from a base in Britain, hitting military 
infrastructure along the Libyan coast.572 Although the attack apparently aimed to 
eliminate Qaddafi, targeting his compound in Tripoli, it failed to achieve that objective, 
instead killing one of his daughters. While the circumstances surrounding both incidents 
remain sketchy, it appears that Moscow had some foreknowledge of them, trying to warn 
Qaddafi.573 It also made an effort to stage a strong diplomatic response, announcing, after 
the first incident, that it "condemns the aggressive U.S. actions in the most resolute 
manner and demands that they be stopped" and pledging, after the second, to "continue to 
fulfill the commitments it has made with respect to the further strengthening of Libya's 
defense capability."574 However, by taking a limited diplomatic action, Moscow also 
signaled that its support for Libya was weakening, a development consistent with Mikhail 
Gorbachev's struggle in the superpower arms race and his early reevaluation of Soviet 
external commitments. 
Aggressive diplomacy, subversion, and terrorism 
As noted earlier, Qaddafi's outward aggression during the bipolar period was not limited 
to direct military action. It spanned a wide range of other activities, including aggressive 
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diplomacy, subversion against incumbent regimes, and international terrorism. In some 
cases, these activities, individually or in combination, were part of an escalatory process 
that culminated in an interstate military conflict, as illustrated by Libya's disputes with 
Chad, Egypt, and the United States. In other cases, they did not catalyze into such 
conflict but were nonetheless significant as sources of international tension and political 
instability in other countries. 
In the realm of diplomacy, the main themes of Qaddafi's activism were anti-Zionism and 
Arab nationalism. Since his rise to power, the Libyan leader aimed to reduce Israel's 
influence in the Middle East and Africa. During the period of U.S. conciliation, this effort 
was carried out with less fanfare and more covertly, apparently not to overstrain the 
relationship with Washington.575 In the 1960s, Israel, facing growing Arab hostility in its 
neighborhood, sought to increase its diplomatic presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, and, by 
1970, the number of its diplomatic missions in the area exceeded that of all Arab states 
combined.576 This development was a thorn in the eyes of Qaddafi, and, in his first few 
years in power, he devised a byzantine, yet effective, strategy to thwart it. The approach 
involved a series of steps whereby Tripoli would establish diplomatic ties with an African 
state (typically through some form of cooperative agreement), follow up with aid (oil, 
money, and military assistance) and, finally, taking advantage of the asymmetric 
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relationship, pressure the target government to sever diplomatic ties with Israel.577 
Indeed, this model was precisely the one used to rupture Israel's relations with Uganda 
and Chad in 1972. As a result of similar Libyan tactics, by the end of 1973, close to 30 
African states, including almost all OAU members, had broken diplomatic ties with 
Israel.578 
Following Libya's realignment with the Soviet Union, Qaddafi's anti-Zionist diplomacy 
became more open and assertive. Although Moscow did not share the colonel's extreme 
view that the only solution to the Palestinian problem was the annihilation of Israel, it 
was supportive of his initiatives insofar they served Soviet interests in maintaining 
patronage among radical Arab states and in curtailing U.S. regional influence. Qaddafi's 
diplomatic offensive reached its apogee in the late 1970s, focusing on efforts to sabotage 
Egyptian and American progress toward unwinding the Arab–Israeli conflict. While the 
main platform for these efforts was the pro-Soviet Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, 
whose members broke diplomatic relations with Cairo after Sadat's 1977 trip to 
Jerusalem,579 Qaddafi also demonstrated activism in other venues. In November 1978, at 
the Arab League summit in Baghdad, he condemned the Camp David Accords 
(concluded a month earlier) and called for harsh political and economic boycott of Egypt 
and the United States.580 After Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in March 1979, 
making good on a promise made at Camp David, the Libyan leader toured the capitals of 
                                                 
577 Ibid., 127. 
578 Ibid., 129. 
579 The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries also broke diplomatic relations with Egypt, closing their 
consulates and cultural centers in the country. Backing the Steadfastness Front, Moscow alleged that 
Sadat's move was part of a U.S. plot aiming to divide the Arab world. See Haley, Qaddafi and the United 
States since 1969, 75–76. 
580 Ibid., 86–88. 
187 
 
moderate Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, seeking to 
mobilize their support against the agreement. Not gaining much traction, however, he 
also pursued a parallel, more aggressive diplomatic track, rallying radical PLO factions 
(relations with Fatah, which had moderated over the years, were severed at the end of 
1979) in his advocacy for an armed opposition against Israel.581 
While this anti-Zionist activism was significant in its own right, it was reflective of 
Qaddafi's larger despotic ambition to reshape the Arab world. Seeing himself as the 
legitimate heir of Nasser, the Libyan leader believed that his small nation was destined to 
be the "Prussia of the Middle East," the unifier of all Arabs in a land without Israel.582 
From his rise to power to the mid-1980s, and particularly during the period of U.S. 
conciliation, Qaddafi made a series of unification attempts: with Egypt and Sudan in 
1969 (Tripoli Charter), with Egypt and Syria in 1972 (Benghazi Treaty), with Egypt in 
1972, with Algeria in 1973 (Hassi Messaoud Accords), with Tunisia in 1974 (Djerba 
Treaty), with Chad in 1981 (Tripoli Communiqué), and with Morocco in 1984 (Oujda 
Treaty).583 All of these initiatives faltered, not least because they were pursued 
impatiently and aggressively, through what John Entelis has called a "take it or leave it" 
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approach.584 Qaddafi often demanded immediate and total union, without regard for his 
targets' concerns and reservations, and, when such sentiments were expressed, he resorted 
to blackmail and subversion. As early as mid-1970, at a meeting with Arab leaders in 
Tripoli, he threatened to incite popular revolt against those who reject unification, a threat 
that reportedly infuriated Nasser.585 In September 1973, frustrated with Sadat's delaying 
tactics, he also sent 20,000 Libyans in a 1,500-mile march to Cairo (the so-called Green 
March) to demand immediate political union.586 (The motorcade was stopped and turned 
back at the border with Egypt.) 
By the time Qaddafi forged an alliance with Moscow, his push for Arab unity had all but 
peaked. Apparently, the Libyan leader had concluded that diplomacy, even if pursued 
aggressively, would not produce the outcomes sought. Since the debacle of 1967, Pan-
Arabism had been on decline, and there was not much enthusiasm for political unions.587 
Qaddafi's arms twisting and activism also caused aversion among Arab leaders, many of 
whom believed that, at best, he lacked the qualities and charisma of Nasser, and, at worst, 
he was unstable and dangerous. The prospect for successful union also shrank as both 
Cairo and Khartoum moved closer to Washington, which no longer had incentives to 
tolerate Qaddafi's contentious policies.588 
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To compensate for setbacks on the diplomatic front, but also to pursue his larger 
revisionist agenda, Qaddafi frequently resorted to his favorite tools of foreign policy: 
subversion and terrorism. The gamut of subversive activities was wide, ranging from 
providing financial and military assistance to rebel groups, to training foreign insurgents, 
to plotting and supporting coup attempts and political assassinations. These initiatives 
followed a pattern similar to that of Libya's aggressive diplomacy, remaining more 
subdued (but picking up strength) in Qaddafi's first few years in power and becoming 
more overt and ambitious after 1973. Initially, in addition to propping up Frolinat in 
Chad, Qaddafi focused on providing money and arms to Fatah, PLO's moderate faction 
led by Arafat. This support, motivated by anti-Zionism, was reflective of the Libyan 
leader's early endorsement of groups involved in so-called wars of national liberation.589 
As Tripoli drew closer to Moscow in the mid-1970s and saw its oil income rise, its 
patronage of such and other groups grew apace. Qaddafi started to provide aid and 
training to radical PLO factions, pinning them against the less violent Fatah,590 and to 
extend material help to faraway movements, such as the Irish Republican Army in Ireland 
and Islamists in the Philippines.591 In line with Soviet interests, he also offered generous 
funding to various Marxist and left-leaning forces, including the Red Brigades in Italy, 
the Somali Salvation Front in Somalia, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in 
El Salvador, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.592 
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As might be expected, the boldest subversive efforts concentrated on countries in Libya's 
immediate neighborhood, in particular pro-U.S. Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and, to a lesser 
extent, noncontiguous Morocco.593 The superpower–client foreign policy unison was 
again on full display in these efforts, with both Tripoli and Moscow seeking redress: the 
former for being rejected in the push for Arab unity and the latter for being betrayed by 
Cairo and Khartoum's realignment with Washington. The two primary targets were, 
unsurprisingly, Sudan and Egypt. In 1975, 1976, and 1983, Qaddafi, working with the 
southern Sudanese opposition and enjoying full backing by the Kremlin, orchestrated 
three abortive coups against Numeiry, the first of which nearly succeeded.594 Between 
mid-1974 and mid-1977, Tripoli launched various efforts to destabilize Sadat's 
government, sponsoring an armed attack against the Technical Military College in Cairo 
(July 1974), plotting with (and training) tribes in western Egypt for anti-regime action, 
and providing financial and logistical support for Islamic groups involved in political 
assassinations.595 At about the same time, Libya's subversion also turned up the heat on 
Morocco and Tunisia. In 1975, joining forces with Algeria and the Soviet Union, Qaddafi 
started to supply weapons, vehicles, and food to Polisario, a rebel group formed in 1973 
to fight Rabat over the Western Sahara.596 In 1980, 6 years after the failed 1974 Djerba 
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Treaty, he encouraged Tunisian dissidents trained by Soviet and Cuban advisors in 
Libyan camps to raid the Tunisian town of Gafsa, aiming to trigger an uprising against 
the pro-U.S. regime of Habib Bourguiba.597 In all of these cases, the United States acted 
promptly, increasing military support for its clients. 
Although much less is known about Libya's involvement in acts of terrorism, the 
evidence suggests that it was particularly active during the bipolar period. Early on, 
Qaddafi endorsed terrorism as an effective form of political violence, especially in the 
Palestinian struggle against Israel.598 In 1972, after the so-called Munich massacre, in 
which 11 Israeli Olympic athletes were murdered by members of the Black September 
terrorist group, he flew the bodies of the assailants (all killed during the action) to Tripoli 
for a martyr's burial. A year later, he also allowed Palestinian and Japanese hijackers of a 
Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 to land in Libya.599 Despite these and similar incidents, it 
appears that Qaddafi's early romance with terrorism was mostly symbolic,600 a situation 
bound to change in subsequent years. During the second half of the 1970s, Libya 
increased its encouragement of Palestinian terrorist activities, eventually ending up on the 
U.S. State Department's list of states sponsors of terrorism (December 1979).601 
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The main terror events came during the 1980s. In March 1984, a Libyan TU-22 aircraft 
bombed a radio station in the Sudanese town of Omdurman, aiming to silence a broadcast 
critical of the regime in Tripoli. The abortive operation, allegedly planned by the 
Kremlin, incited immediate response from Washington, which dispatched two AWACS 
surveillance planes to Sudan.602 Continuing with more sabotage, Libya mined 
chokepoints in the Suez Canal in July 1984, inflicting damage on variously flagged oil 
tankers,603 and, in December 1985, sponsored deadly terrorist attacks on the Rome and 
Vienna airports, providing support to operatives of the Abu Nidal group, which was 
credited with the carnage.604 The last, most significant spell of Libyan involvement in 
terrorism came toward the end of the decade. In December 1988, a Pan Am airliner 
operating a flight from London to New York was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland. A 
subsequent investigation of the wreckage implicated two Libyan agents in the event,605 
which resulted in the death of 243 passengers and 16 crew members. Less than a year 
later, in September 1989, a French UTA airliner flying from Ndjamena to Paris suffered a 
similar fate over Niger, again with alleged Libyan involvement.606 The civilian death toll 
was at par with that of Lockerbie—156 passengers and 15 crew members. It is believed 
that both incidents were part of Qaddafi's retaliatory response to U.S. and French 
involvement in the war with Chad. 
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5.4.3 Putting the brakes on: the bind of the unipole (1990–2005) 
The shift to unipolarity in the late 1980s was followed by a marked moderation in Libya's 
conflict behavior. During the 1990–2005 period, the country did not engage in any 
significant militarized disputes, distanced itself from the Palestinian issue, tamed its 
subversive activities, and eschewed terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. While Qaddafi 
maintained some of his ideological rhetoric, particularly with respect to the Arab–Israeli 
conflict, his voice exhibited "increasingly desperate tone and hackneyed quality."607 
None of this is surprising when viewed through the lens of the theory underpinning 
hypothesis 2. With the Soviet Union out of the regional scene, the superpower 
competition disappeared, the double option was no longer at the disposal of local states, 
and Libya lost its prolific arms supplier and powerful military and diplomatic backer. At 
the same time, the United States preserved and even enhanced its regional position, 
taking advantage of the power vacuum left by Soviet retrenchment. As articulated by the 
White House, its policy goals in the region during the 1990s were to contain revisionist 
states (mainly the petrostates of Iraq, Iran, and Libya), seek "a comprehensive 
breakthrough to Middle East peace," and maintain "the free flow of oil at reasonable 
prices."608 In pursuing these objectives, Washington frequently resorted to economic and 
diplomatic coercion (sanctions), an approach to hegemonic management that profoundly 
affected Libyan foreign policy. 
As noted in section 5.1, structural and behavioral changes rarely occur overnight. 
Symptoms of Soviet pullback from the global and regional competition started to emerge 
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a few years before the close of the decade, and so did symptoms of Libyan moderation, 
particularly after the country's 1987 defeat in the war with Chad. In 1986, facing a 
stagnating economy and declining aggregate and relative capabilities, the Soviet Union, 
now under the leadership of Gorbachev, initiated domestic reforms toward economic and 
political liberalization (the so-called "perestroika" and "glasnost") and started to 
reevaluate its bilateral relations with the United States. Lagging behind in the arms race, 
Moscow sought early rapprochement with Washington, making concessions in the area of 
disarmament and ultimately capitulating in September 1989, when it agreed to decouple 
negotiations for strategic arms reductions from bargaining over the U.S. Strategic 
Defense Initiative.609 In the late 1980s, preoccupied with the wave of upheavals in 
Eastern Europe and Soviet republics, it also began to reduce its commitments in the 
"periphery," including the Middle East. It softened its position on the Arab–Israeli 
conflict (improving relations with Israel), started to temper the ambitions of its local 
clients, and, in 1988–89, after a pivotal decision made in 1987, pulled out of Afghanistan, 
laying bare its regional retreat. 
Qaddafi was not oblivious to the changing geopolitical environment. Early signs of 
Soviet withdrawal were evident not only at the global and regional levels, but also in 
Tripoli's bilateral relationship with Moscow. As noted earlier, Qaddafi's visit to the 
Soviet Union in late 1985 was less productive than expected, securing arms resupply, 
more advisors, and oil deals (albeit for amounts lower than requested), but failing to 
produce a final treaty of friendship and cooperation. The unprecedented U.S. air raid 
against Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, coupled with Moscow's limited diplomatic 
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response to it, must have served as another warning sign. After the raid, a large Libyan 
delegation led by Jalloud flew to Moscow, but failed to achieve any major breakthroughs 
in terms of new Soviet commitments. During the meeting, Soviet officials also raised the 
topic of terrorism, a taboo in previous diplomatic engagements.610 
While these subtle developments did not turn Libya into a peaceful state—the bipolar 
condition survived until the end of the decade—they were a prelude to a shift in the 
country's behavior. In the late 1980s, fearing Soviet abandonment, Qaddafi showed signs 
of moderation, apparently aiming to mirror political and economic reforms in the Soviet 
Union and to issue conciliatory signals for U.S. consumption. In 1987, after the 
humiliating defeat in the Toyota War, he agreed to put the future fate of the Aouzou Strip 
in the hands of the International Court of Justice and, a year later, in a sharp reversal from 
the socialist tenets of The Green Book, took initial steps toward economic liberalization, 
or infitah. In September 1988, the ban on retail trade was abolished, as was the state 
monopoly over imports and exports, except for the oil sector, which remained under tight 
government control.611 In the next few years, and particularly during the early 1990s, 
private shops reopened, professionals resumed private practices, and inefficient state 
enterprises saw staffing reductions and closures.612 In 1989, Qaddafi joined with four 
other countries, including pro-U.S. Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania, in the creation of 
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), a new organization aiming to foster regional economic 
cooperation. In a clear gesture to the West, he also embarked on EPSA III (first 
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announced in 1988), which offered more attractive conditions (in terms of cost sharing) 
for oil exploration in Libya.613 
Early signs of moderation also transpired in the political arena. In 1988, Qaddafi 
publically criticized the violent excesses of his "revolutionary committees," whose 
primary purpose had been to squash anti-regime opposition at home and abroad. In 
March of that year, he participated in the televised destruction of Tripoli's central prison 
and a checkpoint on the border with Tunisia, releasing some political prisoners and 
announcing that Libyans are free to travel. These actions did not amount to much more 
than publicity stunts, however, as evidenced by Qaddafi's use of revolutionary 
committees in putting down domestic uprisings in the early 1990s and the creation of new 
security organizations for political repression.614 What was more significant was the 
Libyan budging "charm offensive" with the United States.615 In mid-1988, in conditions 
of growing U.S. diplomatic pressure and weakening Soviet support, Qaddafi announced 
the Great Green Charter on Human Rights, which, in sharp contrast to Libya's track 
record, called for an end to the arms race and the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction.616 In 1989, he went on to join UN initiatives on human rights (without any 
tangible result) and, a year later, made efforts to gain diplomatic access to the new 
administration of George H. W. Bush, arranging for the release of three European 
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hostages held by the Abu Nidal group.617 In the early 1990s, the charm offensive was in 
full force, with Qaddafi announcing his new vision of Libya as "the Kuwait of the 
Mediterranean,"618 inviting Chad and Sudan to join the AMU, and, in 1993, subserviently 
likening President Bill Clinton's election to a "star shining in the dark."619 
All of this conciliatory signaling fell on deaf ears. The United States smelled blood and, 
in line with its emerging position as a regional hegemon, embarked on a course that 
would put Qaddafi on his knees. In 1989–90, Washington repeatedly accused Libya of 
producing chemical weapons at a plant at Rabta, about 40 miles south of Tripoli, and 
covertly threatened to bomb the facility.620 Qaddafi flatly denied the allegations, claiming 
that the plant was designed to manufacture pharmaceutical items. In November 1991, 
continuing the pressure, the United States and Great Britain demanded that Libya hand 
over the two agents suspected in the Lockerbie sabotage. When Qaddafi refused, 
claiming innocence, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 731 (January 1992), 
threatening to slam him with multilateral sanctions in addition to the unilateral ones 
imposed by the United States in the 1980s.621 After Qaddafi again protested, appealing 
for help to the Arab world and the International Court of Justice (to no avail), the Council 
passed Resolution 748 (March 1992), which banned air travel and arms sales to Libya, 
and Resolution 883 (November 1993), which froze Libyan overseas assets and banned 
the sale of oil equipment.622 Although Tripoli made four different proposals for handing 
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over the Lockerbie suspects between 1993 and 1994, none appeared satisfactory to 
Washington.623 Continuing the squeeze, the U.S. Congress in 1996 passed the Iran–Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA), imposing further restrictions on trade with Libya, along with 
penalties for foreign companies investing more than $40 million in the country's oil 
sector or violating preexisting UN sanctions.624 
The assortment of punitive regimes pushed for by the United States had a heavy impact 
on Libya's economy and military readiness. Although the unilateral U.S. sanctions during 
the 1980s were largely neutralized by Soviet support, they started to bite in the early 
1990s and were reinforced by the series of U.S.-sponsored UN resolutions and the ILSA. 
Libya was about to experience the most difficult years since World War II, including a 
humanitarian crisis due to embargoed medical supplies and other goods. Between 1992 
and 1999, the country's economy grew by less than 1 percent annually, and GDP per 
capita fell from more than $7,000 to below $6,000.625 The productivity of the oil industry 
was hit as well, with oil exports revenues dropping by about 35 percent in the first half of 
the decade,626 but still accounting for most of GDP. In 2000, Libya estimated that its 
economy had lost over $33 billion because of the sanctions.627 Similar impacts were 
observed in the country's military sector. By the late 1990s, the combined arms imports 
of all Maghreb countries were about 10 percent of what they were in the mid-1980s,628 a 
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development consistent with the disappearance of the bipolar condition. As might be 
expected, the most affected states were Libya and Algeria, both former Soviet clients. 
Libya imported a meager $500 million in arms from 1991 to 1995, and nothing from 
1995 to 1998.629 Equally important was the loss of Soviet advisors, who not only 
participated in the planning of Qaddafi's foreign adventures but also maintained and 
operated military equipment. It has been estimated that Libyan forces were able to 
operate only 30–50 percent of that equipment.630 
Strangled and isolated by these developments, Qaddafi was in no position to continue on 
the aggressive course pursued in the previous two decades. Although he criticized Arab 
states for their faithful observance of the punitive measures taken against his country, he 
himself started to adapt to the new realities of unipolarity. He diligently complied with 
the sanctions, except for sending a plane with pilgrims to Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, 
and dispatching a diplomatic delegation to Niger and Nigeria in 1997—transgressions so 
minor they were not even deemed as deserving punishment.631 After the International 
Court of Justice ruled against Libya in the Aouzou dispute in 1994, he accepted the 
decision with no objections.632 Libya's ties with neighbors gradually improved, both 
inside and outside the AMU. Most notable was the warming of relations with Egypt, 
which not only supplied Libya with basic necessities, such as food, but also partnered 
with it in joint efforts to end the civil war in Sudan.633 As part of this moderation, 
Qaddafi also distanced himself from radical Islamic and Palestinian groups, while cutting 
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support for insurgencies in the Middle East and Africa. In April 1999, after years of quiet 
diplomacy to find a compromise solution to the Lockerbie standoff, he finally handed 
over the two Libyan suspects for trial in the Netherlands. (The trial ended in 2001, 
acquitting one of the suspects.) 
While the extradition led to the temporary suspension of multilateral UN sanctions (those 
were permanently lifted in September 2003), Washington chose to keep the pressure, 
maintaining its unilateral sanctions regime. Apparently, its end game was to tame 
Qaddafi to the point of submission, particularly on the issues of Israel, terrorism, 
unconventional weapons, and access to Libyan oil. If so, it obtained all four. By the close 
of the decade, the Libyan leader had lost all interest in the Palestinian issue, even failing 
to attend an October 2000 Arab summit conference in Cairo to address a major 
Palestinian uprising in the previous month (the so-called Second Intifada).634 
Subsequently, during the Arab League summits in Amman (2001) and Beirut (2002), he 
went on to endorse a two-state solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict, abandoning his 
longstanding opposition to the existence of Israel.635 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
2001, he became an "enthusiastic recruit to the war on terror,"636 providing intelligence to 
the United States and Great Britain and describing the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as an 
"act of self-defense."637 Two years later, in late 2003, he also took "full responsibility" 
for the Lockerbie disaster, agreeing to disburse some $2.7 billion in compensation to the 
families of the victims killed in the crash, and announced Libya's decision to be free of 
                                                 
634 Ronen, Qaddafi's Libya in World Politics, 134. 
635 See ibid., 135; and Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 181. 
636 St John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 243. 
637 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 180. 
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banned weapons, opening his military facilities and arms stockpiles for international 
inspection.638 
In the face of this docility, Washington eventually ran out of reasons to sanction Libya. 
U.S. oil companies also became increasingly eager to reenter the country's oil industry. In 
1999, when the multilateral sanctions were lifted, rumors started to circulate that Libya 
had developed plans for EPSA IV, which was to offer even more attractive conditions for 
onshore and offshore drilling.639 In the early 2000s, oil executives ranked Libya as "the 
top exploration spot anywhere in the world,"640 and both Tripoli and American "big oil" 
groups increased lobbying for sanctions relief.641 These developments, coupled with 
Qaddafi's capitulation on virtually every major issue of U.S. foreign policy concern, were 
apparently sufficient for Washington to end its "squeeze" strategy. In 2004, after years of 
backchannel U.S.–Libyan diplomacy that started under Clinton, the administration of 
George W. Bush suspended U.S. economic sanctions and agreed to Libyan membership 
in the World Trade Organization. In January 2005, Tripoli announced the winners of 15 
oil exploration licenses, unsurprisingly granting 11 of those to U.S. oil companies.642 
Later in the year, Washington resumed diplomatic and military relations with Libya and 
removed it from its list of states sponsoring terrorism.643 In a statement that must have 
                                                 
638 Despite Qaddafi's demonstrated interest in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, it remains unclear if 
Libya actually possessed such weapons or the technology capable of producing them. See Wright, A 
History of Libya, 223. 
639 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 161. 
640 Ibid., 177. 
641 See, for example, Ronen, Qaddafi's Libya in World Politics, 63; and Joffe, "Prodigal or Pariah? Foreign 
Policy in Libya," 205. 
642 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 189. 
643 Wright, A History of Libya, 224. 
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been humiliating for Qaddafi, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that 
these steps were taken "in recognition of Libya's continued commitment to the 
renunciation of terrorism and the excellent cooperation it has provided the United States 
and other members of the international community in response to common global threats 
faced by the civilized world."644 
  
                                                 
644 Quoted in ibid., 225. 
203 
 
6 Conclusion 
This study began with a sampling of scholarly pronouncements about the conflict 
experiences of petrostates. It turns out that, when one weeds out the anecdotal from the 
growing body of relevant literature, an intriguing empirical finding comes to fore: rather 
than being more frequent targets of external aggression, oil exporters appear to be more 
frequent initiators of militarized disputes. (See chapters 1 and 2.) Despite accumulating 
considerable statistical evidence for this regularity, existing research has been poor on 
theory, particularly with respect to accounting for variations in the conflict behavior of 
petrostates. As illustrated by historical examples presented throughout the text, such 
variations have been wide and observable both across space and over time. The aim of 
this study was to address this gap—a modest undertaking given the larger, ongoing 
scarcity and cornucopian debates about oil's implications for international security. The 
effort involved developing detailed theoretical arguments—and corresponding variational 
propositions—about why some petrostates may be more belligerent than others and why 
petrostate conflict propensity may differ over time within a single case. This was 
accomplished through two conceptual experiments: one heeding to the internal political 
organization of petrostates and the other to structural features of their external 
environments. Although theory-building was the primary goal of the study, empirical 
evidence providing preliminary support for the hypothesized relationships was also 
offered. 
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6.1 Summary 
Looking inside the state, the first conceptual experiment ceased on theorizing about the 
interaction of oil income and regime institutions, suggesting that, all else equal, the 
conflict-inducing effects of oil would be most explosive in petrostates exhibiting despotic 
rule. The focus on despotism was motivated by the unique compositional and identity 
characteristics of this regime type: the high concentration of decisionmaking power in a 
single individual, the small size and institutional weakness of the group maintaining that 
individual in office, the emphasis despots place on violence as a method of social control, 
and the greater propensity of personalist elites to engage in kleptocracy and seek 
international goods and recognition. Although some of these qualities have been 
highlighted in previous research, this has been done either without attention to resource 
considerations or in studies unconcerned with conflict behavior. The theory developed in 
chapter 3 aimed to close this gap, suggesting that regime institutions could determine 
how oil income is channeled domestically. Because of their small winning-coalition size, 
budgetary opaqueness, and affinity to rent seeking, personalist regimes could be expected 
to have a comparatively firmer grip on discretionary oil wealth—control that could not 
only prop up their capacity for offense, but also lower the ex ante and ex post constraints 
imposed on their foreign policy choices. Oil income could reduce personalists' actual or 
perceived costs of using or threatening military force, strengthen their ability to resist 
political challenges from above and below (through divide-and-rule strategies), and 
foment biases of overconfidence (operating at the individual level). 
While theoretically plausible, this argument left some puzzles unanswered. As recognized 
in chapter 3, a domestic-politics perspective is unable to explain why petrostates of the 
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same regime type have exhibited markedly different conflict behaviors in different 
periods or localities. To answer this question, a second conceptual experiment was 
needed—one that abstracts from petrostates' internal attributes and looks more closely at 
the structural bounds (constraints and opportunities) present in their external 
environments. These environments, and their effects on petrostate conflict behavior, were 
analyzed within a system–subsystem neorealist framework, whereby the focus was on the 
global system's strongest of states, superpowers, and their penetration of regional 
subsystems containing petrostates. It was argued that regions penetrated by two 
superpowers (bipolar penetration) would see more competitive balance-of-power orders, 
increasing the prospect for petrogression. Under such conditions, superpowers would 
have reduced incentives to constrain oil-rich clients, greater incentives to arm them 
(lowering their costs of using or threatening military force), and reduced ability to 
prevent petrostate strategic (constraint-reducing) realignment (double option). Penetration 
was analyzed in two alternative ways: one that sees it as occurring independently of 
regional power relations (penetration imposed) and one that sees it as mediated by them 
(penetration invited). 
The hypotheses derived from the two conceptual experiments found strong support in the 
empirical assessments presented in chapters 4 and 5. Consistent with theory, the monadic 
tests showed that petrostates led by personalists are particularly potent conflict initiators. 
Their odds of initiating militarized disputes were found to be more than 3 times those of 
nonpersonalist petrostates, a result that persisted even when the outcome variable was 
restricted to use-of-force disputes. The effect of personalism was also evident in 
statistical models breaking up the nonpersonalist category, with despotic petrostates 
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exhibiting odds of dispute initiation about 5 times those of their democratic counterparts. 
An interesting result of these tests was that neither military nor monarchic petrostates 
were found to initiate disputes at rates significantly different from those of democracies. 
One possible reason for this result could be the relatively small sample size used in the 
analysis. It is also possible, however, that these regimes exhibit identity characteristics 
that inhibit conflict initiation. As suggested in chapter 3, monarchs face the veto power of 
the aristocracy, and may be more open to pluralistic decisionmaking as a way to maintain 
domestic legitimacy. For their part, military leaders could be more conservative in the use 
of force, not least because such use directly threatens the institution they represent. 
Like personalism, superpower penetration was shown to be a strong and significant 
predictor of petrostate conflict initiation. Petrostates located in regions penetrated by two 
superpowers were found to initiate disputes at rates more than twice those of petrostates 
located in regions with unipolar or no penetration. This estimate held consistently for two 
alternative operationalizations and measurements of penetration, increasing confidence in 
the results. The Libyan case study presented in chapter 5 provided further evidence for 
the hypothesized relationship. The detailed congruence and process-tracing analysis 
showed that, despite maintaining the same regime type (and leadership) throughout the 
study period, Libya exhibited a marked longitudinal shift in its conflict behavior. This 
shift was traced to a structural change in the country's regional environment: most of 
Libya's hostile behaviors were concentrated in the period of bipolar penetration (1969–
89) and subsided after the shift to unipolarity (1990–2005). In addition to confirming this 
pattern, the historical analysis illustrated the causal chains responsible for it. During the 
bipolar period, the superpower regional competition allowed Libya to militarize on a 
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massive scale (with superpower help) and to exploit the double option, opening more 
pathways to conflict initiation. These pathways closed after 1989, with the United States 
using its newly attained dominant position to block Libyan foreign policy revisionism. 
6.2 Research and policy implications 
Although narrowly focused on explaining patterns of petroagression, the foregoing 
arguments have broader theoretical and research implications. The domestic politics 
perspective highlights the need for resource-conflict studies to incorporate regime 
variables in their theory-building and theory-testing efforts. Comprehensive assessments 
of the environmental security literature have singled out inattention to such variables as 
one of the main obstacles to progress in the field.645 While some resource-conflict 
investigations, including those concerned with petroagression, have occasionally 
controlled for democracy, this has been done with the use of Polity scores, which are 
inadequate indicators of regime type. This is surprising because regime variables have 
been employed in research linking resources (mainly oil) to various phenomena with 
potential implications for conflict initiation. As noted in chapter 3, scholars have already 
demonstrated systematic relationships between personal rule and rent seeking, between 
ruling-coalition size and budgetary transparency, and between oil income and regime 
tenure. What the present study does is to weave such insights into a theory that accounts 
for within-group patterns of conflict initiation. 
These same considerations have mirror-image implications for the broader literature on 
autocratic conflict behavior. Since the early 2000s, that literature has recognized that 
                                                 
645 See, for example, Koubi et al., "Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?" 
12; and Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature," 389. 
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nondemocratic countries are not a monolithic category, either in terms of institutional 
characteristics or in terms of foreign policy choices. Seizing on personalism, several 
recent studies have found that despotic regimes are more prone to international violence 
than both democracies and other autocracies.646 However, these studies have advanced 
cursory explanations for their findings. As noted in the theory chapter, they have played 
down the bleak post-ouster fates of personalists, the prospect for elite unrest in those 
rulers' inner circle, and their poor performance on the battlefield—factors with potentially 
conflict-restraining effects. The domestic politics argument offered here could inform a 
more complete and defensible theory. Most obviously, it adds a resource component to 
theoretical analysis, recognizing, on the one hand, that regime institutions could 
determine how resource income is allocated domestically and, on the other, that the 
effects of that income on leaders' decisional constraints and accountability would be 
conditional on regime type. Although the focus here is on oil, nothing precludes careful 
generalizations to other resources and other nontax sources of state revenue.647 
The domestic politics perspective also highlights a critical distinction between personalist 
and nonpersonalist regimes: whereas in the former case foreign policy decisions are made 
by individuals surrounded by sycophants, in the latter they are made by collectivities. 
This distinction, seldom ceased upon in the study of despotic conflict behavior, is 
important, because decisionmaking under conditions of risk differs markedly between the 
individual and group levels. Applying insights from empirical research in political 
                                                 
646 See, for example, Peceny and Butler, "The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes"; Reiter and 
Stam, "Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation"; and Weeks, "Strongmen 
and Straw Men." 
647 Such generalizations should be made carefully because the rents obtained from oil are considerably 
higher than those obtained from other natural resources. 
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psychology suggests that personalists' conflict decisions would be more prone to 
unmotivated and motivated biases—the drivers of "wishful thinking" and inflated 
optimism (overconfidence)648—increasing the prospect for conflict initiation through 
errors of judgment. While these biases would operate independently of resource income, 
they are likely to be amplified by it, as political leaders would discount the perceived 
costs of aggression by that exogenous factor. As discussed earlier, the historical 
persistence of personalists, including those in petrostates, to initiate conflicts with 
negative returns is indicative for the presence of overconfidence. Therefore, future 
research on autocratic conflict behavior should heed more closely to psychological 
mechanisms of risk-attitude formation at the individual level. 
Broader theoretical insights could also be derived from the system-level dimension of the 
theory. Since the mid-1970s, system–subsystem approaches to the study of international 
security have been on decline, partly because of increasing scholarly attention to 
domestic determinants of state behavior and partly because of neorealism's preoccupation 
with the global level. Structural realist theories, being they globally or regionally 
oriented, have also fallen out of favor, particularly after the end of the Cold War. These 
developments, however, have arguably hampered theoretical progress. Explanations of 
conflict behavior that are grounded solely in domestic politics neglect the fact that the 
security preferences of states are bounded by external power structures, which determine 
the constraints and opportunities for foreign policy action. Likewise, structural theories 
focused solely on the global level sideline the experiences of lesser powers and cannot 
account for patterns of security interactions within and across geographical regions. 
                                                 
648 See, for example, Levy, "Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." 
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Following in the footsteps of the "environmental possibilism" tradition,649 the present 
study and its findings suggest that a system–subsystem perspective could be a valuable 
analytical tool in addressing specific empirical puzzles about the conflict experiences of 
states. 
The perspective's value is especially evident in research on oil conflict. Petroleum is a 
"structurally" scarce nonrenewable resource—that is, it is highly unequally distributed 
across countries and geographical areas.650 Its wide economic and military applications, 
along with the high rents obtained from it, also make it a vital ingredient of power and, 
hence, a natural focal point of interest for the international system's strongest of states. 
The system–subsystem perspective allows for examining the interaction between the 
global and regional levels, with a focus on their most relevant structural traits and actors. 
Although this approach was used to explain patterns of petroagression, it could also 
inform future research on scarcity (blood-oil) conflict. For example, it may be that direct 
superpower intervention in oil-rich countries would occur more frequently in conditions 
of unipolar penetration, whereby the unipole, unconstrained by an equally matched 
opponent, enjoys greater freedom of action.651 Conversely, it could be that the security 
interactions of oil-rich countries in regions contested by two or more great powers would 
be dominated by proxy-conflict dynamics as opposed to direct great power intervention. 
                                                 
649 Starr, "Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality," 390. 
650 The concept of "structural" scarcity, introduced by Homer-Dixon in his work on domestic resource 
conflict (Environment, Scarcity, and Violence), refers to unequal distribution of resources and can be 
extended to the international level. For discussion of the unique geography of oil distribution, see Klare, 
Resource Wars, 44–46. 
651 U.S. military interventions in the Middle East post 1989 provide anecdotal support for this proposition. 
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While such hypotheses certainly require more careful argumentation, they illustrate the 
types of questions that could be addressed through the framework proposed here. 
In addition to having broader implications for theory, the present study opens specific 
venues for future empirical work. One such venue is the refinement and enhancement of 
key concepts and measures. For example, data on autocratic regime type differ by source, 
and are continually reevaluated and updated. Although Geddes et al.'s regime typology 
has been used extensively, recent studies have noted that it tends to undercount the 
incidence of personalism.652 The concept of superpower penetration and that of a regional 
subsystem are also open to alternative operationalizations. The empirical assessments 
presented in chapters 4 and 5 offer such alternatives, but they are by no means 
exhaustive. Constructing quantitative measures is particularly challenging, both because 
of a lack of readily available data and because such measures are only partial 
representations of their underlying concepts (a validity concern).653 Rethinking how one 
conceptualizes conflict (the dependent variable) should also be within the sight of 
researchers. While the statistical tests presented in chapter 4 used data on militarized 
interstate disputes, the Libyan case study showed that the concept of conflict could be 
extended to other forms of aggressive behaviors, such as subversive activities abroad and 
state-sponsored terrorism. Although quantitative measures for such behaviors are not 
available, there is no compelling rationale for excluding them from descriptive analyses, 
                                                 
652 See, for example, Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men," 336. 
653 Lake's indicators of regional hierarchy ("Regional Hierarchy"), based on Buzan and Waever's regions 
(Regions and Powers), could be a starting point for developing alternative, continuous measures of 
penetration. So far, such indicators are available only for the United States, but future data collection efforts 
could extend them to other great powers. 
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especially in the case of petrostates, which can use their oil wealth to meddle in the 
internal affairs of other countries. 
Future empirical work could also make use of larger samples and more case studies. The 
sample size used here is relatively small, and expanding it could be pursued both 
longitudinally, by extending the period of analysis, and by using lower oil-income-to-
GDP thresholds or alternative measures of oil availability for determining petrostate 
status (which would increase the number of countries counted as petrostates). To produce 
meaningful tests, however, such efforts should use quality data, a challenge for some 
countries and periods, and be guided by theory, not the desire to serve a statistical 
purpose.654 If, for example, oil income is an important factor in theoretical explanation, 
as it is here, then one's identification strategy should focus on that characteristic and 
ensure that it is a persistent feature of a country's economy. Likewise, if an investigator's 
goal is to study patterns of blood-oil conflict, whereby oil-rich states are posited as 
targets of aggression, then the use of alternative measures, such as oil reserves, could be 
appropriate. One should keep in mind, however, that most quantitative work in political 
science relies on significant simplifications and methodological decisions that are 
inherently arbitrary and would not satisfy everyone. Therefore, future testing efforts 
should make use of more case studies, which allow for more complete and relevant 
descriptions of key concepts and causal mechanisms (see chapter 5). 
While the dissertation makes no normative or prescriptive claims, its theory and findings 
could also be used to inform policy. If oil exporters led by despotic rulers indeed pose 
                                                 
654 As noted by Walt and Mearsheimer, eschewing theory and operating under "the assumption that truth 
lies in the data and what matters most is empirical verification" amounts to simplistic hypothesis testing 
that cannot be trusted  ("Leaving theory behind," 438). 
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major risks to peace—and, by implication, to the health of the global economy—then the 
international community (the United Nations, individual states, regional organizations) 
should take both preventive and mitigating measures to counter those risks. Clearly, the 
most productive policy action would be one that blocks the emergence of personalist 
institutions in the first place. As noted in chapters 3 and 5, despots consolidate domestic 
power in successive power grabs and are most vulnerable in the initial period after regime 
transitions. Therefore, international policy action supporting moderate ruling factions 
should take place as early as possible, before such factions have been eliminated or 
marginalized as a political force. In the case of petrostates with established despotic 
institutions, third parties should pursue policies that raise personalists' costs of 
aggression. One such effort could focus on empowering broad-based opposition groups 
that could stage political challenges against the regime and increase its perceived 
insecurity (and ex post accountability). Most importantly, however, policy action should 
target the resources available to political leaders. As illustrated by the Libyan case study, 
diplomatic and economic sanctions (oil and arms embargoes, freezing of foreign assets, 
travel bans) could be especially effective in inducing foreign policy restraint, particularly 
if pursued multilaterally. 
It should be recognized, however, that policy action has its limits. The system-level 
dimension of the theory, along with the evidence presented in its support, suggests that 
petroagression is partly due to structural conditions that induce great power competitive 
behaviors and regional meddling. During the Cold War, for example, the two 
superpowers provided arms, incumbent protection, diplomatic cover, and other types of 
assistance to some of the most aggressive oil exporters, Libya and Iraq, eyeing to benefit 
214 
 
from their oil wealth while allowing them, sometimes through active encouragement, to 
initiate costly military conflicts, such as those against Chad and Iran. Paradoxically, then, 
policy action that might have constrained revisionist petrostates was forestalled by the 
very actors on which its adoption and success depended the most. Since the early 1990s, 
U.S. dominance in oil-rich regions, in particular the Middle East, has constrained minor 
powers, including oil exporters, producing what Benjamin Miller has called "cold 
peace."655 As the relative power of the United States continues to decline and new global 
and regional structural conditions take shape, however, a reversal to more intense 
interstate conflict dynamics is likely to obtain. If the strongest states in international 
politics have a preference for peace, then, they should resist succumbing to the types of 
self-serving behaviors that have sown instability in the past. 
A note on limitations 
Every study has limitations, and the present one is no exception. To understand these 
limitations, it is important to stress what the study does and does not attempt to answer. 
As stated in earlier chapters, the primary focus here was to develop and test theoretical 
arguments about within-group variations in the conflict behavior of petrostates. In that 
framework, petrostate status (attested by the share of oil exports revenue in a country's 
economic output) was not a variable but what scholars typically refer to as background 
(or initial) condition. That condition has already been confirmed to be associated with 
more aggressive state behavior (see chapter 2), purportedly because of some combination 
of militarization and strategic-oil mechanisms. Thus, the added explanatory layer 
introduced here sought to account for variations in conflict outcomes on the basis of 
                                                 
655 Miller, "When and How Regions Become Peaceful," 232. 
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variable interaction terms, namely, regime institutions and superpower penetration. These 
independent variables were hypothesized to mediate the conflict-inducing effects of oil 
income (the background condition) through opportunity and/or constraints-based causal 
channels. At the same time, no sweeping claims were made with respect to variations in 
outcomes across the petrostate–nonpetrostate divide. 
Despite this more modest scope, the theory developed in chapter 3 suggests that the 
foregoing variational propositions likely operate within a larger population of states. The 
domestic theoretical dimension provides logical grounds for the expectation that 
petrostates governed by despotic rulers would be more conflict prone not only than 
nonpersonalist petrostates (a relationship confirmed in chapter 4) but also than nonoil 
states of any regime type. This follows, in part, from the excess discretionary resource 
available to leaders in personalist petrostates—a resource that is either more limited or 
lacking in other cases. Coupled with the compositional and identity traits of personalism 
(small winning coalition size, outsized international ambition, etc.), this excess resource 
could be expected to move despotic petrostates to the top of the overall conflict-initiation 
ladder. Indeed, the Libyan case study, while focused primarily on testing hypothesis 2, 
provides some preliminary support for this theoretical extension, contrasting Qaddafi's 
conflict behavior both with that of his predecessor and with that of proximate states that 
fall outside of the personalist and petrostate categories. 
Broader predictive claims can also be inferred from the system-level dimension of the 
theory. As noted in chapter 3, bipolar (or multipolar) penetration would be expected to 
create more competitive balance-of-power regional orders, increasing the conflict 
propensity of all subsystem members. It also implies, however, that this conflict 
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propensity would be more pronounced among local petrostates, which can use their oil 
income to more easily overcome constraints imposed by penetrating superpowers. One 
channel identified as working in that direction was the double option, which, while 
available to all regional states, was seen as more salient in the case of petrostates, whose 
oil income could serve as a potent foreign policy tool in any effort toward achieving 
strategic realignment or extracting concessions from incumbent great power patrons. 
From the perspective of penetrating superpowers, petrostates' oil wealth was also seen as 
an indirect offensive asset (absent in nonoil states) that could fuel a proxy competition 
through the sale of arms (militarization) and petrodollar recycling. As detailed in the 
discussion of bipolar penetration in the Middle East, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union took advantage of this opportunity, intensifying the conflict dynamics of 
the subsystem (see chapter 5). 
These broader propositions spanning the petrostate–nonpetrostate divide are certainly in 
want of further elaboration and empirical confirmation. Historical examples and previous 
research cited extensively in the theory and case-study chapters provide some preliminary 
indication for the propositions' real-world plausibility. Yet, readers should keep in mind 
that these broader hypotheses are not tested directly in the present study, whose primary 
aim was theoretical development. Research on petroagression is still in its infancy, and 
the conceptual building blocks and empirical answers offered herein leave ample room 
for future work that could confirm, strengthen, or weaken them. Theoretical efforts that 
cross the petrostate–nonpetrostate divide should be especially attentive to resource curse 
effects, which are known to have both economic and domestic political implications (see 
chapter 2). Overcoming data collection limitations, which were one reason for the more 
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modest empirical approach chosen for this project, should be the highest priority of 
researchers. As noted earlier, developing global regional classifications, quantitative 
measures of great power penetration, and other data that cover all states in the 
international system are formidable challenges that would require extensive primary 
research. It is the author's hope that this task will be taken up in future efforts. 
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